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ABSTRACT
STOCHASTIC DYNAMIC OPTIMIZATION MODELS
FOR SOCIETAL RESOURCE ALLOCATION
FEBRUARY 2014
ARMAGAN BAYRAM
B.Sc., ISTANBUL TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY
M.Sc., ISTANBUL TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Senay Solak
We study a class of stochastic resource allocation problems that specifically deals
with effective utilization of resources in the interest of social value creation. These
problems are treated as a separate class of problems mainly due to the nonprofit
nature of the application areas, as well as the abstract structure of social value def-
inition. As part of our analysis of these unique characteristics in societal resource
allocation, we consider two major application areas involving such decisions.
The first application area deals with resource allocations for foreclosed housing ac-
quisitions as part of the response to the foreclosure crisis in the U.S. Two stochastic
dynamic models are developed and analyzed for these types of problems. In the first
model, we consider strategic resource allocation decisions by community development
corporations (CDCs), which aim to minimize the negative effects of foreclosures by ac-
quiring, redeveloping and selling foreclosed properties in their service areas. We model
iv
this strategic decision process through different types of stochastic mixed-integer pro-
gramming formulations, and present alternative solution approaches. We also apply
the models to real-world data obtained through interactions with a CDC, and perform
both policy related and computational analyses. Based on these analyses, we present
some general policy insights involving tradeoffs between different societal objectives,
and also discuss the efficiency of exact and heuristic solution approaches for the mod-
els. In the second model, we consider a tactical resource allocation problem, and
identify socially optimal policies for CDCs in dynamically selecting foreclosed prop-
erties for acquisition as they become available over time. The analytical results based
on a dynamic programming model are then implemented in a case study involving a
CDC, and social return based measures defining selectivity rates at different budget
levels are specified.
The second application area involves dynamic portfolio management approaches
for optimization of surgical team compositions in robotic surgeries. For this problem,
we develop a stochastic dynamic model to identify policies for optimal team configu-
rations, where optimality is defined based on the minimum experience level required
to achieve the maximum attainable performance over all ranges of feasible experience
measures. We derive individual and dependent performance values of each surgical
team member by using data on operating room time and team member experience,
and then use them as inputs to a stochastic programming based framework that we
develop. Several insights and guidelines for dynamic staff allocation to surgical teams
are then proposed based on the analytical and numerical results derived from the
model.
v
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
We study resource allocation problems where mainly social benefits and non-
quantitative objectives are considered in determining the allocation of the resources.
Resource allocation can be defined as the systematic use of scarce resources, especially
in the near term, to achieve goals for the future.
Because of its social characteristics, our problem falls into the research area of
community-based operations research (CBOR) which is a new sub-discipline within
operations research and the management sciences. CBOR was created to provide
operations research expertise to public sector that addresses societal problems such
as poverty, homelessness and equity. Like other areas of public sector operations re-
search, the objective function is not directly profit maximization or cost minimization,
rather it is mostly related to the maximization of social utility and welfare (Johnson,
2011).
In general, CBOR is a well-studied field of problem structuring methods and soft
systems methodologies, but quantitative focus involving many of operations research
methodologies has been limited. On the other hand, given that most of the real-
world resource allocation problems include uncertainty in the problem parameters,
stochastic optimization is one of the quantitative tools that can be used to model
societal resource allocation problems.
In this thesis, we propose stochastic dynamic modeling methodologies to solve
certain societal problems based on two motivating applications. The non-financial
structure of the objectives, which require an additional phase of objective definition
1
in model development, as well as the similarity of the implemented methodologies in
these problems form the common elements among a seemingly diverse set of applica-
tion areas.
In the remainder of this chapter we describe the methodologies that we utilize in
our analyses and present the specifics of the two motivating applications that form
the focus of our research.
1.1 Methodology
1.1.1 Stochastic Programming
Stochastic programming (SP) with recourse is a method for solving optimization
problems where there is uncertainty. Dantzig (1955) was the first to introduce a
recourse model where the solution could be adapted based on the outcome of a random
event. Since then, the field of SP has grown and become an important tool for
optimization under uncertainty.
A stochastic program results when some of the parameters in a mathematical pro-
gram are described as random variables. A key assumption in SP is that probability
distributions of these random parameters are known. The objective of SP is to iden-
tify a feasible policy that minimizes or maximizes the expected value of a function
of decision variables and parameters over all possible realizations of the random vari-
ables. The most widely studied SP models are two-stage models. In these problems,
a decision is made at the beginning of the first stage without any certainty as to
the values of the random parameters. At the beginning of the second stage, after
observations regarding the uncertain parameters are made during the first stage, a
recourse decision can be made to compensate for or fine-tune the first-stage action.
The optimal policy for a two stage model includes the best decision in the first stage
considering the possible realizations of the random parameters, as well as the best
recourse decision in the second stage for each possible realization. A generalization
2
of the two-stage problems is multistage SP models. In these models, a sequential
structure exists, in which certain decisions are made at the beginning of each stage,
followed by observations of the random parameters during that stage.
1.1.2 Dynamic Programming
Dynamic programming is a methodology for sequential decision making over pe-
riods which was originally used in the 1940s by Richard Bellman to describe the
process of solving problems where one needs to find the best decisions one after an-
other Puterman (1994). At each decision epoch, a decision maker observes the state
of a system and chooses an action, and then gets an immediate reward and moves to
a new state according to the probability distribution determined by the action choice.
Because of the dynamical structure of the problem, this process continues, but now
the system may be in a different state and there may be a different set of actions.
Different from stochastic programming, dynamic programming involves many deci-
sion epochs and few constraints, so solution approaches proposed for these methods
are different from each other. The value of each state at a given time can be found
by working backwards, using a recursive relationship called the Bellman equation.
Bellman’s equation is useful because it reduces the choice of a sequence of decision
rules to a sequence of choices for the control variable. There are different algorithms
to solve dynamic programming problems suitability of which depend on the planning
horizon. For instance, backward induction is a methodology used for finite horizon
problems, while it is not appropriate for infinite horizon problems as there is no last
period in which to start. A dynamic programming model is symbolically represented
in Figure 1.1.
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Current Decision Epoch Next Decision Epoch
Action Action
Reward Reward
Figure 1.1. Symbolic representation of a dynamic programming problem.
1.2 Motivating Application: Nonprofit Foreclosed Housing
Acquisition
The recent U.S. economic recession has had adverse effects in all sectors of the
economy, particularly residential housing. A root cause of the recession was a dra-
matic increase in mortgage foreclosures, originating in decreases in home price appre-
ciation that amplified the effects of increases in mortgage rates and the number of
risky mortgage origination (Bernanke, 2008). The impacts of this crisis on the U.S.
housing market have been broad and profound: there have been substantial decreases
in housing values, home equity, home sales, and total housing starts (Joint Center
for Housing Studies, 2009). As a result, home foreclosures have resulted in massive
losses of consumer wealth: on average U.S. households lost $2.2 trillion in home value
over the last four years, with losses totaling around $3 trillion in 2011 (CNN, 2009;
Business Insider, 2012).
Policies to mitigate these losses include efforts to reduce the number of foreclosed
homes in neighborhoods, which in turn will result in the appreciation of home prices
and stabilization of the housing market. For example, U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development has established a neighborhood stabilization program, which
provides billions of dollars as assistance to state and local governments in the acqui-
sition and rehabilitation of foreclosed property (HUD, 2008). Similar initiatives also
exist at local or regional levels in many states. Key actors in these efforts with access
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to several federal and state funds are nonprofit community development corporations
(CDCs), which acquire and rehabilitate foreclosed properties in their service areas
using resources available to them. CDCs are local organizations that provide services
and engage in other activities to build and revive neighborhoods. When a foreclosed
property is put on sale, an important advantage for CDCs and other similar entities
is their priority in making offers on the property. This is due to requirements put in
place by most financial institutions through the National First Look Program, which
provide owner occupants and public entities that are committed to the community an
early opportunity to bid for a foreclosed property. As part of this policy, only offers
from owner occupants and buyers using public funds are considered during the first
15 days a property is on the market, and offers from investors are considered only
after the first 15 days have passed. This allows for a higher likelihood of a successful
offer for CDCs due to the relatively fewer competitors in the process (Axel-Lute and
Hersh, 2011).
CDCs exist in nearly every major urban area of the United States with approx-
imately 5,000 CDCs spread throughout all 50 states (Community Wealth, 2012).
Given the large number of CDCs operating in different parts of the U.S., the decision
problems they face in their efforts to respond to the foreclosure problem have impli-
cations for the overall economy and public good. This is especially of importance,
as the foreclosure crisis is not yet over, and the limited resources need to be used as
effectively as possible to meet the challenges of the current or any other future crisis.
1.2.1 Strategic Societal Resource Allocation
In this motivating application area, we focus on the strategic resource allocation
problem faced by CDCs. Strategic resource allocations need to consider potential
availability and acquisitions of individual foreclosed units in the future, as well as
the social impacts associated with these acquisitions which are all redeveloped and
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placed on market for sale. Given that all acquired properties are redeveloped, by
acquisition we imply both the acquisition and redevelopment activities on a property
unless noted otherwise in the study. Another key issue is that all these decisions are
made under uncertainty, as several relevant inputs for the decision making process
are determined by the state of the local and national economy, which is inherently
uncertain. For example, the number of foreclosures to occur in a given region over
the planning horizon, the purchase price of a foreclosed property, as well as the value
generated by an acquired property are directly related to the economic conditions,
and thus are not known in advance. Our decision framework is intended to capture
these complexities in determining optimal resource allocations to different geograph-
ical regions by considering the specific acquisition decisions to be made in response
to different realizations of future uncertainty. Our objective in this application is to
develop tractable decision models whose solutions can provide general guidance to
CDCs as they attempt to define priorities and budget allocations for residential real
estate investments, which are intended to minimize the negative local impacts associ-
ated with housing foreclosures. To this end, we develop strategic resource allocation
models under uncertainty, apply these multi-period stochastic models to a case study
of a community-based organization, and discuss the solutions with respect to their
policy implications and computational efficiency.
1.2.2 Tactical Societal Resource Allocation
In the second part of this motivating application we focus on tactical decisions that
are led by CDCs in urban neighborhoods to support neighborhood stabilization and
revitalization. Since the scale of the foreclosure crisis in most neighborhoods exceeds
the response capacity of any particular CDC, our fundamental research question is
the following: Given resource limitations and the uncertainty on the impacts of the
6
foreclosure crisis, what are socially optimal acquisition policies that a CDC should
implement while selecting foreclosed properties for potential acquisition?
A CDC seeking to purchase a foreclosed property faces a decision problem under
uncertainty: should they make an offer on a given property - with a certain proba-
bility of success -, or should they wait for another property which may have a higher
value for neighborhood stabilization? And if an offer is to be made on a property,
what should be the offer amount? These decision alternatives are complicated by the
fact that a property with a greater probability of high social returns may have higher
costs than one with a lower probability of high social returns. Our approach to this
problem involves a dynamic and stochastic resource allocation model where a limited
budget is allocated dynamically to maintain an optimal portfolio of acquired prop-
erties. Each property has some associated cost defined by the dollar value required
for purchase, and return defined by a social utility value, also defined in dollars. The
problem involves stochasticity due to the uncertainty in the costs and returns of the
properties, as well as their availability based on the conditions of the housing market
and foreclosures. The costs and returns of properties are characterized by probability
distributions, and are known for a property that has become available for potential
bidding or acquisition. Upon observing the cost and return value of a property that
arrives randomly over time, a CDC decides on whether to make an offer on the prop-
erty, and if so how much to offer. Through our analysis, we obtain analytical and
numerical results that characterize the optimal policies for a CDC under the cases
with and without a deadline at which time the budget expires.
1.3 Motivating Application: Team Allocation in Robotic
Surgery
Robotic surgery is a method to perform surgery using very small tools attached to
a robotic arm where the surgeon controls the robotic arm through a computer. The
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use of robotic surgery has many advantages over open or conventional surgeries, as it
results in reduced surgical error rates, shorter recovery times, and reduced levels of
patient scarring and other lasting effects of surgery. In 1985 a robot, the Unimation
Puma 200, was first used in a surgery to place a needle and then in 1988 a robot was
developed to perform prostatic surgery. Four years later in 1992, another robotic sys-
tem was introduced to mill out precise fittings in the femur for hip replacement (Ebme
Articles, 2013). Nowadays, the Da Vinci surgical system, which is the most sophisti-
cated robotic platform designed to expand a surgeon’s capabilities, is widely used in
a variety of operations such as gynecologic, cardiovascular, or urological surgeries.
Applications of robotic surgery and its importance have increased dramatically
over time, and more than 300 hospitals across the United States currently use surgical
robots in their procedures (GLG, 2013). Besides its benefits, the robotic systems are
costly investments and have complex, time-consuming setups, requiring additional
training or experience for the entire surgery team (Lanfranco et al., 2004; Wall et al.,
2008). More specifically, each robotic system ranges in price from $1 million to $2.5
million, and the use of robotic surgery increases the cost of procedures anywhere from
$3,000 to $8,000 (Creators.com, 2010).
Given the high costs and the increasingly common usage of robots in surgeries,
it has become essential to evaluate operating room efficiency and cost effectiveness
in these types of surgeries. It is clear that the composition of the surgical team,
and the experience and competence of each team member play an important role in
all surgeries, but it is especially of significance in robotic surgery. This is because
the surgeon is not immediately at the bedside during the major components of the
procedure, and several steps are performed by other team members during the surgery.
Such steps, which require skill development by all team members, include docking of
the robot, some surgical manipulation, and troubleshooting for minor technical and
operational aspects of this highly sophisticated procedure.
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The surgical team always includes a primary surgeon, who operates the surgery
and uses the robot as necessary. A first assistant who is usually a designated physi-
cian assistant (PA) but sometimes another physician, assists the surgeon during the
surgery, and is mainly responsible for robot docking and positioning. A nurse anes-
thetist provides anesthesia care during the surgery. The surgical team also includes a
scrub technician, referred to as a scrub tech (ST), who works under the supervision
of the surgeon, and handles the instruments, scrubs, medications, and other supplies
during the surgical procedure. In addition, a circulating nurse (CN) “circulates” the
operating room, ensuring proper procedures are being followed. Some of his/her re-
sponsibilities include preparing the operating room and all the required equipment,
staying in the room during the surgery, and aiding in counting the equipment after the
surgery. These tasks that each team member perform in robotic surgery differ with
respect to those in a classical surgery, mainly due to the surgeon not being directly
performing the operation, as well as due to the different procedures and equipments
used.
Overall, the role that each surgical team member plays during the surgery is cru-
cial and essential. Moreover, given the higher level of dependence of tasks in robotic
surgery, any mishaps by any member can affect the performance of the entire team.
Hence, the composition of the surgical team, specifically the joint experience, compe-
tence and cohesion among surgical team members are key determinants of efficiency
and effectiveness in a robotic surgery. In many cases, failure to work together ef-
fectively has been cited as a common cause of adverse events and errors in surgery
(Jeffcott, 2009). On the other hand, it is important to note that the ability to work
as a team is a dynamic behavior that is acquired over time.
Our analysis in this application is based on the observation that although the
individual experiences of team members make a difference in a robotic surgery, there
may be an optimal combination of experiences and an optimal team composition,
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defined by the individual and joint number of surgeries performed. Considering this
observation, in this study we aim to answer the following questions: (1) Given a
range of potential experience measures for each team member, how would operating
room performance vary as a function of these experience measures, and what is the
marginal value of an increase in the experience of a specific team member? (2) What
is an optimal team configuration, where optimality is defined based on the minimum
experience level required to achieve the maximum attainable performance over all
ranges of feasible experience measures?
Our methodology to answer these questions involve several statistical analyses, as
well as a stochastic programming approach that is used to identify optimal team con-
figurations by taking into account the dynamics of learning and experience building
over time. The analyses are based on actual robotic surgery data involving records
of around 400 robotic sacrocolpopexy operations, i.e. urologic and pelvic surgeries.
1.4 A Cohesive Framework for the Two Motivating Applica-
tions
In this thesis, we combine the problems described as part of the two motivat-
ing applications above under the general framework of stochastic dynamic societal
resource allocation models. More specifically, we note that the objectives in these
applications involve social dimensions which are different from classical applications
with cost or profit based objectives. The social perspective in these problems re-
quires additional phases in model building which involve definitions of social value.
This is typically not necessary in cost based optimization. Another common element
in the presented analyses in this thesis is the set of methodological approaches used,
as all three problems are modeled and solved using stochastic dynamic optimization
procedures.
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Figure 1.2. Conceptual map showing the relationship between the applications
studied in this thesis.
In the foreclosed housing acquisition problem, a number of social objectives are
considered. For the strategic planning model, these include measures such as collec-
tive efficacy, equity based on budget allocation rate, social utility and equity based on
owner occupation of properties, while the tactical planning model uses only a social
utility measure. Note that the strategic and tactical models for the foreclosed hous-
ing acquisition problem are connected and sequential. A CDC would first perform
strategic planning involving budget allocations to different neighborhoods, and then
given the budget allocations, tactical acquisition decisions for individual properties
are made. These two decision problems are both addressed through stochastic dy-
namic optimization models, which is the general methodological structure combining
all the applications in the thesis.
In our second application, the objective involves the maximization of performance
in robotic surgical operations. Performance in this setting is defined by operating
room time which is a proxy for health and safety based social value. More specifically,
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reduced operating room time through better utilization of team members implies fewer
complications and faster recovery periods, which directly relate to benefits realized
for patients or the society in general. The resulting problem is modeled and solved
through a stochastic programming approach, which again represents the stochastic
dynamic structure in the applications studied in this thesis.
To better display the cohesive framework for the two motivating applications in
this thesis, in Figure 1.2 we show a conceptual map that we envision for stochastic
dynamic societal resource allocation problems in general, which also displays where
our three analyses fall within this framework. We assume that stochastic dynamic
resource allocation problems with social objectives can be categorized based on the
types of application area defined for community based operations research. To this
end, Johnson and Smilowitz (2007) provide a taxonomy consisting of four major areas:
nonprofit management, community development, public health and safety, and human
services. Each of these application areas involves of a variety of resource allocation
problems. Nonprofit management points out common problems in management of
community-based or community-oriented service providers (Berenguer, 2013), while
community development applications address economic growth and welfare improve-
ment of segregated communities. Some subareas of community development can
be listed as housing, community/urban planning, and transportation (Johnson and
Smilowitz, 2007). One sample resource allocation study in this area includes Johnson
et al. (2010), where the authors propose a deterministic and static multi-objective
integer program for foreclosed housing acquisition and redevelopment by allocating
available resources to different acquisitions. In public health and safety, general issues
related to the public wellness and security are covered, such as healthcare, criminal
justice, food insecurity, emergency studies, and dangerous/undesirable facility loca-
tion. Aaby et al. (2006) and Bodily (1978) are two resource allocation related studies
in the literature related to public health. In the first paper, Aaby et al. (2006) propose
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models for clinics to improve resource planning activities in their contagious disease
management decisions, where the authors use discrete event simulations and queuing
models as their methodologies. Bodily (1978) investigate a police sector planning
problem where the workloads of the police officers are equalized by satisfying service
equity and system efficiency. As another major area, humanitarian services typically
include studies in public education, family supportive services, humanitarian logistics,
and public libraries. Related to this field of study, Campbell et al. (2008) propose
models to ensure both equity and efficiency during the allocation of the resources after
a disaster. Another example involves the library vehicle fleet management problem
studied by Francis et al. (2006), where the authors build models to improve vehicle
routing operations and management by considering budget limitations of the library.
Our first application in the thesis can be placed in the intersection of nonprofit
management and community development, because the foreclosed housing acquisition
activities of a CDC can be classified as being related to both nonprofit management
and housing/urban planning. On the other hand, we classify our second application
under the public health and safety application area, as it involves a social value based
implementation based on practice at a private hospital. Overall, as depicted through
Figure 1.2, the three studies presented in this paper fall under the umbrella of the
larger class of stochastic dynamic societal resource allocation problems, which con-
stitute relatively small but relevant components - especially as the first such models
in the corresponding application areas.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
In this section, we discuss the relevant literature separately for the two main mo-
tivating applications in our analysis. To this end, we first present a summary of the
relevant literature on the foreclosed housing acquisition problem, and then discuss
related studies in surgical team allocation. The discussions also include references to
dynamic stochastic resource allocation problems in general. In addition, we also dis-
cuss in this chapter how this thesis contributes to the corresponding areas of research.
2.1 Related Research on Foreclosed Housing Acquisition
The foreclosed housing acquisition problem faced by CDCs is a stochastic resource
allocation problem where a limited budget is allocated to maximize expected social re-
turns. One stream of research on these problems involves dynamic resource allocation
decisions on a set of given investment options, attributes of which evolve stochasti-
cally over time. Some examples to these studies include Mild and Salo (2009), where
the authors develop a multi-criteria decision model for the allocation of resources to
road maintenance activities, and Loch and Kavadias (2002), who develop a dynamic
model for allocating resources to different new product development projects and
identify analytical solutions by considering different types of return functions. Bert-
simas and Popescu (2003) and Calafiore (2008) are other examples where dynamic
policies are investigated for allocating scarce resources to stochastic demand through
approximation based procedures.
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In addition to these studies, Chalabi et al. (2008) propose a two-stage stochastic
mathematical programming formulation to optimally allocate resources within and
between healthcare programs when there is an exogenous budget and the parameters
of the healthcare models are uncertain. Chalabi et al. (2008) limit their analysis to
a small-scale two stage formulation without any algorithmic discussion or numerical
analysis. In contrast to Solak et al. (2010), our first application addresses multiple
objectives, including a measure of social utility, and uses novel return functions.
As a stochastic resource allocation model with a multi-objective structure, Medaglia
et al. (2007) describe allocating limited resources to R&D projects by considering
multi-criteria under uncertainty. Cheng et al. (2003) propose an investment strat-
egy model for firms based on two-stage multi-objective optimization framework. The
problem formulation leads to a multi-objective Markov decision problem representa-
tion, which is used to define Pareto optimal design strategies. Our first application
extends the limited scope of Medaglia et al. (2007), which is static and uses a Monte
Carlo simulation analysis, and extends that of Cheng et al. (2003) through the use of
multi-stage stochastic programming.
Given the knapsack-type offer/no-offer decisions on properties that become avail-
able over time in the foreclosed housing acquisition decision process, a more relevant
stream of research is the literature on dynamic stochastic knapsack problems. These
problems have been formally defined by Kleywegt and Papastavrou (1998), where
the authors study optimal acceptance policies for equal-sized items that arrive ran-
domly over time with stochastic return structures. This framework is then extended
by Kleywegt and Papastavrou (2001) to include items with random sizes. These
two papers form the basis for some other studies in the literature, which involve
models and solution approaches proposed for various applications with a dynamic
stochastic knapsack structure. One such application is Kilic et al. (2010), where the
authors study a model for raw material allocation in food production and propose a
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heuristic algorithm to derive an optimal policy. Similarly, Dizdar et al. (2011) derive
simple policies under some limiting assumptions for revenue-maximization based gen-
eral resource allocation problems. In another general analysis, Lu (2005) proposes a
computational procedure to calculate the optimal policy for infinite horizon dynamic
stochastic knapsack problems. In addition, Lin et al. (2008) apply stochastic knapsack
type models in revenue management and dynamic pricing, while Nikolaev and Jacob-
son (2010) study resource allocation to a random number of jobs and present optimal
policies for the sequential stochastic assignment problem. All these studies involve
variations of the dynamic stochastic knapsack problem with different characteristics
or algorithmic implementations in various applications. Our second application adds
to this stream of research by considering a distinct application in the nonprofit sector,
and extends this general framework by considering additional decisions, such as the
selection of an overbid rate when making offers to selected foreclosed properties.
For housing policy based literature, we note that while foreclosures have many
negative impacts on neighborhoods Kingsley et al. (2009), data limitations generally
result in analyses of property value impacts of foreclosures. Campbell et al. (2009) use
regression analyses of house prices and extend their analysis to estimate the total lost
value from properties proximate to a foreclosed unit. Harding et al. (2009) estimate
different effects on sales of non-distressed properties also by using regression analysis
and present findings related to specific features of neighborhoods, foreclosed units, or
the surrounding market conditions. Harding et al. (2009), along with Schuetz et al.
(2008), also assess the impact of multiple foreclosures in an area, where the authors
conclude that the number of proximate foreclosures generally multiplies the effects
on neighboring house prices. In contrast to these descriptive and exploratory studies,
our prescriptive decision models are intended to mitigate these negative impacts.
There also exist some related works on CDCs and their involvement in housing
markets through property acquisitions. Swanstrom et al. (2009) describe acquisi-
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tion strategies that CDCs employ to acquire and redevelop foreclosed housing, and
NeighborWorks (2009) describes the difference of these strategies from those used for
traditional community development. Key challenges encountered by CDCs during
implementation of foreclosure acquisition and redevelopment strategies are investi-
gated by Bratt (2009). Based on the observations from those studies, Simon (2009)
describes some suggestions for CDCs and policy makers to implement. We add to this
qualitative literature through a quantitative rigorous approach aimed to help CDCs
in their long term strategic decision processes.
A relevant stream of research for the traditional housing market that focuses
on purchasing strategies also exists. Such an analysis is performed by Drew et al.
(2001), where the authors use regression analysis to measure competitiveness and
offer a purchasing strategy model in selecting which properties to bid for. In another
related paper, Yao and Zhang (2005) develop optimal dynamic portfolio decisions
on housing investments for individual investors over a lifetime. Different from us,
they build a long term economic model using a dynamic programming structure,
and present some numerical analysis. Unlike these papers, we explicitly consider
stochasticity in a portfolio model involving both near and long term decisions, as
well as multiple objectives, in our first application. Moreover, we specifically address
both the budget allocation and foreclosed property acquisition decisions for CDCs
with social objectives, which differs significantly from the decisions of an individual
investor.
There are a few recent papers that directly address problems similar to those
we study in this thesis. These involve Johnson et al. (2010), where the authors
describe the formulation and solution of a deterministic and static multi-objective
integer program for foreclosed housing acquisition and redevelopment, applied to
multifamily foreclosed housing in a small city. Bayram et al. (2011a) and Bayram et al.
(2011b) investigate optimal policies for resource allocation and foreclosed property
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acquisition under some restrictive assumptions such as dominancy, in which the social
utility values of different property categories are assumed to follow a dominancy based
relationship throughout the planning period. By building on the framework discussed
in these papers, we model and analyze the dynamic stochastic decision process for
nonprofit housing investments over multiple periods.
2.2 Related Research on Surgical Team Allocation
The surgical team allocation problem we study falls into the general category of
performance based team allocation problems. We summarize some relevant descrip-
tive and prescriptive models for team performance and discuss their applicability to
the problem we study. There are many papers involving data based analyses of med-
ical team performance, where the factors affecting team performance are determined
through statistical analysis. Cassera et al. (2009) and Burtscher et al. (2011) show
the importance of information sharing during a surgery, and suggests enhancing com-
munication to improve the overall surgical team performance. In addition to these
studies, Ortega et al. (2013) note that team learning through experience has a signifi-
cant effect on nurse performances. Fransen et al. (2012) also highlight the importance
of experience and team training, specifically focusing on obstetric surgeries. Different
from these descriptive studies, in our study we provide a team performance function
based on statistical analysis, and utilize this function to prescribe an optimal team
composition structure.
Although there exist some studies that focus on optimal team composition to
maximize expected utility, Zakarian and Kusiak (1999) note that multi-functional
team selection/formation process is a complex problem for which comprehensive an-
alytical approaches are difficult to obtain. Hence, studies in this area are mostly
limited approaches. Some studies consider team formation by using the analytical
hierarchy process (AHP), where they solve a linear programming model to find opti-
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mal team compositions. As an example, Chen and Lin (2004) develop an analytical
hierarchy model to aid in establishing an efficient multifunctional team by selecting
team members for each project according to their skills. Zakarian and Kusiak (1999)
also develop a methodology which is based on the AHP approach and the quality
function deployment method for determining optimal team formations. In another
paper, Zhang and Zhang (2013) propose a multi-objective team formation optimiza-
tion model for new product development projects by considering capabilities and
interpersonal relationships of all members, and again address the problem through
AHP. Distinct from such studies, in our application we develop a stochastic dynamic
team optimization model and address the problem through stochastic programming
methods.
For additional relevant research, Slomp and Suresh (2005) build a multi-objective
goal programming model for the problem of assigning operators to teams that work
in three daily-shift systems. They propose a two phase solution approach in which
the shift systems, machines and the sizes of each shift team are identified first, and
in the second phase the team members are assigned to the corresponding teams.
Team formation models are also applicable to the sport teams. For example, Ahmed
et al. (2012) define a constrained multi-objective optimization model in selection of
players for a cricket team using a finite budget. The authors propose a multi-objective
evolutionary metaheuristic to optimize the overall batting and bowling strength of a
team with eleven players. Unlike these papers, we identify the optimal assignment of
available surgery team members to each operation dynamically over time, in order to
improve expected performance over all operations by considering the uncertainty in
observed performances.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no literature that specifically addresses
optimal team formation in healthcare applications, where the team assignments are
made according to experiences and performances of team members. Team allocation
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is typically integrated into scheduling models, where the performance of all physicians
and nurses are assumed to be the same. On the other hand, there are several studies
on nurse and physician scheduling, where cost minimization is mainly considered. We
summarize below some of these team scheduling and planning studies, and how our
study complements these analyses.
As an example to assignment and staffing problems in healthcare, Stolletz and
Brunner (2011) addresses a shift scheduling problem in which physicians are assigned
to demand periods to minimize the paid out hours by integrating physician preferences
and fairness aspects into the scheduling model. In another paper, Choi and Wilhelm
(2013) develop a block scheduling policy by proposing a newsvendor-based model in
order to minimize the sum of expected lateness and earliness costs in surgeries. In
addition to these studies, Wright and Mahar (2012) and Dowsland (1998) develop
scheduling models where the objective is to ensure that enough nurses are on duty
at all times while taking account individual preferences and requests for days off to
treat all employees fairly. Another relevant paper is a literature review on operating
room planning and scheduling, where the authors evaluate and list the literature on
multiple fields that are related to either the problem setting or the technical features
(Cardoen et al., 2010). As an optimal team configuration study, Harper et al. (2009)
propose a method to find optimal size and skill-mixes for nursing teams to match with
patient needs through combining simulation and optimization tools. They consider
the demand uncertainty and dynamically identify the size and mix of the teams
based on changing patient needs over time. In addition, Bordoloi and Weatherby
(1999) present a linear program to determine the optimum mix of different staff
categories for a hospital medical unit, where cost is minimized subject to constraints
of patient demand and minimum staffing policies. Different from these papers, in our
application we assign team members based on their experiences in order to maximize
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the minimum performance over all teams, where surgery time is taken as the main
performance measure.
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CHAPTER 3
STRATEGIC SOCIETAL RESOURCE ALLOCATION IN
FORECLOSED HOUSING ACQUISITION
Consider a CDC making strategic decisions in advance of a planning horizon for
their property acquisition investments. These decisions may involve prioritization
and resource allocation to individual geographically distinct service areas, which we
refer to as ‘neighborhoods’. It is assumed that the strategic resource allocation deci-
sions will be made at the beginning of the planning horizon and certain information
will become available over subsequent planning periods. Tactical acquisition deci-
sions, i.e. those involving specific purchasing decisions for available properties, will
be made based on this information as well as the probabilistic information on social
and economic impacts of each acquisition. The resource in our problem refers to an
available budget, while the planning periods are typically defined in years. Hence,
such terms are used interchangeably throughout the study.
A more specific representation of this general decision process is depicted visually
in Figure 3.1, which can be described as follows. The decision maker, i.e. the CDC,
initially decides on a tentative budget allocation to each neighborhood. Subsequently,
properties become available for acquisition, i.e. foreclosures occur over time, and
their acquisition costs become known to the CDC. Once this information is available,
individual acquisition decisions are made under uncertain return characteristics. The
process can continue for multiple periods where resource reallocations can take place
based on any new information that becomes available. Hence, depending on the
planning horizon considered, this process can be represented through a two-stage or
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Figure 3.1. The general decision process for the strategic foreclosed housing acqui-
sition problem.
multi-stage decision structure. The models we develop capture these different levels
of complexity in the problem.
A key assumption in this strategic planning framework is that information on all
foreclosed properties, particularly acquisition costs, in a particular planning period
is available immediately after the resource allocation decision is made, and tactical
acquisition decisions are made based on such information. In reality, however, real
estate development is a dynamic process, and tactical acquisitions are performed
over time as properties become available. Given the strategic planning nature of the
problem and the relatively small gap in dynamic and static tactical decision making
in this setting, we believe that this assumption does not detract significantly from
the validity of the model.
The goal in the foreclosed housing acquisition problem (FHAP) is to decide on an
initial strategic resource allocation plan such that an expected value function based
on multiple potentially conflicting criteria is optimized. In other words, the problem
is:
max
x∈X
EΨ
[
max
h∈H(x)
[G(x, h,Ψ)]
]
(3.1)
where G(x, h,Ψ) is a function based on multiple objectives, with x ∈ X representing
the resource allocation decisions that take on values in the feasible set X , h ∈ H(x)
modeling the tactical acquisitions to be made based on the allocations as defined
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by the set H(x), and Ψ being a vector of random parameters with known joint
probability distributions. This vector of random parameters corresponds to costs,
availabilities and returns of properties in the service area of a CDC. To allow for a
tractable stochastic programming approach, we assume discrete distributions of these
random parameters, and refer to each possible realization ψ ∈ Ψ as a scenario with
a corresponding probability pψ. Using this framework, we develop two stochastic
programming approaches to the problem with different levels of complexity, which
we describe in detail below. We note here that our models are based on interac-
tions with CDCs and are thus informed by an inclusive, and cross-disciplinary view
of community-based or community-oriented decision modeling.
3.1 Model I: FHAP with Simple Resource Allocation
(FHAP-S)
First, we consider a basic strategic resource allocation framework that is typically
applicable for annual planning. While an annual timeline may be short for most
strategic planning problems, the CDC operations and specifically fund availabilities
are strictly dependent on the condition of the economy and government policies.
Hence, a very long strategic planning framework is not typical for these organizations.
On the other hand, our general modeling framework is flexible enough to handle
longer planning periods, and indeed the more advanced models in Section 3.2 are
typically applicable to a multi-year planning structure. In FHAP with simple resource
allocation, which we refer to as FHAP-S, we consider a planning horizon consisting
of two decision periods where initially a budget allocation decision is made, followed
by acquisition decisions determined according to realizations of foreclosed property
availability, costs and expected returns.
We assume that a CDC can acquire units from a set of foreclosed properties N .
Each property is associated with a neighborhood i ∈ I, based on its geographic lo-
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cation, and a category l ∈ L, based on a pre-defined categorization scheme such that
properties in each category have similar characteristics some of which are stochas-
tic and dependent on external market environments. The CDC wants to determine
the optimal amount of budget xi to be allocated to neighborhood i given a limited
available budget B, and potential future acquisition decisions hψil. The acquisition
decisions hψil denote the number of properties of category l ∈ L acquired from neigh-
borhood i ∈ I under scenario ψ ∈ Ψ.
3.1.1 Model Inputs
Model formulations for our decision framework involve several probabilistic and
deterministic parameters. While we describe them in detail in this section, a summary
list of these parameters is also provided in Appendix A. In the following paragraphs,
we discuss these model inputs, and based on analysis of numerical data, we note for
each parameter as to why that parameter is treated in a deterministic or stochastic
manner.
3.1.1.1 Stochastic Parameters
The uncertainty in the modeling framework is represented through the attributes
of the property categories l ∈ L, which are defined by three stochastic parame-
ters, corresponding to costs, returns and availabilities of foreclosed properties. More
specifically, we let cilψ denote the acquisition and redevelopment cost for a category
l property in neighborhood i under scenario ψ. Note that for clarity in notation,
the scenario index ψ in the stochastic parameters is denoted as a subscript, while a
superscript is used for decision variables. When a foreclosed property is put on sale
by the lender, it has an associated asking price, usually based on the price opinion
of a broker with experience in the area. In addition to this purchasing cost, for each
such property, CDCs perform an analysis to estimate the redevelopment costs for the
property. The cost parameter cilψ refers to the sum of these two cost components,
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and is defined by a probability distribution based on historical data. We demonstrate
the observed variation in acquisition and redevelopment costs through a histogram
of these costs for a specific category of properties in a given neighborhood within the
service area of the CDC that we obtained operational data from. The histogram is
included in Appendix A, where the distribution of these costs suggests a need for their
consideration as a stochastic parameter. While the numerical analyses performed in
Section 3.4 are based on data from 2011 where the economy was consistently in a poor
state, dynamics based on the state of the economy and the markets are important in
estimating the probability distribution of future acquisition and redevelopment costs.
Clearly, an improving trend in the economy would imply a higher likelihood of higher
costs, while a slowing economy would result in the opposite. The dynamic nature of
residential property prices, which can be used as a proxy for the acquisition and re-
development costs of foreclosed properties, is demonstrated in Appendix A through a
plot of U.S. house prices over time. These dynamics can be captured in our modeling
framework by defining scenario probabilities such that they reflect potential trending
effects due to market factors.
The second stochastic parameter µilψ denotes the social return from the acquisition
of a category l property in neighborhood i under scenario ψ. Foreclosures have signifi-
cant effects on social and community life of the surrounding neighborhoods since they
result in depreciation of a neighborhood’s image and residents’ quality of life (Immer-
gluck and Smith, 2006). Therefore the acquisition and redevelopment of foreclosed
properties yield in social value for the society, where estimating this social return is
clearly difficult. Johnson et al. (2013) highlight this challenge, and develop a measure
validated by some CDCs, which is based on the impact of the acquisition of a fore-
closed property on the appreciation of the value of nearby properties. More formally,
the property value impact (PVI) measure is defined as the expected impact on proxi-
mate property values from a given foreclosure. This measure is directly related to the
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geographical location of a property, and can be calculated for each foreclosed property
through a procedure described by Johnson et al. (2013), where the authors calculate
an approximation to the expected total property value losses associated with a prop-
erty by using Markov chains and cost-benefit analysis. PVIs are the results of several
determinants which are associated with foreclosures, i.e. increased blight, crime and
social disorder (Harding et al., 2009). While any social return measure can be used
when implementing the decision models, we utilize the PVI values to represent the
social returns from the acquisition of a foreclosed property in our empirical analysis.
PVI values are calculated as a dollar amount by Johnson et al. (2013), however in the
strategic foreclosed acquisition problem analyzed in Chapter 3 we consider normalized
values that vary between 0 and 1. This normalization is achieved dividing all PVI
values by the maximum observed PVI in the data set directly obtained from Johnson
et al. (2013). Note that the PVI measure is assumed to be a random variable, where
a histogram based on a sample set of calculated PVI values is depicted in Figure A.2
in Appendix A. The PVI values in the figures are distributed uniformly between 0.85
and 1.0. Similar to the acquisition and redevelopment costs, the probability distribu-
tion of PVI values is defined based on historical data. A statistical analysis of costs
and PVI values has shown almost no correlation between the two within the same
category of properties, hence the stochastic process for social returns is assumed to be
independent of the costs in the numerical study discussed later in the study. In Ap-
pendix A we show how PVI values vary for a set of properties considered for potential
acquisition by the partner CDC, as well as how the PVI values and the acquisition
and redevelopment costs lack correlation based on the same data set. We note that,
although there does not exist any data for a quantitative analysis, the PVI measure
is likely to be negatively correlated with the state of the economy and the housing
market. If the economy is good, depreciation of property values due to presence of
a foreclosed property in a neighborhood will typically be limited. Thus, the impact
27
of the acquisition and redevelopment of a foreclosed property in a neighborhood in
a good economic state is not likely to be as high either. While such dynamic effects
due to market factors may not be as significant, they can again be captured through
scenario probabilities used within our stochastic programming framework.
As the final stochastic parameter, we let θilψ refer to the total required budget to
acquire all properties of category l available for acquisition in neighborhood i under
scenario ψ. The stochasticity in this parameter is due to the inherent uncertainty in
the housing market and the overall economy. Note that the definition of θilψ implicitly
represents the number of foreclosed properties of category l available for acquisition
in neighborhood i, as the cost of each property in a given category is assumed to have
the same probability distribution. Hence, a high realization of this parameter would
correspond to a high rate of foreclosures occurring for the corresponding category
of properties in a given neighborhood. The stochastic structure in this parameter
definition is also based on data analysis involving the transitions of properties in dif-
ferent pre-foreclosure stages to foreclosed status over a given period. These transition
probabilities, derived from historical property data, are described in detail in Johnson
et al. (2013). Given the current pre-foreclosure stage information for the properties
and using the transition probability structures, a probability distribution defining the
number of properties in a neighborhood that will be in foreclosed status in the next
period can be derived. Such a probability distribution for a sample category and
neighborhood is included in Appendix A.
We note here that there exists a correlation between the stochastic parameters cilψ
and θilψ, which correspond to the acquisition and redevelopment costs and the total
required budget to acquire all properties of category l in neighborhood i. When the
housing market or the economy worsens, property values are expected to decrease,
which should normally imply that the total required budget to acquire all foreclosed
properties would also decrease. At the same time, however, there is a negative corre-
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lation between number of foreclosures and property prices as shown through an em-
pirical analysis by McDonald and Stokes (2013). Thus, the reduced property prices
due to a worsening economy would also imply an increase in the number of foreclosed
properties. This could result in an increase in the total required budget to acquire
all properties. Given this interplay between the costs and the number of foreclosures,
the correlation between cilψ and θ
il
ψ can be either negative or positive. We capture
such correlation in our modeling framework by considering scenarios that reflect both
types of correlation, and assigning appropriate probabilities to each scenario based on
the likelihood of each type of correlation. The positive correlation case corresponds
to the situations where the property prices are high and at the same time there is
a high number of foreclosures, or vice versa, i.e. low costs and low number of fore-
closures. Based on an analysis by Chen (2009), we assume that the total likelihood
of these cases is 0.2. Hence, the negative correlation cases of low cost-high required
budget and high cost-low required budget outcomes have a total probability of 0.8.
The numerical analyses described in Section 3.4 have been implemented under these
assumptions on the correlation between the two parameters.
3.1.1.2 Deterministic Parameters
In addition to the stochastic parameters described above, several deterministic
inputs representing neighborhood and category properties are used as part of the
modeling framework. One such parameter is φil, which corresponds to the expected
financial return from the sale of an acquired category l property in neighborhood i.
In other words, this is the expected revenue in excess of costs associated with the
eventual sale of a foreclosed property that has been acquired and redeveloped to a
defined community standard. We assume for modeling and tractability purposes that
the financial returns φil from an acquired property are deterministic. This is mostly
a reasonable assumption as financial returns from acquired properties are typically
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better estimated than social returns, especially considering the 1-2 year timeline used
in the problem definition. In addition, these profit amounts are typically constant
for each category of properties. More specifically, the profit amount is determined
by adding a specific dollar amount on the total acquisition and redevelopment cost
of a property before its sale, as opposed to a percentage. The specific planned profit
amounts are determined by CDC management. Hence, financial returns in general
are independent of the costs incurred for a property, and they only vary over differ-
ent neighborhoods or categories of properties. To demonstrate the mostly constant
structure of the financial returns, in Appendix A we provide a plot of the financial
returns realized through a set of historical acquisitions by the CDC from which we
obtained historical acquisition data. In addition, given that a CDC typically uses a
fixed financial return objective, and does not use different markup rates under differ-
ent economic and market conditions, it can be assumed that such dynamics do not
play a significant role in this model parameter.
Another important measure assumed to be deterministic in the model is the col-
lective efficacy measure for a given neighborhood i, which is denoted as ei. The
collective efficacy ei is defined by Sampson et al. (1997) as the social cohesion among
neighbors combined with their willingness to intervene on behalf of the common good.
This measure is a hard-to-quantify social value and is typically based on expert opin-
ions. Thus, we include it in the model as a strategic value measure through which we
attempt to capture the benefits from a property’s location that relate to the CDC’s
mission and objectives for property redevelopment. Morenoff and Smapson (2001)
state that violent activities involving crime is directly related to the collective effi-
cacy of a neighborhood. More specifically, the authors note that criminal activities
can be ecologically concentrated because of the absence of guardianship defined by
the collective efficacy level of a neighborhood. The authors show a negative corre-
lation between crime rate and collective efficacy where collective efficacy is expected
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to be higher for the neighborhoods having lower crime rates. Based on this analysis,
we quantify the collective efficacy of a neighborhood using neighborhood-level crime
data. Given that crime statistics for a neighborhood are fixed and known, we natu-
rally assume this measure to be a deterministic parameter. We further standardized
crime rate information in each neighborhood to vary between 0 and 1 by dividing
each crime rate value by the maximum over all neighborhoods. Note that it is im-
plicitly assumed that ei > 0, as no neighborhood is likely to have a crime rate equal
to zero. While there exists some correlation between the state of the economy and
this model parameter, it is possible to assume that the impacts are likely going to
be similar in proximate neighborhoods, resulting in minor fluctuations in the relative
values for different neighborhoods. This is especially the case because the decision
epochs do not cover an extensive length of time, and any impacts on crime rates due
to economic dynamics or investment decisions are likely to take a longer time.
In order to model the fact that not all acquired properties might be redeveloped
and sold within the planning horizon, we introduce the parameter ril denoting the
probability that a category l property in neighborhood i will be sold within a given
time frame. While it is assumed that all acquired properties will be redeveloped and
sold over time, it may be that the CDC will consider a shorter planning horizon
for some return related parameters, during which not all properties might be sold.
Such dynamics play a more significant role in the more complex models we study
later in the study. This probability is estimated based on historical sales data, and
for FHAP-S it will be used to reflect the projected impact of acquisitions on home
ownership in a neighborhood, as redeveloped properties are typically sold to owner
occupants only. Given that the period length used to determine this probability, and
thus the probability ril, can vary based on the return type, we append the notation
for ril with a superscript corresponding to the return type. To this end, we let r
o
il
denote the probability used for owner occupancy modeling purposes, and also define
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oi and ni as the current number of owner occupied and total number of properties in
a given neighborhood i, respectively. Similarly, we define rφil as the probability of sales
used for financial return calculations. The values for roil and r
φ
il are obtained through
past property sales ratios, and are fixed and known by definition. These values can
vary based on the state of the economy and the housing market, but this is likely to
take a longer amount of time than the planning horizons considered in the models.
Finally, dij is used to denote the distance between two neighborhoods i and j,
which will be utilized as part of an objective involving the allocation of the budget
in a way that would take advantage of synergistic effects of investing in proximate
neighborhoods. We note here that the distance between neighborhoods is an ambigu-
ous notion, which in this study is approximated as the straight-line distance between
centroids of two neighborhoods. Thus, by definition it is a deterministic parameter.
In addition, by synergistic effects we mean a social value arising between certain num-
ber of properties that produce a value greater than the sum of their individual PVI
values, which we discuss further as part of objective descriptions in Section 3.1.2.
3.1.2 Model Definition
In addition to the budget allocation decisions xi and the tactical acquisition de-
cisions hψil which were defined above, a set of additional decision variables are also
utilized in the model formulation. To this end, we first define zψi as the unused budget
allocated to neighborhood i in scenario ψ. This variable will be used as part of an
objective to maximize expected budget utilization, noting that having any unused
funds would imply that the resources are not being utilized.
All other variables used in the formulation are auxiliary variables that help define
different objectives and constraints. Of these, yij relates the investments in neighbor-
hoods i and j with respect to the distance between the neighborhoods. Rψ and Sψ,
on the other hand, define the minimum expected home ownership rate and minimum
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Figure 3.2. Scenario tree illustrating the decisions and stochastic parameter real-
izations in FHAP-S.
allocation rate over all neighborhoods for scenario ψ. The allocation rate in the defi-
nition of Sψ refers to the ratio of the budget allocated to a given neighborhood over
the observed value of available housing units for acquisition in that neighborhood.
Using the notation described above, we model FHAP-S as a two stage stochastic
mixed-integer programming problem. In this recourse model, the first-stage decisions
involve xi, i.e. the allocation of budgets to each neighborhood, and the auxiliary
variables yij . Once the components of the random vector Ψ corresponding to costs
and availability of properties are realized, the tactical acquisition decisions are made
as defined by the second stage variables hψil and z
ψ
i . While it is assumed that the
returns µilψ from the acquired properties will be realized further into the future, no
decisions are assumed to be made after the return realizations. Hence, we incorporate
the stochasticity in the returns by considering the expected returns for each scenario.
The corresponding scenario tree for FHAP-S is illustrated in Figure 3.2, where the
dark rectangles represent the decision nodes. This assumption is relaxed in the more
comprehensive models described in the later sections. We first summarize the notation
used in FHAP-S below, and then describe the objectives and constraints in detail.
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3.1.2.1 Notation Used in FHAP-S
Variables Used in FHAP-S
hψil : Integer variable denoting the umber of properties of category l acquired
from neighborhood i under scenario ψ
Rψ: Auxiliary variable defining the minimum home ownership rate among
all neighborhoods for scenario ψ
Sψ: Auxiliary variable defining the minimum allocation rate among all
neighborhoods for scenario ψ
xi : Amount of budget allocated to each neighborhood i
yij : Auxiliary variable relating the investments in neighborhoods i and j
with respect to the distance between the neighborhoods
zψi : Unused allocated budget for neighborhood i in scenario ψ
Parameters Used in FHAP-S
B : Available budget over the planning horizon
cilψ : Acquisition cost for a category i property in neighborhood l
under scenario ψ
dij : Distance between neighborhoods i and j
ei : Collective efficacy measure for a given neighborhood i
ni : Current number of properties for a given neighborhood i
oi : Current number of owner occupied properties for a given neighborhood i
pψ : Probability of scenario ψ
roil : Probability that a category l property in neighborhood i will be sold
within the time frame used for measuring owner occupancy
µilψ : Social return from the acquisition of a category l property in
neighborhood i under scenario ψ
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λk: Weight importance for objective k
θilψ : Total required budget to acquire all properties of category l
available for acquisition in neighborhood i under scenario ψ
φil : The financial return from the acquisition of a category l property
in neighborhood i
uk : An upper bound value for objective k.
uk : An auxiliary value for objective k.
3.1.2.2 Model Formulation
Based on this framework, the multi-objective two-stage stochastic mixed-integer
programming formulation for FHAP-S is as follows:
F(x,y,Ψ) = max λ1
|I|∑
i=1
xi
ei
+ λ2
|I|∑
i=1
|I|∑
j=1
yij + EΨ[Q(x,y,Ψ)] (3.2)
s.t.
|I|∑
i=1
xi ≤ B (3.3)
yij =
xi
dij
∀i, j (3.4)
xi, yij ≥ 0 ∀i, j, l, ψ (3.5)
where F(x,y,Ψ) is a weighted sum of all objectives and Q(x,y,Ψ) is the optimal
objective value of the second stage decision problem for any given realization ψ of the
random vector Ψ. Q(x,y, ψ) is defined as:
Q(x,y,Ψ) = maxλ3S
ψ + λ4
|I|∑
i=1
|L|∑
l=1
φilh
ψ
il + λ5
|I|∑
i=1
|L|∑
l=1
µilψh
ψ
il + λ6R
ψ
+ λ7(1−
∑|I|
i=1 z
ψ
i∑|I|
i=1
∑|L|
l=1 θ
il
ψ
) (3.6)
xi∑|L|
l=1 θ
il
ψ
≥ Sψ ∀i, ψ (3.7)
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oi +
∑|L|
l=1 r
o
ilh
ψ
il
ni
≥ Rψ ∀i, ψ (3.8)
xi −
|L|∑
l=1
cilψh
ψ
il = z
ψ
i ∀i, ψ (3.9)
cilψh
ψ
il ≤ θ
il
ψ ∀i, l, ψ (3.10)
xi, yij, z
ψ
i , S
ψ, Rψ ≥ 0 ∀i, j, l, ψ (3.11)
hψil ∈ Z
+ ∀i, l, ψ (3.12)
where λk is the weighting factor coefficient for objective k = 1, . . . , 7, where
∑7
k=1 λk =
1 and λk ≥ 0. Although there are many algorithms in the literature to deter-
mine weight values, no fundamental guidelines have been presented for selecting
weights. Eckenrode (1965), Hobbs (1980), Voogd (1983) can be given as examples to
the proposed approaches in weight determination. In our application, we determine
weights accordingly based on discussions with CDC staff. Since they are indifferent
between objectives and do not have any priorities, we use equal λk values for the
objectives in our implementations.
Note that our objective function is a weighted combination of several objectives.
To derive this function, we first normalize each objective value function separately by
performing the following steps:
1. Set the corresponding weighting factor for the given objective k to 1 while
setting other weighting factors to 0.
2. Solve the model and let the value of the overall objective function be uk, where
uk represents an upper bound for objective k.
3. Use the current values of all weighting factors (e.g. in our implementations all
λk’s are assumed to be equal), and solve the model. Let the corresponding value
for objective k be uk.
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4. Normalize each objective value as uk
uk
.
Through these steps we ensure that each objective value is between 0 and 1. In
order to combine separate objectives, we multiply each objective by its weight and
sum them up. Since
∑7
k=1 λk = 1 and λk ≥ 0, the overall objective function will
be between 0 and 1 as well. Note that our solution methods for FHAP-S, as well
as its variants and extensions, are applied to a single-objective version of this model
using a weighted representation of the objectives with weights where the weights are
determined by the CDC. On the other hand, other multi-objective frameworks can
be considered for the optimization as well. We further note that, we obtained the
value of our weighted objective function by using mathematical programming tools
instead of generating a seven dimensional noninferior set of alternatives. However,
in Section 3.4.4, we perform Pareto analysis for grouped sets of objectives where
we grouped our objectives into two groups and investigate the noninferior set of
alternatives between new two objectives.
3.1.2.3 Objectives and Constraints
As noted above, our optimization model includes seven types of objectives, which
reflect different goals involving maximization of overall socio-economic utility and
equity through the decisions made. These objectives were developed based on consul-
tations with CDCs which involved formal value focused thinking sessions with CDC
staff. Modeling of the objectives requires introduction of various constraints, which
we also describe below.
The first and second objectives shown in (3.2) constitute the first stage objective
function, which implies that they are only a function of the first stage variables,
i.e. the resource allocation decisions. Objective 1 is an equity related objective
defined according to neighborhood-level collective efficacy measures introduced in
Section 3.1.1. This objective, similar to those of Leclerc and McLay (2012), maximizes
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total collective efficacy of a budget allocation strategy over all neighborhoods by
allocating higher budgets to neighborhoods with relatively lower efficacy values. This
is ensured by the ratio xi
ei
in the objective definition. Given the efficacy measures ei
for each neighborhood, the ratio will be maximized if larger xi values are assigned to
neighborhoods with lower ei levels.
Objective 2 is related to the economies of scale and aims to maximize efficiencies
associated with proximity of acquired units. The objective is modeled through the
variable yij and the constraint (3.4) and standardized by following steps described
in Section 3.1.2.2. The structure of the objective involves the minimization of a
function of the total distance between neighborhoods to which resources are allo-
cated. Notice that we use the distance between neighborhoods, as opposed to actual
properties, because property availability is an uncertain parameter and thus specific
location information is not known within the modeling framework. So the intended
objective is assumed to be achieved by considering that higher allocations to a neigh-
borhood would result in a higher number of properties to be acquired with closer
proximity. This is done by the maximization of the yij values, for which larger xi
and xj values need to be assigned for neighborhoods i and j that are geographically
closer, i.e. where dij is small. The utility of having more acquisitions in proximate
neighborhoods is mainly due to ease of managing redevelopment activities in nearby
regions. If the acquired properties are closer to each other, then it also becomes more
convenient to locate municipal services. In the absence of an explicit function repre-
senting such economies of scale, the model tries to allocate the budget proportionally
to the distances between neighborhoods through this function, where the distances
between neighborhoods are based on the centroids of the neighborhoods. Related to
this structure, Galster et al. (2006) show that concentrated long-term investments in
small areas produce beneficial results when compared with areas without such focused
investments.
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The remaining five objectives correspond to the second stage objective function as
shown in (3.6), as their values depend on the realization of the uncertain parameters.
Objective 3 another equity related objective and involves the maximization of the
minimum allocation rate, i.e. the ratio of the budget allocated to a given neighbor-
hood and realized value of available housing units for acquisition to provide equitable
service to different neighborhoods. Hence, this objective aids to allocate resources
equally to neighborhoods. This is modeled through constraint (3.7), the structure
of which implies that Sψ will be maximized if the ratio on the left hand side is as
high and close as possible for all neighborhoods. This objective is a ratio and varies
between 0 and 1 but similar to the other objectives it is also standardized by using
steps in Section 3.1.2.2.
Objective 4 considers the financial returns from the resource allocation strategy
by maximizing the total expected profit based on the financial return structures for
each category of housing. This is a relevant objective for CDC operations, despite
the fact that CDCs are nonprofit organizations. This is because any financial profits
made in the current planning period will enable more acquisitions in the future. The
profit amounts are defined based on the product of expected per unit profit and the
number of properties acquired as shown in the formulation. Although the unit of this
objective is in dollars, after standardization, it varies between 0 and 1.
Objective 5 ensures the social utility maximization of a foreclosed housing acqui-
sition strategy, where social utility is based on the social return measure µilψ defined
for each category of housing in each neighborhood. As noted previously, we adapt a
social return measure based on the impact of the acquisitions on the values of nearby
properties (PVI). Similar to the financial returns, PVI based social returns in FHAP-
S are defined by the product of realized per unit PVI and the number of properties
acquired in each category in a neighborhood. The objective value is standardized and
changes between 0 and 1.
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Objective 6 represents an equity related goal based on owner occupation rates in
neighborhoods. Maximization of owner occupied housing units in each neighborhood
is one of the missions of CDCs (Galster et al., 2005), and this objective tries to achieve
it in an equitable way by maximizing the minimum owner occupation rate among
neighborhoods. The objective structure is modeled through constraint (3.8), where
expected increase in the number of owner occupied properties in a neighborhood is
defined in the numerator on the left hand side of the constraint. The increase is based
on the probability roil that a property in a specific category will be sold to an owner
occupant within a predefined period, where the length of this period is dependent
on a CDC’s overall goals with regard to owner occupancy. Maximizing Rψ would
imply a more evenly distributed owner occupancy rates among neighborhoods after
the acquisitions. This objective also varies between 0 and 1 after standardization by
following steps in Section 3.1.2.2.
Finally, Objective 7 ensures that the available budget is utilized in the most
efficient manner across different scenarios. To this end, constraint (3.9) defines the
variable zψi , which corresponds to any unused portion of the allocated budget to a
neighborhood. Hence, the expression
∑|I|
i=1 z
ψ
i
∑|I|
i=1
∑|L|
l=1
θil
ψ
in (3.6) is the ratio of unused budget
to the total value of available properties for a given scenario. This ratio is used to
ensure that the consideration of the unused budget amounts for different scenarios is
consistent, as the availabilities differ for each scenario.
In addition to the constraints described above, the optimization model involves
constraints (3.3), (3.10), (3.11) and (3.12). In constraint (3.3), we ensure that amount
of allocated resources are less than the total budget available, while constraint (3.10)
ensures that total amount of acquired properties does not exceed the total amount
of available properties. We further define nonnegativity and integrality through con-
straints (3.11) and (3.12), respectively.
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This model reflects fundamental policy-analytic concerns with tradeoffs between
efficiency, effectiveness and equity (Bardach, 2005), as well as an understanding of
policy and practice in foreclosure mitigation activity derived from observations of
specific CDCs. In addition, observing that the expectation in (3.2) can be repre-
sented through the scenario probabilities pψ, the overall model can be expressed in
the following compact form:
max
{
λ1
|I|∑
i=1
xi
ei
+ λ2
|I|∑
i=1
|I|∑
j=1
yij +
∑
ψ∈Ψ
pψ
[
λ3S
ψ + λ4
|I|∑
i=1
|L|∑
l=1
φilh
ψ
il
+ λ5
|I|∑
i=1
|L|∑
l=1
µilψh
ψ
il + λ6R
ψ + λ7(1−
∑|I|
i=1 z
ψ
i∑|I|
i=1
∑|L|
l=1 θ
il
ψ
)
]
s.t. (3.3), (3.4),
(3.7)− (3.12)
}
(3.13)
Note that by setting λk′ = 1 and λk = 0 for all k 6= k′, we may analyze the corner
points of the Pareto frontier associated with a solution to FHAP-S. In addition to such
an implementation, we also generate estimates of the Pareto frontier associated with
aggregations of various FHAP-S objectives through an application of the constraint
method (Collette and Siarry, 2003) later in the study.
3.2 Model II: FHAP with Gradual Uncertainty Resolution
(FHAP-G)
The second model we consider for FHAP has a more complex representation of
the resource allocation decision process. While this representation is more realistic
as it considers potential reallocation of budget depending on gradual realization of
information on the economy and its impacts on neighborhoods, the resulting model
is a more complex multi-stage stochastic mixed-integer programming problem.
The multi-stage decision process that involves gradual resolution of uncertainty is
depicted in Figure 3.4. We assume a longer strategic planning timeline consisting
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of two budgeting periods, e.g. two years, with a pooled budget to be allocated
over the two periods. Such a strategic decision timeline has been observed to be
used by CDCs (Frisch and Servon, 2006). Given the longer planning horizon of
two years, a CDC can perform better planning by taking into account the learning
effects that will take place over time. More specifically, the state of the economy and
market conditions two years into the future will be better estimated in the next year
based on realized conditions in the first year. Hence, a model that captures such
dynamics is likely to be more valuable when deciding on optimal budget allocations.
At the beginning of the planning horizon, i.e. in the first decision epoch, initial
resource allocation decisions for each neighborhood are made separately for each
of the next two years. Foreclosed properties then become available for potential
acquisition along with the associated costs, and acquisition decisions are made in the
second decision epoch based on the social return distribution information available at
that time. It is assumed that additional new information on returns will be revealed
after the second decision epoch based on the state of the economy, which will be
followed by a potential reallocation of second year resource allocations, as well as
new allocations of any unused budgets and realized returns from any sales in the
first year. These represent the decisions in the third decision epoch, while in the
fourth epoch acquisitions for the second budgeting period will be performed after new
availability and cost information becomes known. We note here that the realizations
of the cost parameters in the second period are dependent on the social return, i.e.
PVI realizations in the first period. More specifically, a high PVI value in the first
period would imply a higher appreciation of house prices which is then reflected in
the acquisition costs of foreclosed properties in the same area in the second period.
Hence, scenarios for the stochastic programming formulation are defined based on
this dependent structure.
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Figure 3.3. Demonstration of gradual resolution of uncertainty for the random
availability parameter θilΨ.
We further describe gradual uncertainty realization through Figure 3.3, which
shows an example where the availability information θilΨ is learned over time. In this
example the availability is assumed to be either at low or high levels, indicated by L
and H, respectively. At Epoch I, the probability of a low realization is 0.6, while the
probability is 0.4 for a high availability level. Information becomes available over time,
and preliminary availability information is known at Epoch II. If this information is
θilΨ = L, then the probability distribution for low and high availabilities in the second
period, which is to be realized at Epoch IV, is updated to be 0.8 and 0.2, respectively.
On the other hand, if θilΨ = H at Epoch II, then the corresponding probabilities are
0.3 and 0.7 for low and high availabilities as shown in the figure. This representation
suggests four combinations of realizations for the random availability parameter θilΨ,
namely LL, LH, HL, HH, which form part of the scenario definitions involving all
uncertain parameters.
Based on the description above, we expand the notation used in Section 3.1 by
referring to the first stage allocation variables as xiρ where ρ ∈ {1, 2} refers to the
planning period. Note that xi2 represents the tentative allocations for period two
made at the first decision epoch. This tentative allocation can be changed in the third
decision epoch, as represented through variables x+ψi and x
−ψ
i which correspond to
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Figure 3.4. The decision process for the strategic foreclosed housing acquisition
problem with gradual resolution of uncertainty in social returns.
the positive and negative reallocation decisions for scenario ψ ∈ Ψ. The definitions
of all other decision variables are also extended through the subscript ρ ∈ {1, 2}.
The realized values of the stochastic parameters after the reallocation period are
denoted as follows: µ˜ilψ, θ˜
il
ψ, c˜
il
ψ. Finally, a penalty parameter νi is introduced for
the costs associated with budget reallocation to/from a given neighborhood i. This
reallocation cost corresponds to variable overhead and other expenses due to changes
in the initial allocated budgets to neighborhoods. We include the minimization of
the expected value of this cost as a new objective and associate it with the weighting
parameter λ8. The notation used in FHAP-G and the formulation of the model are
as follows:
Variables Used in FHAP-G
hρψil : Number of properties of category l acquired from neighborhood i at
period ρ under scenario ψ
R2ψ : Auxiliary variable defining the minimum home ownership rate among
all neighborhoods at second period for scenario ψ
S2ψ : Auxiliary variable defining the minimum allocation rate among all
neighborhoods at second period for scenario ψ
xρψi : Amount of allocated budget to each neighborhood i at period ρ
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in scenario ψ
x+ψi : Amount of positive reallocation budget of neighborhood i in scenario ψ
x−ψi : Amount of negative reallocation budget of neighborhood i in scenario ψ
yρψij : Auxiliary variable relating the investments in neighborhoods i and j at
period ρ in scenario ψ with respect to the distance between
the neighborhoods
zρψi : Unused allocated budget for neighborhood i at period ρ in scenario ψ
Parameters Used in FHAP-G
c˜ilψ : Acquisition cost for a category l property in neighborhood i at
second period under scenario ψ
rφil : Probability that a category l property in neighborhood i will be sold
within the second period under time frame used for measuring
financial returns
µ˜ilψ : Social return from the acquisition of a category l property in
neighborhood i at second period under scenario ψ
θ˜ilψ : Total required budget to acquire all properties of category l available
for acquisition in neighborhood i at second period under scenario ψ
αη : Parameter defining the vertex point η in the piecewise linear
approximations
Θ : Upper bound on the amount of allocation to any neighborhood
τ1, τ2 : Threshold values used in the definition of the investment
dependent return function
Υψψ
′
ρ :

1, if ψ and ψ′ have the same history at a given decision epoch
in period ρ
0, otherwise
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This objective function for the resulting multi-stage stochastic mixed-integer pro-
gramming formulation for FHAP-G can be expressed in nested expectation form as
follows, where the notation Ψt denotes the vector of random parameters that realize
after each epoch t as described in Figure 3.4. G(x,y,S,h,R, z,Ψ) is defined as a
scalar value which is the weighted sum of all objectives:
G(x,y,S,h,R, z,Ψ) = max λ1
|I|∑
i=1
xi1
ei
+ λ2
|I|∑
i=1
|I|∑
j=1
yij1 (3.14)
+ EΨ2
[
λ3S
Ψ2
1 + λ4
|I|∑
i=1
|L|∑
l=1
φilh
Ψ2
il1 + λ5
|I|∑
i=1
|L|∑
l=1
µilΨ2h
Ψ2
il1 + λ6R
Ψ2
1
+ λ7(1−
∑|I|
i=1 z
Ψ2
i1∑|I|
i=1
∑|L|
l=1 θ
il
Ψ2
) (3.15)
+ EΨ3|Ψ2
[
λ1
|I|∑
i=1
xi2 + x
+Ψ3
i − x
−Ψ3
i
ei
+ λ2
|I|∑
i=1
|I|∑
j=1
yΨ3ij2 − λ8
|I|∑
i=1
νi(x
+Ψ3
i + x
−Ψ3
i )
(3.16)
+ EΨ4|Ψ3,Ψ2
[
λ3S
Ψ4
2 + λ4
|I|∑
i=1
|L|∑
l=1
φilh
Ψ4
il2 + λ5
|I|∑
i=1
|L|∑
l=1
µ˜ilΨ4h
Ψ4
il2 + λ6R
Ψ4
2
+ λ7[(1−
∑|I|
i=1 z
Ψ4
i2∑|I|
i=1
∑|L|
l=1 θ˜
il
Ψ4
)]
]]]
(3.17)
The components of the objective shown in (3.14) and (3.15) are respectively the objec-
tive functions for the first and second stages, and are defined similar to the FHAP-S
formulation described in Section 3.1.2. The nested expectation in (3.16) corresponds
to the third stage objective function, which consists of a similar setup as (3.14) plus
Objective 8. The third stage objective function is calculated assuming the realization
of preliminary costs, availabilities, and social returns in the first and second stages.
The structure of Objective 1 in (3.16) involves the reallocation decisions as part of
the numerator defining the final resource allocation amount to each neighborhood for
the second period. The fourth stage objective is shown through the expectation in
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(3.17) which is defined over the uncertainty in social returns given the information
on realized costs and availabilities in the third stage.
Defining a scenario ψ with probability pψ for each possible combination of realiza-
tions of the random parameters over the entire planning horizon, where conditional
realizations are also taken into account, the overall formulation for FHAP-G can be
stated by combining the components of the objective function that are multiplied by
the same weighting factor λk, k = 1, . . . , 8:
G(x,y,S,h,R, z,Ψ) = maxλ1
|I|∑
i=1
xi1
ei
+ λ2
|I|∑
i=1
|I|∑
j=1
yij1
+
∑
ψ∈Ψ
pψ
[
λ1
|I|∑
i=1
xi2 + x
+ψ
i − x
−ψ
i
ei
+ λ2
|I|∑
i=1
|I|∑
j=1
yψij2 + λ3(S
ψ
1 + S
ψ
2 )
+ λ4
|I|∑
i=1
|L|∑
l=1
φil(h
ψ
il1 + h
ψ
il2) + λ5
|I|∑
i=1
|L|∑
l=1
(µilψh
ψ
il1 + µ˜
il
ψh
ψ
il2) + λ6(R
ψ
1 +R
ψ
2 )
+ λ7
[
(1−
∑|I|
i=1 z
ψ
i1∑|I|
i=1
∑|L|
l=1 θ
il
ψ
) + (1−
∑|I|
i=1 z
ψ
i2∑|I|
i=1
∑|L|
l=1 θ˜
il
ψ
)
]
− λ8
|I|∑
i=1
νi(x
+ψ
i + x
−ψ
i )
]
(3.18)
s.t (3.4), (3.7)− (3.12)
|I|∑
i=1
2∑
ρ=1
xiρ ≤ B (3.19)
yψij2 =
xi2 + x
+ψ
i − x
−ψ
i
dij
∀i, j, ψ (3.20)
xi2 + x
+ψ
i − x
−ψ
i∑|L|
l=1 θ˜
il
ψ
≥ Sψ2 ∀i, ψ (3.21)
oi +
∑|L|
l=1 r
o
ilh
ψ
il1 −
∑|L|
l=1 θ˜
il
ψ +
∑|L|
l=1 r
o
ilh
ψ
il2
ni
≥ Rψ2 ∀i, ψ (3.22)
xi2 + x
+ψ
i − x
−ψ
i −
|L|∑
l=1
c˜ilψh
ψ
il2 = z
ψ
i2 ∀i, ψ (3.23)
c˜ilψh
ψ
il2 ≤ θ˜
il
ψ ∀i, l, ψ (3.24)
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|I|∑
i=1
x+ψi −
|I|∑
i=1
x−ψi =
|I|∑
i=1
|L|∑
l=1
rφilφilh
ψ
il1 +
|I|∑
i=1
zψi1 ∀ψ (3.25)
χψρ = χ
ψ′
ρ ∀ρ, ψ, ψ
′ : Υρψψ′ = 1 (3.26)
xiρ, x
+ψ
i , x
−ψ
i , y
ψ
ijρ, z
ψ
iρ, S
ψ
ρ , R
ψ
ρ ≥ 0 ∀i, j, l, ψ, ρ (3.27)
hψilρ ∈ Z
+ ∀i, l, ψ, ρ (3.28)
We note that, similar to the FHAP-S model,
∑8
k=1 λk = 1 and λk ≥ 0. In our
calculations, we use equal weighting factors to evaluate the objective function and
the same steps described in Section 3.1.2.2 are used to normalize the objective func-
tion. The constraints in the above formulation have a similar structure as FHAP-S
except that they are defined both for the first and second planning periods, where
the first period involves decision epochs I and II, and the second period involves deci-
sion epochs III and IV. The constraints also reflect the relationships between the two
planning periods. More specifically, constraint (3.19) is the revised budget constraint
which ensures that the sum of resource allocations to neighborhoods do not exceed
the initially available budget B. Constraint (3.20) defines the variables y in relation
to Objective 2 in the second period, where the numerator xi2 + x
+ψ
i − x
−ψ
i represents
the final second period allocation to neighborhood i at decision epoch III. Through
the same allocation representation, constraint (3.21) is used to define Objective 3 for
the second period, which involves maximization of the minimum allocation rate over
neighborhoods. Note that constraint (3.21) involves an approximation where previous
allocation decisions are only implicitly considered and not endogenously modeled in
the denominator of the left hand side of the constraint. This is because second stage
property availability should also take into account any remaining properties from the
first period, i.e. the denominator in (3.21) should be
∑|L|
l=1(θ
il
ψ + θ˜
il
ψ)− xi1. However,
this gives rise to a nonlinear and nonconvex structure, which we approximate by as-
suming that the second period availability will be exogenously determined, taking into
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account any potential remaining properties. In Section 3.3 we remove this assump-
tion and reformulate the original model through a piecewise linear approximation
approach.
The objective related to home ownership for the second period is modeled by
constraint (3.22), which involves an endogenous structure as it captures the impact
of previous period sales and new foreclosures in defining the owner occupancy rate.
This is done by updating the number of owner occupied units in the numerator
through the addition of number of sold properties as defined by the probability roil,
and the subtraction of the number of new foreclosures. Similar to its first period
counterpart, constraint (3.23) represents the amount of unused budget in period two.
More specifically, the amount of unused budget in neighborhood i is the difference
between the final second period allocation of xi2 + x
+ψ
i − x
−ψ
i and the total number
of acquisitions
∑|L|
l=1 c˜
il
ψh
ψ
il2. The inequality (3.24) is the availability constraint for the
second period, modeling the fact that the number of acquisitions is limited by the
available number of foreclosed properties. As a new constraint, (3.25) ensures that
reallocations in the second period are feasible given the tentative allocations. The
right hand side of this constraint represents the newly available funds for the second
period, which corresponds to the sum of any unused budget in the first period and
the financial returns from any property sales that might have occurred before the
budget reallocation time, while the variables on the left hand side correspond to the
reallocation decisions.
Constraints (3.26) are the nonanticipativity constraints for this multi-stage prob-
lem, which impose the condition that scenarios that share the same history at a
decision epoch also make the same decisions during that history. Note that nonan-
ticipativity is implied for the first decision epoch as the same variable definitions are
used for all scenarios. Moreover, the fourth stage decisions are independent for each
scenario, so no nonanticipativity requirements exist at that stage. Hence, explicit
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nonanticipativity representation is required for the second and third decision epochs
only. Since these two epochs correspond to the first and second periods respectively,
we utilize the period index in defining these constraints. More specifically, we intro-
duce the indicator parameter Υψψ
′
ρ , where Υ
ψψ′
ρ = 1 if ψ and ψ
′ have the same history
at the second and third decision epochs, which respectively correspond to ρ ∈ {1, 2}.
Defining the sets χρ as χ1 = {h
ψ
il1, z
ψ
i1, S
ψ
1 , R
ψ
1 } and χ2 = {x
+ψ
i , x
−ψ
i , y
ψ
ij2}, we are
able to represent the nonanticipativity in the formulation through constraints (3.26).
We also define nonnegativity and integrality conditions thorough constraints (3.27)
and (3.28).
3.3 Model Variations and Extensions
In this section we present two extensions to the core FHAP models presented.
These variations of the model are used to capture some additional complexities that
may exist in different practical settings.
3.3.1 Investment Dependent Social Return Functions
In this section we consider a different and more complex return structure for the
two FHAP models by including synergistic effects that can be realized based on the
number of acquisitions or the amount of investment in a given neighborhood. Such
synergistic effects, specifically in social returns, have been discussed in the literature
and also have been typically observed in practice (Bhide, 1993; Damodaran, 2005).
Moreover, Harding et al. (2009) show that the contagion effect is a nonincreasing
convex function of the number of foreclosures. This result implies that social returns
can be considered as nondecreasing concave functions of the acquired foreclosed units.
Hence, we expand our models to include this aspect by modeling the effect of acqui-
sition decisions on social return characterizations. However, due to the introduction
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of new constraints and binary variables, the complexity of the resulting problem is
increased.
To model this investment dependent return structure, we assume that the social
returns µilψ in the first period and µ˜
il
ψ in the second period are defined as piecewise step
functions of the ratio of investment for each category and neighborhood over available
acquisitions, which we refer to as the ‘acquisition ratio’, similar to the function type
shown in Figure 3.5. The corresponding return structure has the following pattern:
as the acquisition ratio in a property category and neighborhood increases, the return
also increases up to a threshold level τ1 and then remains constant in the range (τ1, τ2).
If the acquisition ratio exceeds τ2, then a synergistic joint return value µ
il
ψ is realized
for each scenario. We note here that while the structure of these return functions
has been justified through practical discussions in the literature, there is no empirical
evidence as to what the typical values for τ1 and τ2 should be for PVI based return
functions. These parameters need to be subjectively defined by CDC practitioners,
similar to what was done for our numerical implementations. On the other hand, we
have also performed a sensitivity analysis around these parameter values as described
in Section 3.4.3.
We also note that our modeling framework is quite general and can be adapted
to different input characterizations. While in Figure 3.5 we show a piecewise lin-
ear structure, it is possible to define the returns using nonlinear functions as long
as convexity of the optimization model is maintained and the model is solved as a
stochastic nonlinear integer programming problem. Hence, in our representation of
the investment dependent return functions we use generic notation and refer to the
piecewise components of the return functions as f ρψ(h
ψ
ilρ) and g
ρ
ψ(h
ψ
ilρ), as indicated
in Figure 3.5 for ρ = 1. The uncertainty in the social returns is modeled through
the parameters of these functions. Based on the linearity assumption and for the
empirical analysis in the study, we consider a probabilistic structure for the slope of
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Figure 3.5. Investment dependent social return function modeling the synergistic
effects of property acquisitions in a given neighborhood.
the function f ρψ(h
ψ
ilρ). Hence, different return realizations would imply different slopes
for this function. This is demonstrated in Figure 3.5 for low, medium and high social
return realizations for first period social returns µilψ. This uncertainty representation
can be generalized by considering more uncertain parameters in the function defini-
tions, such as the parameters of gρψ(h
ψ
il) and the joint return value µ
il
ψ. Hence, these
functions are also denoted using the scenario subscript ψ. In addition, we define the
binary variables βψilρ, which equal 1 if the joint return is realized, i.e. if the acquisition
ratio exceeds τ2, and 0 otherwise. Also while µ
il
ψ and µ˜
il
ψ are defined as parameters in
FHAP-S and FHAP-G, they become decision variables when investment dependent
return is modeled. Note that second period returns are modeled through their expec-
tations, so the parameters of the functions f 2ψ(h
ψ
il2) and g
2
ψ(h
ψ
il2) in the second period
are constant as they are based on these expectations.
Using this notation, it is possible to incorporate the investment dependent return
structure into the two models as follows. For a more general representation, we
show the modifications required for FHAP-G and describe how they would differ for
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FHAP-S. The first modification involves the changes in the social return objective
corresponding to the weighting parameter λ5. We first summarize the added notation
as follows:
Variables Added for FHAP-S and FHAP-G Extensions
ωψ1 : Approximated value of the square of S
ψ
2
ω2i : Approximated value of the square of xi1
ωψ3i : Approximated value of the square of the summation of S
ψ
2 and xi1
γSψη : SOS2 variable for approximation of the square of S
ψ
2 defined at
point η under scenario ψ
γXiη : SOS2 variable for approximation of the square of X
1
i defined at
point η under scenario ψ
γSXψiη : SOS2 variable for approximation of the square of the summation of
Sψ2 and xi1 for neighborhood i defined at point η under scenario ψ
βψilρ :

1, if the total category l property acquisitions in neighborhood i
exceed the threshold for joint return realization under scenario ψ
in period ρ
0, otherwise
To capture the investment dependent return structure, this function needs to be
expressed in FHAP-G as:
G(x,y,S,h,R, z, µ˜,µ,β,Ψ) = max · · ·+ λ5
|I|∑
i=1
|L|∑
l=1
(µilψ + µ
il
ψβ
ψ
il1 + µ˜
il
ψ + µ
il
ψβ
ψ
il2)
+ . . . (3.29)
where the dots indicate that the remainder of the objective is exactly as shown in
(3.18). Moreover, the following additional constraints need to be defined for the
model, where the variables βψil1 and µ
il
ψ are included into the group χ1, while β
ψ
il2 and
µ˜ilψ are included into the group χ2:
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βψil1 −
hψil1c
il
ψ∑|L|
l=1 θ
il
ψ
≤ 1− τ2 β
ψ
il2 −
hψil2c˜
il
ψ∑|L|
l=1 θ˜
il
ψ
≤ 1− τ2 ∀i, l, ψ (3.30)
βψil1 −
hψil1c
il
ψ∑|L|
l=1 θ
il
ψ
≥ −τ2 β
ψ
il2 −
hψil2c˜
il
ψ∑|L|
l=1 θ˜
il
ψ
≥ −τ2 ∀i, l, ψ (3.31)
µilψ ≤ f
1
ψ(h
ψ
il1) µ˜
il
ψ ≤ f
2
ψ(h
ψ
il2) ∀i, l, ψ (3.32)
µilψ ≤ g
1
ψ(h
ψ
il1) µ˜
il
ψ ≤ g
2
ψ(h
ψ
il2) ∀i, l, ψ (3.33)
χψρ = χ
ψ′
ρ ∀ρ, ψ, ψ
′ : Υρψψ′ = 1 (3.34)
µilψ, µ˜
il
ψ ≥ 0 ∀i, l, ψ (3.35)
βψilρ ∈ {0, 1} ∀i, l, ψ, ρ (3.36)
Constraints (3.30)-(3.31) ensure the realization of the joint return for the two
periods if the acquisition ratio is greater than the threshold level τ2. The piece-
wise structure of the return is modeled through constraints (3.32)-(3.33) due to the
maximization objective involving the social returns. Constraint (3.34) represents the
nonanticipativity constraints for the newly introduced variables as discussed above.
Through constraints (3.35) and (3.36) we define nonnegativity and integrality condi-
tions for the new decision variables.
For adaptation of the above modifications into FHAP-S, the term µ˜ilψ + µ
il
ψβ
ψ
il2 is
removed from the objective function (3.29). In addition, constraints (3.30), (3.31),
(3.32), and (3.33) are added to the formulation as shown, except the subscript of the
acquisition variable is removed, to be denoted as hψil.
3.3.2 Reformulation of Allocation Rate Constraint
The second extension we introduce applies to FHAP-G only, and deals with the
reformulation of constraint (3.21) which corresponds to one of the equity objectives
in the model. Although this new extension adds to the complexity of the formulation,
it is a more accurate representation of the equity objective as described in Section
3.2.
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As noted previously, when remaining property information from the first plan-
ning period is included in the denominator on the left hand side of constraint (3.21),
i.e. if the denominator is
∑|L|
l=1(θ
il
ψ + θ˜
il
ψ) − xi1, the resulting constraint is nonlin-
ear and nonconvex. We deal with this issue by convexifying the model through a
piecewise linear approximation of the nonlinear terms as follows. The nonlinear con-
straint can be rewritten as xi2 + x
+ψ
i − x
−ψ
i ≥
∑|L|
l=1 S
ψ
2 (θ
il
ψ + θ˜
il
ψ) − S
ψ
2 xi1, where
the second component on the right hand side involves the product of two decision
variables. Through some algebraic manipulation, this bilinear term can be expressed
as Sψ2 xi1 = −
(Sψ
2
)2
2
− (xi1)
2
2
+
(Sψ
2
+xi1)
2
2
to involve three terms with squared values of
decision variables. We utilize piecewise linear approximation methods on these three
terms using a set of parameters corresponding to the vertices of the piecewise linear
curves.
More specifically, we define new nonnegative variables γXiη , γ
Sψ
η and γ
SXψ
iη for
each i, ψ, and η= 0, 1, ...N , where N is the number of vertices used to represent the
nonlinear functions. Note that N can vary for each of the functions approximated.
Moreover, the lower and upper bounds for xi1 are 0 and Θ = min{B,maxψ
∑|L|
l=1 θ
il
ψ},
while they are 0 and 1 for Sψ2 . Hence, it is possible to define the vertices of the piece-
wise linear curves for the three functions using these bounds and ratio parameters
αη = {0,
1
N
, 2
N
, . . . , 1} for η= 0, 1, ...N . A complexity in the piecewise linear represen-
tation involves the requirement that at most two adjacent values of γ··η are nonzero in
each representation to ensure global optimality. We do this by defining the variables
γXiη , γ
Sψ
η and γ
SXψ
iη as being members of specially ordered sets of type two (SOS2).
Given this structure, constraint (3.21) in FHAP-G can be replaced by the following
set of constraints to more accurately model the allocation rate based equity structure:
xi2 + x
+ψ
i − x
−ψ
i ≥
|L|∑
l=1
Sψ2 (θ
il
ψ + θ˜
il
ψ) +
ωψ1
2
+
ω2i
2
−
ωψ3i
2
∀i, ψ (3.37)
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Sψ2 =
N∑
η=0
γSψη αη ∀ψ (3.38)
xi1 = Θ
N∑
η=0
γXiηαη ∀i (3.39)
ωψ1 =
N∑
η=0
(αη)
2γSψη ∀ψ (3.40)
ω2i = Θ
2
N∑
η=0
(αη)
2γXiη ∀i (3.41)
ωψ3i =
|L|∑
l=1
(Θ + 1)2
N∑
η=0
(αη)
2γSXψiη ∀i, ψ (3.42)
N∑
η=0
γSψη = 1 ∀ψ (3.43)
N∑
η=0
γXiη = 1 ∀i (3.44)
N∑
η=0
γSXψiη = 1 ∀i, ψ (3.45)
γSψη , γ
X
iη , γ
SXψ
iη ∈ SOS2 ∀i, ψ, η (3.46)
Constraint (3.37) is the modified version of constraint (3.21) after linear approxima-
tion. Constraints (3.38) and (3.39) define the variables Sψ2 and xi1, and approximate
the squares of Sψ2 and xi1 as represented by ω
ψ
1 and ω2i. The square of the sum-
mation of Sψ2 and xi1, which is defined by ω
ψ
3i, is represented by constraint (3.42).
Constraints (3.43), (3.44) and (3.45) imply that the summation of these piecewise
approximation variables should be equal to 1. As the last constraint, (3.46) ensures
the SOS2 requirement for the newly introduced approximation variables.
3.3.3 Heuristic Simplifications
While different versions of FHAP can potentially be solved using direct solu-
tions of the deterministic equivalents for small number of scenarios, this becomes
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intractable for slight increases in the number of scenarios, especially for the enhanced
formulations described in Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2. To this end, we introduce two
heuristic approaches that simplify the solution process for the FHAP models, with
the aim of establishing practical and efficient solution structures for CDCs that they
can use more easily during potential implementations. We discuss the computational
implications of these simplifications in the numerical analyses performed in Section
3.4.
In the first heuristic approach (Heuristic-1), we assume that given a budget al-
location to a neighborhood, the property acquisitions from each category will be
proportionally based on the availability in that category. In other words, acquisition
levels are likely to be high for categories with high availability levels. This is reason-
able from a practical perspective since CDCs would typically desire to acquire more
housing units from categories and neighborhoods with high foreclosure rates.
The heuristic involves the solution of the corresponding FHAP models with these
fixed relationships among the variable values. On the other hand, due to the inte-
grality of the acquisition variables hψil, it is not possible to fix the acquisition variable
values directly as a function of resource allocations xi. Hence, we represent these
conditions through inequality constraints, rather than using equalities, which is fur-
ther described below. For presentation purposes, we describe the steps of the heuristic
approaches by referring to FHAP-S and then state how they would differ for FHAP-G:
Step 1. Add the following constraints to fix the number of acquired units as a
function of resource allocations:
hψil ≤
θil
ψ
∑|L|
l=1
θil
ψ
xi
cilψ
hψil ≥
θil
ψ
∑|L|
l=1
θil
ψ
xi
cilψ
− 1 ∀i, l, ψ (3.47)
Step 2. Solve the model to obtain resource allocation values xHi for each neigh-
borhood.
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Step 3. Evaluate the heuristic solution by setting xi = x
H
i and solving the original
model without constraints (3.47).
In Step 1, we fix the number of acquired units from each category in each neigh-
borhood according to the availability rate of each category. Then in Step 2, the total
budget is allocated by considering fixed acquisition amounts. As a last step, the
model is reevaluated and the acquisition quantities are updated based on the budget
allocated.
In the second heuristic simplification (Heuristic-2), we assume that property ac-
quisitions in each scenario will be made proportionally among categories based on the
ratios of expected social return over cost, which we refer to as ‘marginal social return’.
Hence, more acquisitions will be performed from categories with larger marginal so-
cial return values. This approach is intuitively and practically reasonable due to the
non-profit nature of CDCs and the role of social returns in their decision making.
Note that we implicitly assume the availability in each category will be such that the
allocation scheme is feasible. The implementation of Heuristic-2 is very similar to
the first heuristic, except that the constraints (3.47) to be added are replaced with
the following set of constraints: In the second heuristic simplification (Heuristic-2),
we assume that property acquisitions in each scenario will be made proportionally
among categories based on the ratios of expected social return over cost, which we
refer to as ‘marginal social return’. Hence, more acquisitions will be performed from
categories with larger marginal social return values. This approach is intuitively and
practically reasonable due to the non-profit nature of CDCs and the role of social
returns in their decision making. Note that we implicitly assume the availability in
each category will be such that the allocation scheme is feasible. The implementation
of Heuristic-2 is very similar to the first heuristic, except that the constraints (3.47)
to be added are replaced with the following set of constraints:
58
hψil ≤
µil
ψ
/cil
ψ
∑|L|
l=1
µil
ψ
/cil
ψ
xi
cilψ
hψil ≥
µil
ψ
/cil
ψ
∑|L|
l=1
µil
ψ
/cil
ψ
xi
cilψ
− 1 ∀i, l, ψ (3.48)
These heuristics imply simple and practical rules for CDCs in their budget al-
location decisions. CDCs can easily determine the amount of budget to allocate to
different neighborhoods in an approximate way by looking at the relative ratios of
availability rates or returns.
As part of the adaptation of the above modifications into FHAP-G, first the
same constraints are defined for period one. In addition, similar constraints are also
included for period two by updating the notation of the acquisition and allocation
variables, as well as the uncertain parameter realizations, with their corresponding
second period counterparts.
3.4 Numerical Tests and Analyses Based on a Real-life Im-
plementation
In this section, we implement our models in a real-life decision making situation
based on data obtained from a CDC located in the city of Boston, Massachusetts. The
data was collected through records kept by the CDC as well as through interviews
with CDC staff. In addition, property value information used in the calculations
were obtained from the authors of Johnson et al. (2013). This CDC has expressed an
interest in decision aids to help them improve their capacity for longer-term strategy
design related to foreclosure housing acquisition and redevelopment. In this study,
we apply the models we have formulated to data provided by the CDC with the aim
of generating strategies that could potentially help this and other CDCs in achieving
their goals. Hence, our analysis involves both policy implications for the results
obtained from the solutions of the models, as well as some computational issues
related to the optimization models.
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3.4.1 Description of Data
The CDC in consideration has two alternative decision frameworks for strategic
resource allocation, which involve different geographical representations of their ser-
vice area. More specifically, the two alternatives assume that the CDC’s service area
can be split into either two or four distinct geographical regions. In addition to the
geographical split, these regions also reflect different levels of poverty in the corre-
sponding neighborhoods. The CDC is interested in an equitable and effective strategy
so that overall welfare in the service area is maximized. In order to achieve this objec-
tive, the organization will be acquiring and redeveloping foreclosed properties in each
neighborhood to be sold to owner occupants eventually. Similar to the alternative
geographical representations, we assume two alternative categorizations for the types
of properties to be acquired. In one case, the potential properties are categorized
into two groups, while in the other alternative four distinct categories of properties
are defined. We describe this categorization scheme in detail in the next paragraph.
Overall, the two alternative decision frameworks are defined by letting i = 1, 2 and
l = 1, 2 in one implementation, and i = 1, 2, 3, 4 and l = 1, 2, 3, 4 in another im-
plementation. We refer to these as “Case 2x2” and “Case 4x4”, respectively. The
geographical representations of the two cases, along with sample foreclosed property
availability counts, are shown in Figure 3.6. In addition to its practical relevance,
this structure also allows for a better analysis of computational efficiency from a
methodological perspective.
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1
2
Number of Available Units
Cat. 1=15
Cat. 2=11
Cat. 1=16
Cat. 2=15
(a) Service area and sample foreclosed property availability information
with two neighborhoods and two categories
Number of Available Units
Cat. 1=2
Cat. 2=3
Cat. 1=6
Cat. 2=1
Cat. 3=1
Cat. 4=6
Cat. 3=1
Cat. 4=7
Cat. 3=1
Cat. 4=7
Cat. 3=2
Cat. 4=6
Cat. 1=3
Cat. 2=3
Cat. 1=5
Cat. 2=3
(b) Service area and sample foreclosed property availability in-
formation with four neighborhoods and four categories
Figure 3.6. Categorization of CDC’s service area based on distinct geographical regions. Sample foreclosed property availability
information for each region and property category is also shown on the maps.
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A key issue in the modeling framework is the categorization of properties. We as-
sume that properties in each category have similar characteristics which are stochas-
tic and dependent on external market environments. While any type of classification
scheme can be used, i.e. based on cost, size or proximity to a specific location, a prac-
tical categorization can be based on the property value impacts. As noted previously,
PVI corresponds to the expected impacts on proximate property values from a single
foreclosure. Hence, PVI reflects a relative measure over the properties available for
potential acquisition, where it is natural to assume that the closer the PVI values
for given properties, the likelier it is for them to have similar attribute values, such
as returns and costs. For example, properties with high PVIs are typically located
in central and more desirable locations which imply higher acquisition costs and po-
tentially higher financial returns. The categorizations of properties in the numerical
study have been determined by considering their PVI values.
For both Case 2x2 and Case 4x4, empirical data was gathered to generate the
specific problem instances based on available information and expert opinions. Two
main data sets were used for this purpose. The first data set, obtained directly
from the CDC, consisted of information on properties being considered for potential
acquisition by the CDC in 2011. This information involved estimates of acquisition
and redevelopment costs for the properties, and estimated financial returns from
property sales. The second data set was obtained from the authors of Johnson et al.
(2013) and involved property value impact calculations for all the properties available
for acquisition in the CDC’s service area. Model inputs for the numerical study were
then created based on information extracted from these data sets. For each parameter
considered, histograms and other data displays were plotted as shown in Appendix
A to study the variation and correlation structures in the data sets. Based on these,
acquisition and redevelopment costs, total required budget to acquire all properties of
a given category in a neighborhood, and social returns (represented by standardizing
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the PVI values to vary between 0 and 1), were taken as stochastic parameters, while
financial returns were treated in a deterministic manner.
To characterize the uncertainty in the random parameters of cost, availability, i.e.
total required budget to acquire all properties, and social return for each property
category in each neighborhood, two-point probability distributions were used. To this
end, low and high realizations were computed as the values of the first and third quar-
tiles for each parameter under consideration. Given their exogenous dependence on
the economy, we assume in the implementations that the realizations of a parameter
for the same category are at the same level across all neighborhoods. For example,
if the cost value of a category l in a given neighborhood i is realized as ‘low’, then
the cost of category l in another neighborhood j is also realized as ‘low’. The set of
data showing possible cost, availability and return values for Case 2x2 of FHAP-S
is included in Table 3.1. The scenarios for the stochastic program were then gener-
ated by considering all possible combinations of the different levels of the stochastic
parameters in the model. The probability for each scenario was then calculated by
taking into account the correlation between cil and θil values as described in Section
3.1.1, and by assuming that the social return realizations are independent from the
realizations of these two parameters, where the low and high values for the latter
were assigned an equal probability of occurring. Given that the number of stochastic
parameters in each model configuration is different, the number of scenarios and thus
the complexity of models varies as well. We describe the number of scenarios in each
problem configuration in Section 3.4.6.
A total budget value of $5 million was used in the implementations, which is rep-
resentative of the resources available to the particular CDC considered, while values
for community efficacy were generated by normalizing relative crime rate information
in each neighborhood so that the values have a range between 0 and 1. Distances
between neighborhoods were estimated through existing Geographic Information Sys-
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Cost (cil) Availability Value (θil) Social Return (µil)
Low High Low High Low High
Neigh. 1 Cat.1 $389,000 $575,000 $3,090,000 $ 5,935,000 0.966 0.998
Cat.2 $405,000 $641,000 $4,090,000 $ 4,450,000 0.886 0.997
Neigh. 2 Cat.1 $303,000 $425,000 $4,574,000 $ 4,990,000 0.947 0.986
Cat.2 $329,000 $431,000 $4,314,000 $ 4,675,000 0.895 0.997
Table 3.1. Data representing possible stochastic parameter realizations for FHAP-S
Case 2x2.
tem (GIS) data. Finally, social return function thresholds for FHAP-G were defined
based on expert opinions resulting from consultations with CDC staff. The specific
values of the deterministic parameters used in the study are summarized in Appendix
A for Case 2x2. The computational analysis was based on an equally weighted ob-
jective structure. Using this problem setup, optimal budget allocation decisions to
different neighborhoods were obtained for the CDC in consideration.
3.4.2 Value of Application of Optimization Models
In this section we study the potential value that can be added to CDC opera-
tions by applying the optimization models presented in the study. This is done by
comparing the results from the optimization models with the objective levels to be
achieved when a resource allocation structure similar to current practice is assumed.
We note that our CDC partner did not have a systematic procedure that they im-
plemented in determining resource allocations to different neighborhoods. Rather,
it involved an ad hoc process, which typically meant equal resource allocations to
different parts of their service area. The allocated amounts were then used to acquire
foreclosed properties again through an ad hoc process. Hence, to be able to assess
the differences from an optimal strategy, we represent this practical framework by
assuming that the available budget is split equally among different neighborhoods.
The ad hoc acquisition strategy after resource allocations is studied through three al-
ternative configurations, given that there is no specific system that the CDC utilizes
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Obj. Equal Alloc.- Equal Alloc.- Equal Alloc.- Opt. Alloc.-
Type Highest Return Lowest Cost Optimal Acq. Opt. Acq.
FHAP-S -G FHAP-S -G FHAP-S -G FHAP-S -G
Overall 0.80 0.70 0.80 0.68 0.89 0.79 1.0 1.0
Obj. 1 0.80 0.88 0.80 0.83 0.80 0.90 1.0 1.0
Obj. 2 0.88 0.92 0.89 0.90 0.95 0.94 1.0 1.0
Obj. 3 0.87 0.61 0.87 0.56 0.91 0.61 1.0 1.0
Obj. 4 0.62 0.35 0.63 0.33 0.90 0.58 1.0 1.0
Obj. 5 0.63 0.37 0.65 0.36 0.81 0.55 1.0 1.0
Obj. 6 0.77 0.82 0.78 0.77 0.85 0.94 1.0 1.0
Obj. 7 1.0 0.99 1.0 0.99 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Obj. 8 - 1.0 - 1.0 - 1.0 - 1.0
Table 3.2. Comparison of standardized objective values for the equal budget alloca-
tion strategy, which represents the current practice, and the optimal allocations for
FHAP-S and FHAP-G Case 2x2.
for this purpose. We refer to the resulting cases as equal allocation-highest return,
equal allocation-lowest cost, and equal allocation-optimal acquisition.
In equal allocation-highest return, we assume that after the budget is allocated
equally among neighborhoods, individual acquisition decisions prioritize properties
with the higher return values. In other words, first the highest return properties
are aimed for acquisition, followed by the next highest if budget still remains, etc.
The equal allocation-lowest cost strategy assumes that the prioritization is based
on costs of properties, and lower cost properties are acquired first. Finally, equal
allocation-optimal acquisition configuration assumes that the acquisition decisions
are determined optimally based on the objective structure in the models. Note that
the equal allocation-optimal acquisition strategy would result in the best possible
value for the CDC given an equally split budget during the allocation phase. Hence,
the difference between the corresponding objective values in this case and the optimal
solutions constitutes a lower bound for the value of application of optimization models
developed.
In Table 3.2 we show a comparison of the standardized objective values for each
policy described above under FHAP-S and FHAP-G implementations. The objec-
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Financial Gain Social Gain
Policy FHAP-S FHAP-G FHAP-S FHAP-G
Equal Alloc.-Highest Return $0 $4,694 $0 $18,905
Equal Alloc.-Lowest Cost $2,208 $0 $44,973 $0
Equal Alloc.-Optimal Acq. $60,521 $55,302 $242,602 $252,877
Optimal Alloc.-Optimal Acq. $80,871 $144,150 $489,710 $853,813
Table 3.3. Comparison of gains in financial and social returns as modeled through
Objectives 4 and 5 under different policy implementations.
tive values have been standardized so that the optimal solutions correspond to an
objective value of 1.0. As highlighted above, the equal allocation cases represent the
current practice. For FHAP-S, Optimization through our modeling framework can be
observed to result in an increase of between 10-20% in the overall value of foreclosed
housing acquisition policies. Of the specific objectives, the most significant impact
is on Objectives 4 and 5, which correspond to maximization of financial returns and
social utility, respectively.
The value of optimization over the current practice increases for the FHAP-G
model. This is expected, as the uncertainty is captured in a more accurate fashion
in this implementation. For FHAP-G, a difference of between 20-30% is observed
between the current practice and optimal policies. Again, the most significant value
is added through the financial and social utility objectives, implying that equity
is achieved at a somewhat high level under the current practical implementations.
In Table 3.3 we show the differences in financial and social returns under different
implementations in terms of dollar values. Each data column in the table displays
the difference between the expected return of a given policy and the lowest expected
return among all policies. For example, in the last column we see that equal allocation-
lowest cost policy would create the lowest social return as measured through the PVI
values. By using the optimal policy the CDC can create an additional value of around
$600,000 in property value impacts in their service area when compared with the
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equal allocation-optimal acquisition policy. By the nature of the restricted financial
return structure, the gains in financial returns are lower. Overall, however, the gains
through optimization can be consistently observed for all cases, especially in terms of
social returns. In Section 3.4.3, we describe the implications of the optimal resource
allocation decisions and how changes in different problem parameters impact these
decisions.
3.4.3 Resource Allocations and Impacts of Model Parameters
In this subsection we investigate the implications of the resource allocation deci-
sions form a practical perspective and how changes in different problem parameters
impact these decisions. For the practical implications of the allocation decisions, we
note that no detailed quantitative information was available for one to one compar-
isons with historical budget allocation decisions of the CDC studied. This was be-
cause the specific CDC made such decisions through an ad hoc process, which mostly
involved equal resource allocations to different parts of their service area. Hence,
through consultations with CDC staff, the design of a structured strategic resource
allocation process, as well as the implications of using different quantitative measures
in that process, were noted to be the relevant issues from a practical perspective.
To this end, in this section we try to analyze the structure of our decision models,
specifically with respect to their sensitivity to different model parameters, while the
latter issue involving implications of different objectives is addressed in Section 3.4.4.
Our sensitivity study is based on three key parameters in the modeling frame-
work, which represent general inputs, as opposed to neighborhood specific parameters.
These inputs consist of the available budget to be allocated, and the two threshold
parameters τ1 and τ2 used in defining the social returns from foreclosed property ac-
quisitions when investment dependent return is modeled. For each parameter, we
consider a range of possible values and study how the allocations to different neigh-
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Figure 3.7. Change in optimal resource allocations and objective function value over
different budget levels.
borhoods as well as the overall objective function value change over that range. To
provide a clearer illustration, the analyses were performed on Case 2x2 of the FHAP-S
model with the investment dependent return structure.
In Figure 3.7 we show how the resource allocations and the optimal objective
function value vary over a range of budget values. It is observed that the model is
quite robust to changes in the budget. First, the increase in the optimal objective
function value is minimal as the budget increases. This is likely due to the limitations
imposed by the current availability of the foreclosed properties, as well as due to
the multi-objective structure of the problem. Even though more properties may be
acquired with larger budgets, it does not necessarily mean that these acquisitions
would help increase the value of all objectives. While it would increase utility based
objectives, it may have a negative impact on the equity objectives. A similar robust
structure, although to a smaller extent, is observable in resource allocation decisions
as well. For the given empirical setting, a budget split of 55%-45% is optimal for
budget amounts larger than $4 million. On the other hand, there is a change towards
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a 60%-40% split at lower budget levels, which may be due to the decrease in the
number of options to balance utility and equity. We also note that these resource
allocation decisions have been deemed practically plausible by the CDC considered
in the study.
In Figure 3.8 we present the analysis results for the parameters τ1 and τ2 used
in modeling the social returns. These values were selected for a sensitivity analysis
as they are mostly based on expert opinion and few mathematical models exist on
such return functions. On the other hand, we observe for both parameters that
the optimal objective function value remains mostly the same despite the change in
the parameter values, except for lower τ2 values which enable increased joint return
realization without much impact on equity. Optimal budget splits also show a similar
pattern.
Overall, the model solutions are quite robust with respect to increases and minor
decreases in the general input parameters of budget and investment dependent return
thresholds. This robustness result is a strengthening argument for the conclusions
reached for the given empirical setting, and is likely to hold unless foreclosure rates,
which are currently at high levels, increase significantly to result in an even larger
number foreclosed properties becoming available for acquisition.
3.4.4 Comparison of Financial vs. Nonfinancial and Equity vs. Utility
Based Objective Optimization
As part of our analysis of the impact of using different objectives, which was ob-
served to be of interest to the CDC studied, we consider two trade-off situations in
FHAP. These situations deal with financial versus nonfinancial goals, and equity ver-
sus utility objectives. These issues are especially relevant and unique to our analysis
due to the social dimensions involved in the optimization. We emphasize here that
our analyses are numerical and experimental. Hence, any conclusions are based on
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(a) Analysis for parameter τ1
(b) Analysis for parameters τ2
Figure 3.8. Change in optimal resource allocations and objective function value over
different values of parameters τ1 and τ2.
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the real-world data obtained from the CDC we interacted with. On the other hand,
it can potentially be assumed that similar conclusions are likely to be reached for
organizations operating in scales similar to this CDC, as there is anecdotal evidence
that the CDC studied can be representative of typical CDC operations in other major
cities (NeighborWorks, 2009).
We first analyze how financial objective optimization in FHAP relates to nonfi-
nancial objective optimization. In this analysis, the profit objective, i.e. Objective 4,
is categorized as financial, while all other objectives are categorized as nonfinancial
measures. We apply the constraint method of Collette and Siarry (2003) to these two
aggregate objectives, and the result of this analysis is Pareto curves representing the
trade-offs between the two categories. Figure 3.9 contains Pareto curves for the base
cases of FHAP-S and FHAP-G.
Our main observation is that the trade-off is not so significant and thus inclusion
of financial objectives in FHAP do not detract much from the social and equity based
objectives. This is especially the case for FHAP-S, where only two decision epochs
are involved in the optimization. More specifically, we note that even if purely fi-
nancial objectives were considered, it would still imply around 92% fulfillment of
non-financial objectives for FHAP-S and 87% fulfillment for FHAP-G. We also note
that the trade-off is slightly biased towards the nonfinancial objectives in both mod-
els, where nonfinancial optimization would imply around 89% fulfillment of financial
objectives in FHAP-S, while this rate is 83% for FHAP-G. This is somewhat expected
as nonfinancial goals involve several different objectives that the optimization tries
to achieve, as opposed to a single objective involving financial profit. While we do
not show Pareto plots for alternative configurations of financial and non-financial ob-
jectives, the trade-offs in those configurations are also observed to be similar to the
base case analysis described above. Overall, our analysis shows that even if the CDC
makes its acquisition decisions purely based on financial returns, it would still imply
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(a) FHAP-S
(b) FHAP-G
Figure 3.9. Pareto curves of financial and non-financial objectives for base models
of FHAP-S and FHAP-G.
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around 90% fulfillment of social objectives. The trade-off between financial profit and
non-financial objectives is not so significant and thus inclusion of financial objectives
in decision making does not take away much from the social and equity based objec-
tives. In other words, for the service area considered financial and social values of the
properties are mostly positively correlated.
An important issue for most nonprofit organizations is how to ensure equity in
their services as they try to maximize socio-economic utility. We analyze this issue
by categorizing the multiple objectives considered in FHAP as equity versus utility
objectives. To this end, we assume that equity related to collective efficacy, allocation
rate and owner occupancy, i.e. Objectives 1, 3, and 6, represent the equity related
objectives; while the economies of scale, financial return, social utility and efficient use
of budget, i.e. Objectives 2, 4, 5, and 6, are utility based objectives. We then perform
a Pareto analysis similar to the financial versus nonfinancial objective case above. In
Figure 3.10 we display the trade-off curves for equity versus utility objectives for the
base cases of the two model types.
We observe that the two models behave somewhat differently with respect to the
corresponding values of the two objective types. Overall, utility maximization will
achieve around 80% equity, while equity maximization would achieve around 95% of
utility in FHAP-S. These rates are around 74% for both cases in FHAP-G. Thus,
the two objective types have more of a trade-off when compared with the previous
analysis, specifically for FHAP-G. This suggests that, although the magnitude of
the trade-offs between the two classes of objectives is not large, for a socially focused
organization in this framework the optimization of equity is likely to imply a somewhat
less efficient strategic allocation and vice versa. The results for other configurations
are also similar, and organizations can choose to balance the emphasis on equity versus
utility based on the Pareto representations. For example, it is possible to achieve
around 85% equity and same levels of utility through an optimal solution on the
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(a) FHAP-S
(b) FHAP-G
Figure 3.10. Pareto curves of equity and utility objectives for base models of FHAP-
S and FHAP-G.
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Pareto curve for FHAP-G. Overall, we observe that if equity is not considered in CDC
acquisition selections, it is expected that these acquisitions will be approximately 20-
25% less equitable between different regions than an ideal equitable selection decision.
Such a conclusion can be useful in discussions with community representatives of
neighborhoods. We note that we also consider selected trade-offs between individual
model objectives, and discuss the resulting conclusions in Section 3.4.5.
3.4.5 Value Path Analysis
In this subsection we consider selected trade-offs between model objectives through
value path analyses. Figure 3.11 shows value paths for the equity objectives in the
FHAP-S and FHAP-G base configurations. Objectives 1, 3, and 6 correspond to
equity objectives related to collective efficacy, allocation rate and owner occupancy,
respectively. Each distinct line in the value path represents the performance of a
corner point solution to the multiobjective problem according to all objectives. The
vertical axis represents the extent to which each model instance achieves the most-
desired value for a particular objective. Here we observe a somewhat similar behavior
between FHAP-S and FHAP-G base configurations.
When the collective efficacy based equity measure, i.e. Objective 1, is optimized
in FHAP-S, all other equity measures are at or close to their minimal levels, imply-
ing that different equity objectives are not always synergistic for the neighborhood
data considered. A similar observation can also be made for FHAP-G. The pattern
is somewhat different when the maximization of the allocation rate and owner occu-
pancy based equity objectives are considered individually. Some positive association
is observed between the allocation rate based equity measure and efficacy, as both
are typically at high levels when one of these objectives is maximized. Indeed, the
optimization of owner occupancy is also synergistic with all other equity objectives,
although it is not as strong in FHAP-S where efficacy and allocation rate objectives
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(a) FHAP-S
(b) FHAP-G
Figure 3.11. Trade-off graphs for equity objectives of base models of FHAP-S and
FHAP-G.
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are slightly below their maximum levels when owner occupancy objective is maxi-
mized. Overall, we conclude that maximization of collective efficacy measure by itself
would imply some deviation from fulfilling the allocation rate and owner occupancy
related equity objectives, while strong synergistic effects exist between the latter two
objectives. On the other hand, it should be noted that due to the potential existence
of alternative solutions and the dependency on the data used in the analysis, these
insights may not hold at the identified levels for different data or applications.
In Figure 3.12 we display value paths for FHAP-G with investment dependent
return and with both investment dependent return and reformulated constraint (3.21).
As expected, the former has similarities to the base FHAP-G case. An interesting
observation deals with the optimal value of Objective 3, which is related to constraint
(3.21), in the overall optimization results shown this figure. Although the difference
is not very large, this value is higher than the corresponding value shown for the
base FHAP-G case. Hence, it may be concluded that the improved representation of
(3.21) impacts the model such that Objective 3 is better defined and maximized at a
higher level. On the other hand, the investment dependent return structure and the
reformulated constraint do not have a significant impact on the trade-offs with respect
to the equity related objectives, i.e. the general pattern is similar to the base FHAP-G
model.
A similar value path analysis is also performed for utility objectives. In Figure
3.13 we show such curves for the utility objectives, where Objectives 2, 4, 5, 7, and
8 respectively correspond to the economies of scale, financial return, social utility,
efficient use of budget, and the reallocation penalty objectives. Here it can be observed
that Objectives 2 and 4 do not have significant trade-offs among each other, while
Objectives 5 and 7 appear to be negatively correlated with these objectives. Hence,
if objectives related to the economies of scale and financial returns are maximized
independently, the efficiency in other utility objectives involving social utility and
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(a) FHAP-G with investment dependent return
(b) FHAP-G with investment dependent return and reformulated
constraint (3.21)
Figure 3.12. Trade-off graphs for equity objectives of investment dependent re-
turn extension of FHAP-G with and without reformulation of reallocation constraint
(3.21).
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(a) FHAP-S
(b) FHAP-G
Figure 3.13. Trade-off graphs for utility objectives of base models of FHAP-S and
FHAP-G.
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budget utilization is reduced. On the other hand, as expected, the reallocation penalty
based goal represented by Objective 8 is synergistic with all other objectives. This
behavior is also similar for other configurations of the problem.
3.4.6 Value of Alternative Formulations and Heuristic Approaches
Another analysis that we perform involves the computational aspects of different
formulations, specifically to identify lost value if acquisition decisions were to be made
according to rule-based heuristics. To this end, we consider the complete stochastic
mixed-integer programming (SMIP) solutions of the given formulations, as well as
the two simplifying heuristic approaches. We note here that while the problem is a
strategic one, where computational times are typically not a significant concern, the
proposed decision models are aimed at serving as guides to CDCs in their decision
making process. As a result, during the planning stage multiple alternative parameter
values can be used and tested from a sensitivity analysis perspective, which would
require multiple solutions for the problem. Hence, relatively quick solution generation
is likely to have some relevance for practical implementation of the proposed models
as well.
The computational results for different instances and versions of FHAP are shown
through the tables 3.4 - 3.6 for this study. Computations were performed on a PC
with Intel i5 Core processor with 2.3 GHz speed and 4 GB memory. All solutions
were obtained using the CPLEX 12 solver, where implementations were performed in
the General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS).
One consideration for our research is that given the implementation challenges of
advanced optimization models by CDCs, it may be possible that simplified heuristic
approaches, which can be implemented more easily, can be used as decision aids by
these organizations. Hence, we are specifically interested in the lost value when such
heuristic approximations are used. We first note that the two heuristics proposed are
80
more efficient from a computational perspective, allowing for solutions in reasonably
short run times, i.e. much less than one hour. Moreover, the quality of the solutions
appear to be quite high for all cases. The overall average computational improvement
is around 60% for the two heuristics for FHAP-S, while the corresponding values
are even higher, i.e. around 68%, for FHAP-G. Indeed, improvements are much
higher for the more complex Case 4x4 configurations. The observed difference in
terms of objective function values is around 4% for FHAP-S when averaged over all
instances, while this gap is around 2% for FHAP-G. Hence, it can be concluded that the
proposed rule-based heuristic approaches can be chosen as reasonable alternatives to
the complete SMIP optimization as the expected difference from optimality is around
4%. Complete SMIP implementation results in long computational times, especially
as larger problem instances are considered. Indeed, the effectiveness of the heuristics
increases with computational complexity.
We also compare the computational efficiency of different formulations. More
specifically, we compare the computational times for the base and investment depen-
dent return models. We note that the inclusion of investment dependent returns adds
significant complexity to the model, as observed in the CPU times of the complete
SMIP solutions for both models. For example, FHAP-S can not be solved in the one
hour of allocated time when investment dependent return structure is used. Similar
observations can also be made for FHAP-G that the computations take more than
an hour for all such implementations. Hence, for the complete SMIP models, the
computational challenges associated with the inclusion of investment dependent re-
turns should be considered. On the other hand, this issue is not the case for heuristic
approaches, as we described above.
As another comparative analysis, we consider the value of the reformulation of
constraint (3.21) for FHAP-G based on the information in computational result ta-
bles provided as Table 3.5. The base and investment dependent return configurations
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for this model are based on an approximation of this constraint, which is a more
restrictive formulation. Hence, the reformulation allows for potential improvement
in the expected utility of the investments. For both the complete SMIP and heuris-
tic formulations, the utility increases about 10% when the reformulation is used.
The only trade-off involves the computational complexity added due to the piece-
wise approximation used as part of the reformulation of (3.21). The results show
that the reformulated model performs worse computationally, especially for the com-
plete SMIP approach. In those cases, a deterioration of around 20% is observed in
the computational times for FHAP-G, since additional complexity through the SOS2
variables is added to the model.
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Base Inv. Dep. Ret.
Case # of Obj. Obj. CPU CPU Obj. Obj. CPU CPU
FHAP-S Scen Val. % Gap (sec) % Gain Val. % Gap (sec) % Gain
Complete SMIP 2x2 16 0.934 - 8.7 - 0.96 - 20.1 -
4x4 256 0.887 - 1340.2 - 0.909 - 5702.5 -
Heuristic-1 2x2 16 0.934 0.0% 6.4 26.3% 0.958 -0.2% 15.2 24.1%
4x4 256 0.751 -15.3% 83.4 93.8% 0.884 -2.8% 1175.1 79.4%
Heuristic-2 2x2 16 0.934 0.0% 6.2 28.7% 0.96 -0.0% 16.9 15.6%
4x4 256 0.764 -13.9% 61.7 95.4% 0.885 -2.6% 219.5 96.2%
Table 3.4. Computational results for the base model and investment dependent return extension of FHAP-S.
Base Reformulated (3.21)
Case # of Obj. Obj. CPU CPU Obj. Obj. CPU CPU
FHAP-G Scen Val. % Gap (sec) % Gain Val. % Gap (sec) % Gain
Complete SMIP 2x2 1024 0.880 - 245.7 - 0.955 - 325.2 -
4x4 4096 0.845 - 4527.4 - 0.947 - 5137.8 -
Heuristic-1 2x2 1024 0.873 -0.8% 106.0 56.9% 0.955 -0.0% 197.1 39.4%
4x4 4096 0.837 -0.9% 802.6 82.3% 0.927 -2.1% 881.4 82.8%
Heuristic-2 2x2 1024 0.875 -0.6% 114.8 53.3% 0.951 -0.4% 127.3 60.9%
4x4 4096 0.836 -1.0% 638.3 85.9% 0.934 -1.4% 725.9 85.9%
Table 3.5. Computational results for the base model and reformulated allocation rate constraint extension of FHAP-G.
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Inv. Dep. Ret. Reform. (3.21)- Inv. Dep. Ret.
Case # of Obj. Obj. CPU CPU Obj. Obj. CPU CPU
FHAP-G Scen Val. % Gap (sec) % Gain Val. % Gap (sec) % Gain
Complete SMIP 2x2 1024 0.884 - 284.6 - 0.959 - 426.1 -
4x4 4096 0.862 - 6444.7 - 0.913 - 7091.9 -
Heuristic-1 2x2 1024 0.861 -2.6% 100.7 64.6% 0.94 -2.0% 215.7 49.4%
4x4 4096 0.849 -1.5% 698.5 89.2% 0.850 -6.9% 1798.1 74.6%
Heuristic-2 2x2 1024 0.88 -0.5% 183.8 35.4% 0.933 -2.7% 191.5 55.1%
4x4 4096 0.841 -2.4% 708.4 89.0% 0.898 -1.6% 921.1 87.0%
Table 3.6. Computational results for the investment dependent return extension of FHAP-G with and without reformulation
of allocation rate constraint (3.21).
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In the computational result tables, the first and second columns indicate the
solution method used and the case type for the corresponding version of FHAP, while
the third column shows the number of scenarios in each instance. The other columns
describe the results obtained for each version by listing the objective function value
obtained, its percent difference from the best solution, the computation time and its
percent difference from the computation time of the complete SMIP solution. The
base configurations correspond to the basic formulations of FHAP-S and FHAP-G as
described in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, respectively. The investment dependent return and
reformulated (3.21) configurations are the model extensions introduced in Sections
3.3.1 and 3.3.2. Note that reformulation of (3.21) applies only to FHAP-G, where the
introduction of gradual uncertainty resolution results in a complexity in the definition
of constraint (3.21). The second configuration in the third result table considers both
the reformulation structure and investment dependent returns for FHAP-G.
3.4.7 Policy Implications for CDCs
The policy implications of our study arise from our use of real-world based data
that represent the strategic decision framework of a particular CDC. While our conclu-
sions specifically apply to this data set, it is possible that the operating environments
for many other CDCs are similar in nature, for which some anecdotal evidence exists
as noted previously. Hence, we believe that our general findings can be helpful for
such organizations in devising strategic investment plans.
CDCs can benefit from the results of this study in two ways. First, as a direct
utilization, the optimization models can potentially be implemented to identify a
benchmark resource allocation strategy as defined by the model assumptions and
inputs. This benchmark strategy can be adjusted based on any other qualitative
inputs that may exist, and the adjusted strategy can be used directly to allocate
resources to different neighborhoods. As an alternative, the model results can be
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used to assess or justify the existing resource allocation policy of a given CDC, or to
guide other routine activities. Second, as an indirect utilization, the policy related
conclusions we reach through our numerical analysis, which is based on a typical
CDC operation, can be used for general guidance in strategic resource allocation or
property acquisition by CDCs. We specify these general policy implications in the
following paragraphs.
For general policy guidelines, first we note that the optimal resource allocation
strategy, which involves splitting of the budget among different neighborhoods, is
quite robust for different budget levels and return function parameters. Hence, CDCs
can adjust the resource allocations proportionally if fund availabilities change during
the planning period.
Second set of policy implications deals with the emphasis on different optimization
objectives. The results suggest that there is no significant conflict between financial
and nonfinancial objectives. While this conclusion is based on the numerical data
used for this specific case study, it is likely that if a CDC makes its acquisition
decisions solely based on financial returns, it would still imply around 90% fulfillment
of social objectives. Hence, CDCs can simply consider only financial objectives in
their acquisition policies and this would not result in huge loss of social value.
While still not very significant, the trade-offs are a bit more apparent when equity
objectives are considered with respect to utility. Thus, it is important for CDCs
to consider equity in their resource allocation and property acquisition processes,
as otherwise the resulting social value may be high but unbalanced among different
parts of their service area. Optimizing investments based on only social returns may
imply some inequity between neighborhoods, corresponding to an observed loss of
equity around 20-25%. This conclusion is of course dependent on the distribution of
different category properties across the service area. For the case study presented,
this distribution is not significantly biased towards a specific subset of neighborhoods.
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This relatively even distribution of neighborhood parameters can be expected to be
observed in other CDC service areas as well given their typically focused geography.
Hence, the results are likely to be applicable to other CDC operations, too.
In addition, CDCs can take into account that the collective efficacy measure is
not necessarily synergistic with other equitable allocation objectives such as those
involving allocation and owner occupancy ratios in neighborhoods. On the other
hand, the latter two equity objectives are strongly correlated implying that focusing
on one would also increase the effectiveness level in the other. CDCs should also
note that if they try to take advantage of economies of scale by investing mostly in
proximate properties, this will have a somewhat significant negative impact on the
social utility achieved through such a policy.
A third category of policy implications relate to the use of rule-based heuris-
tics. Given the objective structure presented and assuming that budget allocations
to different neighborhoods are done as efficiently as possible, selecting property ac-
quisitions based on relative marginal returns or availabilities over different categories
does not result in significant loss of overall utility for CDCs. For most cases, this loss
is expected to be less than 4% with respect to an optimal strategy. Hence, in the
absence of any optimization implementations, CDCs can consider using such general
rule-based acquisition strategies.
3.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we studied stochastic dynamic models for resource allocation and
foreclosed property acquisition to provide some general evidence-based guidance to
a specific CDC, with potentially broader implications. To this end we first devel-
oped a two-stage stochastic programming formulation, and then expanded this model
through a multi-stage structure involving gradual uncertainty resolution. We also
studied two variations in these models in order to capture some additional com-
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plexities. Finally, an empirical analysis has performed based on real-world data for
practical and computational evaluations.
While our conclusions are based on the specific numerical data used, we demon-
strate through our analyses that CDCs can benefit from the utilization of the pro-
posed models either through direct implementation for specific strategic guidance, or
through the indirect use of several policy results obtained. We further show that two
simplistic heuristic improvements result in increased efficiency without a significant
optimality gap, indicating the potential practical value of these approaches.
A specific characteristic of our analysis is that we build our models through inter-
actions with a CDC, and use real-world data to test them. As a first stochastic model
of its type in this application area, our study is aimed to provide strategic resource
allocation guidelines for practitioners through explicit consideration of uncertainty.
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CHAPTER 4
TACTICAL SOCIETAL RESOURCE ALLOCATION IN
FORECLOSED HOUSING ACQUISITION
In this chapter, we consider a CDC that faces decisions on potential acquisitions of
foreclosed properties that become available over time in their service area. By being
available, we refer to the case that a property is placed on market for potential sale
by a bank or other mortgage holder, and that the property is potentially approvable
for acquisition by a funding source. When a foreclosed property is put on sale, an
important advantage for CDCs and other similar entities is their priority in making
offers on the property. This is due to requirements put in place by most financial
institutions through the National First Look Program, which provide owner occupants
and public entities that are committed to the community an early opportunity to bid
for a foreclosed property. As part of this policy, only offers from owner occupants
and buyers using public funds are considered during the first 15 days a property is on
the market, and offers from investors are considered only after the first 15 days have
passed. This allows for a higher likelihood of a successful offer for CDCs due to the
relatively fewer competitors in the process (Axel-Lute and Hersh, 2011). We further
describe the details of this decision framework in the following section
4.1 Tactical Foreclosed Acquisition Model
We assume that the availability of foreclosed properties for potential acquisition
follows a Poisson process with rate λ as suggested by analysis of historical data. The
availability rate λ is typically related to the conditions of the economy and the housing
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market. A high availability rate implies a poor state of economy where foreclosure
rates are high, while low rates would indicate that the economy and the housing
market are in better condition. We note here that λ is assumed to be stationary, i.e.
we do not model a dynamic environment where the state of the economy fluctuates,
due to the long-term dynamics of such fluctuations. On the other hand, we analyze
later in the study how optimal policies change for different availability rate levels.
At the beginning of the planning period, CDC has an estimate of the total fund-
ing that they can potentially access through various sources during that period. This
funding level, which we denote by B, represents the total amount of credit or other
funds that the CDC can assume to be potentially available for foreclosed property ac-
quisition. The total amount of accessible funds is typically well estimated by CDCs, as
they depend on their existing lines of credit with banks or the fixed grants available
through various government programs. Suppose T ∈ (0,∞] denotes an expiration
time for the available funds, after which any unused funds will have no value. This
time limitation typically depends on the funding source. For example, certain govern-
ment funds have deadlines that they need to be used by, while other resources such
as donations may not have any such stipulations, implying that they can be used
anytime.
When a foreclosed property is placed on market by the lender, it has an associated
asking price, usually based on the price opinion of a broker with experience in the
area. In addition, CDCs can also perform a market analysis themselves to estimate
the market value of a foreclosed property. Without loss of generality, we assume
that the asking price is a lower bound on a foreclosed property’s market value, as
well as on the amount required for a successful offer. This is quite typical in the
regular operation of the real estate market, as banks or other lenders would often
have lower asking prices on foreclosed properties due to their desire to sell these
properties quickly. Hence, such properties would typically sell at above the asking
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price, and offers would involve overbids. We let C ∈ [C, C¯] denote the asking price
for a foreclosed property, which represents the minimum resource requirement for the
acquisition of that property. The asking price of a property is defined by a probability
distribution f(c).
Similar to the asking prices, the social-return from a property, denoted by R ∈
[R, R¯], is also stochastic and is characterized by a probability distribution f(r), or
f(r, c) if social-returns and the asking prices are correlated. Estimating the social-
return from the acquisition and redevelopment of a foreclosed property is clearly
difficult. Johnson et al. (2013) highlight this challenge, and develop a measure vali-
dated by some CDCs, which is based on the impact of the acquisition of a foreclosed
property on the appreciation of the value of nearby properties. As also noted in
Chapter 3, more formally, the property value impact (PVI) measure is defined as
the expected impact on proximate property values from a given foreclosure. This
measure is directly related to the geographical location of a property, and can easily
be calculated through the procedure described by Johnson et al. (2013) for each fore-
closed property that becomes available for acquisition. In this chapter, we use PVI
values that we obtained from Johnson et al. (2013) directly without normalization.
Thus, PVI values used in this chapter are in units of dollars. We emphasize here that
our focus is on the returns to the society, and hence we do not model any financial
returns for the CDC which may be realized due to the rental or sale of an acquired
property. The latter involves a much broader scope with a focus towards the overall
operation of a CDC, as opposed to foreclosed housing acquisitions. Moreover, several
CDCs that were consulted noted the maximization of the impact on property values
as being their objective in foreclosed property acquisitions. This is somewhat natural,
as most resources such as government funds for foreclosed property acquisition are
aimed at appreciation of home prices and stabilization of the housing market.
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Observing a foreclosed property entering the market at time t ∈ [0, T ] with an
asking price c, a CDC first decides whether they should consult with the funding
source and make an offer on the property. If an offer decision is reached, then the
next decision involves the determination of the amount to offer. We model the offer
amount decision at time t, for a remaining fund level b, through an overbid rate
parameter δbct ∈ [0, δ¯c], which corresponds to the percent difference between the offer
amount and the asking price c. This notation implies that the overbid rate can vary
over the planning horizon, and the limits on the overbid rate can differ based on the
asking price of a given property. We denote δbct as a percentage, e.g. δbct = 0.05
implies that the offer amount is 5% over the asking price. The probability of success
for an offer, i.e. the probability of winning a bid, is an increasing function of the
overbid rate, and is denoted p(δbct). As part of our analysis, we assume that p(δbct)
can be any general increasing bounded function.
When an offer is made on a foreclosed property, an overhead cost corresponding
to the time and other expenses required to make the offer is incurred by the CDC.
This cost is typically a certain percentage G of the offer amount, and can be defined
as g(c, δbct) = (c + cδbct)G, where c + cδbct is the offer amount. While it may not
typically hold in practice, a fixed cost assumption is also possible here, in which case
the analytical derivations would apply in a simpler way. If the offer is not accepted
by the seller, then this cost is sunk. Hence, g(c, δbct) can be interpreted similar to a
penalty cost for not acquiring a property on which the CDC has made an offer.
Given this decision framework, the objective for the CDC is to determine a policy
involving offer/no-offer decisions and overbid rates that maximize the expected total
social-return accumulated over a given planning horizon. In the following sections,
we first summarize the notation used in the model and then describe the model
formulation.
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4.1.1 Notation Used in the Model
b: Available accessible funds at any given time
B: Available accessible funds at the beginning of the planning period
c: Asking price for a foreclosed property
C, C¯: Minimum and maximum possible asking price for a property
f(c): Marginal probability distribution of property asking prices
f(r, c): Joint probability distribution of asking prices and property
value impacts
g(c, δbct): Overhead costs representing expenses required to make an offer
on a property
G: Rate at which overhead costs are incurred defined as a percentage
of the offer amount
p(δbct): Probability of success for an offer on a property
r: Property value impact of a foreclosed property representing returns
from acquisition
R, R¯: Minimum and maximum possible property value impact of a
property
T : Time of budget expiration
V (bt): Expected total property value impact from an available budget
b at time t
x(δbct): Property value impact threshold used to decide whether an offer
should be made on a property
α: Discount rate
δbct: Overbid rate defined as the percent difference between the asking price
and offer amount
λ: Rate that foreclosed properties become available for acquisition
τ : Discretization factor used in the discrete approximations
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4.1.2 Model Formulation
Note that when the CDC makes an offer of c+ cδbct ≤ b on a foreclosed property
and the offer is accepted, for which the probability is p(δbct), the property is going
to be acquired and a social-return r, defined in terms of the associated PVI, will be
realized. If the offer is not accepted, then the overhead expenses g(c, δbct) are lost.
These expenses do not come out of the acquisition funds, but rather from the general
operating budget of the CDC, and are considered as lost social value. In addition, the
PVI values of different acquisitions, which indirectly capture proximity effects, are
additive from a social-return perspective as described in Harding et al. (2009). Given
this framework, we let the value function V
(
bt
)
denote the maximum expected total
PVI that can be achieved from time t until T using the remaining funds b, and note
that the value function V
(
bt
)
satisfies the following dynamic programming recursion
for t < T :
V
(
bt
)
= EC,R
[
max
{
V
(
bt
)
, max
δbCt≥0
C+CδbCt≤b
{[
R + V
(
(b− C − CδbCt)t
)]
p(δbCt)
+
[
V
(
bt
)
− g(C, δbCt)
][
1− p(δbCt)
]}}]
(4.1)
Moreover, we have V
(
bT
)
= 0 for all fund levels b. In the representation above, the
two arguments in the first maximum operator correspond to no-offer/offer decisions,
while the second maximum operator implies the selection of an overbid rate that would
maximize the overall value. Note that the condition C + CδbCt ≤ b for nonnegative
δbCt in the second maximum operator models the budget constraint and implies that
the value function remains the same if accessible funds are not sufficient to acquire a
property with a given cost. Defining the expectation based on the distributions of C
and R, equation (4.1) can be expressed as:
V
(
bt
)
=
∫ b
C
∫ R¯
R
max
{
V
(
bt
)
, max
δbct≥0
c+cδbct≤b
{[
r + V
(
(b− c− cδbct)t
)]
p(δbct)
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+
[
V
(
bt
)
− g(c, δbct)
][
1− p(δbct)
]}}
f(r, c)drdc (4.2)
It can be observed from the recursion that the optimal policy for a foreclosed property
that becomes available at time t with an accessible fund level of b would be as follows.
The CDC should make an offer on a property with asking price c and property value
impact r using an overbid rate of δ∗bct if c+ cδ
∗
bct ≤ b and :
[
r + V ∗
(
(b− c− cδ∗bct)t
)]
p(δ∗bct) +
[
V ∗
(
bt
)
− g(c, δ∗bct)
][
1− p(δ∗bct)
]
≥ V ∗
(
bt
)
(4.3)
where V ∗
(
bt
)
denote the optimal value function, while the optimal overbid rate δ∗bct
is formally defined as δ∗bct = argmaxδbct
{[
r + V ∗
(
(b− c− cδbct)t
)]
p(δbct) +
[
V ∗
(
bt
)
−
g(c, δbct)
][
1 − p(δbct)
]}
. Through some algebraic manipulation, condition (4.3) can
be expressed as a PVI threshold policy. More specifically, the CDC should make an
offer on a foreclosed property available for acquisition if accessible funds are sufficient
and the PVI value of the property is greater than a threshold, i.e. if:
r ≥ V ∗
(
bt
)
− V ∗
(
(b− c− cδ∗bct)t
)
+
1− p(δ∗bct)
p(δ∗bct)
g(c, δ∗bct) (4.4)
Hence, to determine the optimal threshold value for fund level b at time t, a priori
calculation of the optimal value functions V ∗
(
bt
)
and overbid rates δ∗bct is needed for
all b ∈ [0, B] and t ∈ [0, T ]. We describe in the following sections how these values
can be determined, and what their implications for CDCs are.
As part of our analysis throughout the rest of the study, we consider two types of
practical decision making situations that the CDCs face: (1) an infinite horizon case
where the accessible acquisition funds do not expire, i.e. funds can be used anytime,
and (2) a finite horizon case where the unused amount of potentially accessible ac-
quisition funds is assumed lost at the end of a fixed planning period such as a fiscal
95
year. We study these two cases separately, and describe results about the optimal
value functions and overbid rates for each case.
4.1.3 Optimal Foreclosed Housing Acquisition Policies with No Fund Ex-
piration
A portion of funds potentially accessible by CDCs for foreclosed property acqui-
sitions may not have usage deadlines, such as donations or lines of credit that they
might have through private banks or other lenders. Such resources can be considered
as funds without any expiration, implying that they can be used over an infinite time
horizon. While CDCs would typically try to replace any funds used out of their lines
of credit with funds from other sources, it is reasonable that a CDC, like any other
similar organization, will do planning every six months or a year to determine an
acquisition strategy based on their available lines of credit. In addition, while these
lines of credit might involve cash flows due to property sales or other transactions,
these can be assumed to be not affecting the acquisition decisions as they can be con-
sidered in the next period’s planning due to the time delay in the redevelopment and
sale of acquired properties. In this section, we address optimal acquisition policies
under such conditions, which corresponds to the case with T = ∞. We specifically
describe procedures for calculating optimal value functions, and characterize optimal
policies including overbid rates to be used if an offer decision is made on a foreclosed
property.
Given the stationarity of the probability distributions of foreclosed property ask-
ing prices, PVI measures, and the availability rates, as observed through analysis of
historical data from 2009 to 2012, the value function for the case without fund expi-
ration is independent of time t, and is thus denoted by V (b). Moreover, a continuous
discount rate of α is assumed for this case to reflect the time value of available funds
and property value impacts of acquisitions. Our first result deals with the calculation
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of the optimal value functions. We note that under some very general assumptions,
it is possible to solve for the optimal values of V (b) through a recursive relationship
as follows:
Theorem 1. If accessible funds for foreclosed housing acquisition for a CDC do not
expire, then the optimal expected total PVI for a given fund level b, denoted as V ∗(b),
is the solution of the following equation:
αV ∗(b) =λ
∫ b
C
max
δbc
{∫ R¯
x(δbc)
p(δbc)
(
r −
[
V ∗(b)− V ∗(b− c− cδbc)
+
1− p(δbc)
p(δbc)
g(c, δbc)
])
f(r, c)dr
}
dc (4.5)
where x(δbc) is the PVI threshold for making an offer and is defined as x(δbc) =
V ∗(b)− V ∗(b− c− cδbc) +
1−p(δbc)
p(δbc)
g(c, δbc).
Proof. All proofs are included in Appendix B.2. 
By evaluating the integral in Equation (4.5), the set of corresponding recursive
relationships can be numerically solved to determine the optimal expected total PVI
for each fund level b ∈ [0, B], and thus the optimal overbid rates δ∗bc and the PVI
thresholds x(δ∗bc). For the optimal overbid rate, it is possible to numerically evaluate
the recursion in (4.5) by considering a discrete set of overbid options, and then se-
lecting the rate that results in the maximum expected total PVI. On the other hand,
it is also possible to characterize the optimal overbid rate analytically under certain
conditions. These characterizations are described through Theorem 2 as follows:
Theorem 2. Let K¯ = maxk∈{R,R¯}{E(r|r ≥ k)− k}. In addition, let L(δbc) = Gc
(
1−
p(δbc)−
p′(δbc)
p(δbc)
(1+ δbc)
)
with L¯ = maxδbc∈[0,δ¯c]{L(δbc)} and L = minδbc∈[0,δ¯c]{L(δbc)} for
a property with asking price c and PVI value of r.
If accessible funds for foreclosed housing acquisition for a CDC do not expire,
then the optimal overbid rate is approximately independent of the amount of accessible
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funds, and the following policies are optimal for overbidding on a foreclosed property
for which a CDC will make an offer:
1. If the condition p′(δ¯c)K¯ − L ≤ 0 holds, then the CDC’s offer should be at the
asking price.
2. If the condition L¯ ≤ 0 holds , then the CDC’s offer should be at an overbid level
of δ¯c:
3. If the probability of success for an offer is a convex function of the overbid rate
or if −p′′(δbc)
[
r − R + Gc
(
δbc + 1 −
1−p(δbc)
p(δbc)
)]
≤ 2Gcp′(δbc) for all δbc ∈ [0, δ¯c],
then the CDC’s offer should always be either at the asking price or at overbid
level δ¯c.
An important implication of Theorem 2 is the independence of the optimal overbid
rate from the amount of accessible funds, which suggests that δ∗bc = δ
∗
c for all b. Hence,
under some basic assumptions discussed in the proof of the theorem, the same overbid
rate is optimal for a property at all fund levels. On the other hand, for the sake of
completeness, we continue to use the subscript b when referring to the overbid rate
throughout the study. The results in Theorem 2 can be used to help determine the
amount to offer for a given property, while at the same time simplifying the solution
of Equation (4.5) as the maximization over δbc will not be needed if any of the first
two conditions listed are satisfied. Even when the two conditions do not hold, but
the condition in item 3 applies, the solution is still simpler due to the conclusion
that δ∗bc ∈ {0, δ¯c} under that case. Moreover, the conclusions can serve as a simple
benchmark for offers made using arbitrary overbid rates. Note that if the conditions
in Theorem 2 are not satisfied, then the optimal overbid rate can be obtained through
enumeration of potential discrete values of δbc, and solving Equation (4.5) separately
for each case.
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An indirect result of the analysis in Theorem 2 involves the characterization of
the relationship between the optimal overbid rate, the PVI thresholds, and the asking
prices of the properties. The following result provides insights about these relation-
ships which has implications about the overbid policy that the CDC should use:
Corollary 1. For any PVI threshold level k, let K = E(r|r ≥ k) − k. The optimal
overbid rate that the CDC should use under no fund expiration for a property with
asking price c has the following properties:
1. The optimal overbid rate that the CDC should use is either 0, δ¯c, or a solution
of the equation p′(δbc)K − L(δbc) = 0 for a PVI threshold level k.
2. The optimal overbid rate is nonincreasing in K.
3. The optimal overbid rate is nondecreasing in c.
Given the dependence of optimal overbid rates and PVI threshold levels, item 1
in Corollary 1 indicates that for any threshold level k the optimal overbid rate can be
obtained by solving the equation p′(δbc)K −L(δbc) = 0. A solution lying in the range
[0, δ¯c] would correspond to the optimal overbid rate. If all solutions are outside the
range, then the optimal overbid rate is one of the boundary values. This result might
also be helpful when an arbitrary PVI threshold is used. More specifically, it may
be the case that the CDC uses a PVI threshold based on previous experience of the
staff or based on existing organizational policies, and the results above would provide
insights about the offer amounts to be made. Item 2 in Corollary 1 describes how the
optimal overbid rate changes as a function of K, which depends on the distribution of
the PVI values. A more direct result is item 3, which indicates that CDCs typically
should use higher overbid rates for higher cost properties. This is likely due to the
overhead costs being higher for those properties. In Figures 4.1(a) and 4.1(b), we
demonstrate as an example how the optimal overbid rates vary as a function of K
and c for a concave increasing function of probability of success in an offer.
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Figure 4.1. Demonstration of how optimal overbid rate changes as a function of K
and property asking price for a PVI threshold k, when the probability of success in
an offer is a concave increasing function of overbid rate.
Using the discussion above, it can be shown that for the case with uniformly
distributed returns the optimal overbid policy can be expressed in a more compact
form. We summarize this through the following corollary:
Corollary 2. If the returns in the foreclosed housing acquisition problem are uni-
formly distributed, then the following policies are optimal on the overbid rate for a
property with asking price c under no fund expiration:
1. If the condition p′(δ¯c)(R¯ − R) − 2L ≤ 0 holds, then the CDC’s offer should be
at the asking price.
2. The optimal overbid rate that the CDC should use is either 0, δ¯c, or a solution
of the equation p′(δbc)(R¯− k)− 2L(δbc) = 0 for a PVI threshold level k.
Through further analysis, we also note some qualitative characteristics related to
the optimal acquisition policy under the no fund expiration case. As part of this
analysis we introduce two measures of practical relevance, which we refer to as the
“critical fund level” and “critical time”. The critical fund level is defined as the
specific funding level such that the optimal policy for funds larger than that level is
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to make offers to all available properties that satisfy a minimum return requirement.
Similarly, the critical time is the time period such that the optimal policy after that
time period is to make offers to all available properties satisfying the minimum return
requirement. For the no fund expiration case, the optimal thresholds are constant
over time, so the critical time is either 0 or ∞. Hence, this measure becomes more
relevant when the funds expire at a certain time, which we discuss later. Given these
additional definitions, we summarize some important characteristics for the optimal
foreclosed housing acquisition policy as follows:
Theorem 3. The following conditions always hold for the foreclosed housing acqui-
sition problem with no fund expiration:
1. The larger the amount of accessible funds, the higher the expected total PVI
value to be realized from foreclosed property acquisitions.
2. The higher the availability rate of foreclosed properties, the higher the optimal
PVI thresholds that a CDC should use.
3. The marginal value of accessible funds decreases as the fund amounts get larger,
if optimal PVI thresholds are decreasing in the amount of accessible funds.
4. Let δ˙bc be a solution to the equation p(δbc)
(
1 − p(δbc)
)
− p′(δbc)(1 + δbc) = 0. If
there is a unique solution δ˙bc ∈ [0, δ¯c] or if δ˙bc > δ¯c, then for all δbc ∈ [0, δ˙bc], the
higher the PVI threshold used by the CDC, the higher the overbid rate should
be. For all, δbc ∈ [δ˙bc, δ¯c] or if δ˙bc < 0, the higher the PVI threshold used by the
CDC, the lower the overbid rate should be.
5. If optimal PVI thresholds are increasing in overbid rate, then the higher the
overbid rate used, the higher the critical fund level.
6. The critical fund level and the marginal value of accessible funds are constant
over time.
101
The first result is an intuitive conclusion that the higher the amount of accessible
funds, the more value they have in terms of the total PVI that can be achieved from
acquired properties. Similarly, item 2 in Theorem 3 is also somewhat intuitive, as it
indicates that a CDC should be more selective if acquisition options arrive at a higher
rate. The third conclusion is due to the concavity of the total expected PVI value from
acquisitions under the stated condition of being less selective when operating with
larger funding levels. In that case, the marginal value of available funds will be higher
as the remaining amount of accessible funds gets lower. The property described in the
fourth item in Theorem 3 implies that the relationship between PVI thresholds and
overbid rates vary over the range of overbid rates. If a CDC has a policy to overbid
at a rate lower than δ˙bc, then they should use higher overbid rates only when an offer
is made on a property with a larger PVI value. However, if the CDC’s policy is to
offer above δ˙bc, then they can use higher overbid rates for properties with lower PVI
values. As the fifth item, we note that if the CDC uses high overbid rates and high
thresholds, then the critical fund level will get higher as the overbid rate increases.
In other words, usage of higher overbid rates would result in the CDC stopping being
selective earlier. Finally, given that the no fund expiration case assumes an infinite
planning horizon, the optimal threshold policy and thus the critical fund level and
the marginal value of accessible funds are the same at all times.
4.1.4 Optimal Foreclosed Housing Acquisition Policies with Fund Expi-
ration
Another important case for CDCs’ foreclosed housing acquisition process is when
they face deadlines for utilizing the potentially accessible acquisition funds. This is
typically the case when the providers of the funds stipulate that they are used within
a given time frame. For example, the funds that were made available to CDCs by the
federal government as part of the Neighborhood Stabilization Program over the last
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few years required that these funds were used by the end of 2012 Stable Communities
(2012).
Utilizing a similar structure as the infinite horizon case, in this section we char-
acterize the optimal foreclosed housing acquisition policies for CDCs when they have
time-based limitations for using the accessible funds, which we broadly refer to as fore-
closed property acquisition under fund expiration. This introduces a time-dependent
decision structure, where the optimal offer decisions depend on the remaining time
before expiration. We first note through Theorem 4 below that the optimal expected
total PVI at a given time for different remaining fund levels can be found by recur-
sively solving a set of differential equations:
Theorem 4. If accessible funds for foreclosed housing acquisition for a CDC expire
at a finite time T , then the optimal expected total PVI for a given funding level b at
time t, denoted as V ∗
(
bt
)
, is the solution of the following differential equation:
∂V ∗
(
bt
)
∂t
= −αV ∗
(
bt
)
+ λ
∫ b
C
max
δbct
{∫ R¯
x(δbct)
p(δbct)
(
r −
[
V ∗
(
bt
)
− V ∗
(
(b− c− cδbct)t
)
+
1− p(δbct)
p(δbct)
g(c, δbct)
])
f(r, c)dr
}
dc (4.6)
where the PVI threshold x(δbct) is defined as x(δbct) = V
∗
(
bt
)
− V ∗
(
(b− c− cδbct)t
)
+
1−p(δbct)
p(δbct)
g(c, δbct).
Note that in the representation above we slightly abuse the notation, and show
the time dependence of the value function through the subscript t in the budget
notation bt. Our utilization of a discount factor in the fund expiration case is mostly
due to completeness in capturing the time value of available funds over the planning
horizon which might be long enough to justify discounting. Moreover, we note that
the funds with expiration are typically government grants and are not paid back.
Equation (4.6) represents a set of ordinary differential equations which can not be
solved analytically. Thus, these equations need to be solved numerically as a system,
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possibly in a recursive way. On the other hand, a discretization approach is possible
for improved computational efficiency in the numerical analysis. In addition to its
computational implications, the discrete-time based approach also approximates the
actual decision process of CDCs whose acquisition related decisions are periodic. As
part of the discrete time approximation, let τ be the discretization factor such that
the minimum time between two consequent decisions is defined by T/τ . Based on
this representation, equation (4.6) can be approximated by:
V ∗(bt−T/τ ) =(1− α)V
∗
(
bt
)
+
T
τ
λ
∫ b
C
max
δbct
{∫ R¯
x(δbct)
p(δbct)
(
r −
[
V ∗
(
bt
)
− V ∗
(
(b− c− cδbct)t
)
+
1− p(δbct)
p(δbct)
g(c, δbct)
])
f(r, c)dr
}
dc (4.7)
where the solutions converge to the actual optimal value functions as τ →∞.
While the optimal total PVI for a given fund level at a given time can be calcu-
lated through Theorem 4, the identification of the optimal overbid rates adds to the
complexity of the problem as discussed in Section 4.1.3, as it would typically involve
enumeration over a discrete set of overbid rates. On the other hand, we show through
Theorem 5 below that similar results as in the no fund expiration case apply to the
fund expiration case as well:
Theorem 5. For the foreclosed housing acquisition problem with fund expiration, the
optimal overbid rate is approximately independent of time and the amount of accessible
funds, and thus the optimal policy for overbidding on a foreclosed property for which
a CDC will make an offer is same as the case with no fund expiration.
More specifically, Theorem 5 states that the introduction of a time dimension
would have a negligible impact on the optimal overbid policy, and that the same
results as those described in Theorem 2, Corollary 1 and Corollary 2 apply to the fund
expiration case as well. These properties can help identify the optimal overbid rate for
a CDC or simplify the solution of (4.6). In addition, further practical implications for
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the foreclosed housing acquisition problem with fund expiration can also be derived
on the value functions and threshold levels, which we summarize through Theorem 6
as follows:
Theorem 6. The following conditions always hold for the foreclosed housing acqui-
sition problem with fund expiration:
1. Results 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 in Theorem 3 apply to the foreclosed housing acquisition
problem with fund expiration.
2. The expected total PVI value of accessible funds decreases over time.
3. The marginal value of accessible funds decreases over time.
4. Optimal PVI thresholds decrease over time.
5. The critical fund level decreases over time.
6. If optimal PVI thresholds are increasing in overbid rate, then the higher the
overbid rate used, the later the critical time.
7. If optimal PVI thresholds are decreasing in the amount of accessible funds, then
the larger the amount of accessible funds, the earlier the critical time.
The first statement in Theorem 6 indicates that some structural characteristics
of the no fund expiration case also apply to the problem with fund expiration, and
thus their interpretations are the same as those described in Section 4.1.3. Items 2
and 3, on the other hand, imply that the value of available funding decreases over
time if not used, and moreover the rate of change is higher as it gets closer to the
fund expiration date. The fourth item is related to the PVI threshold levels and
indicates that a CDC would be better off by gradually being more aggressive, i.e. less
selective, in making offers to foreclosed properties as time progresses towards fund
expiration. Similarly, other results in Theorem 6 help estimate the behavior of the
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optimal policy as well. More specifically, item 5 states that as a CDC becomes less
selective in acquisitions over time, the critical fund level indicating an offer decision
for all available properties above the minimum return requirement also decreases over
time. In item 6, we note that usage of high overbid rates by a CDC would imply
that they should begin making offers to all properties above the minimum return
requirement at a later time than if they were to use lower overbid rates. Finally,
result 7 suggests that for any two different fund levels, it should be expected that,
under the stated condition, the larger funds would imply an earlier switch to making
offers to all available properties above the minimum return requirement.
4.2 Real-Life Implementation and Policy Implications of the
Models in Foreclosed Housing Acquisition
The optimal policies described in Section 4.1 are quite general and address different
types of problem configurations. In this section, we use these general results to identify
policies that apply to the decision framework currently faced by many CDCs. To this
end, we utilize real numerical data as input to our models to provide guidelines for
the foreclosed housing acquisition process of a typical CDC, which is considered to
be reflective of CDCs operating in similar urban neighborhoods.
4.2.1 Description of Data
Data based implementation and analysis of the foreclosed housing acquisition
problem was performed in close coordination with the CDC located in the city of
Boston, Massachusetts. This CDC was also involved in the model building phase of
the study. While there is no comprehensive quantitative information that compares
the operating framework for this CDC to that of other CDCs, there is anecdotal
evidence that the CDC studied can be representative of typical CDC operations in
other major cities (NeighborWorks, 2009; Gass, 2010). This is also supported by the
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Figure 4.2. Distributions of asking price and market entry times of foreclosed prop-
erties in the CDC’s service area.
fact that PVI distributions calculated for a different CDC in an entirely different
area of Boston, Massachusetts reflect similar characteristics as those obtained for the
service area studied in this study Johnson et al. (2013).
The decision making situation faced by this CDC involves managing funds that
they can potentially access for acquiring foreclosed properties in their service area.
Similar to our categorization of the two problem types, these funds differ in their usage
requirements. The acquisition process for the CDC starts with their notification of
a property becoming available for acquisition in their service area. The CDC then
gathers information about the property, specifically with respect to the asking price
and the potential returns to be realized if the property is acquired and redeveloped.
Given such information, the CDC decides whether to work with a funder to make an
offer on the property and how much to offer.
To characterize the actual decision problem parameters, as well as the uncertainty
in property costs and returns, data based on recent historical foreclosed property
availabilities and acquisitions were used. This data was directly obtained from the
records of the CDC that we worked with and is available upon request. Based on
this data, an average of approximately 10 properties were observed to be entering the
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market each month following a Poisson distribution, which corresponds to an average
availability rate of 2.5 properties/week. A histogram showing the distribution of the
time between property availabilities is included in Figure 4.2(a). While this number is
likely to fluctuate based on the conditions of the economy and the housing market, it
reflects a practical quantity for the current state of the economy. On the other hand,
our analysis later in this section involves a sensitivity study around this availability
rate value. In Figure 4.2(b), we show the asking price distribution for the properties
considered in the data set, which implies a triangular distribution with parameters of
120, 250 and 380 thousand dollars.
The distribution of the PVI values for the same data set, as calculated through
the methodology described in Johnson et al. (2013), is shown in Figure 4.3(a). The
best fitting distribution for the PVI values is uniform between 60 and 120 thousand
dollars. Moreover, the PVI values of the properties are found to be independent
of their asking prices as reflected in the scatter plot in Figure 4.3(b), which also
includes a regression line. Hence, we assume independent distributions for asking
prices and the PVI measures. This independence structure is likely because lower
cost properties can have higher impacts on the values of nearby properties, especially
if they are located in dense neighborhoods. Similarly, a higher priced property does
not necessarily imply higher social value from a CDC’s perspective, e.g. in the case
of a property with few proximate properties.
The overhead costs for the CDC for each offer that they make on a property are
calculated to be around 1.5% of the amount offered on the property. As discussed
in the model description, the probability of acquisition after an offer on a property
depends on the overbid rate used for a given asking price. Using data from previous
acquisitions, and also based on consultations with the CDC staff, we define this
probability as p(δbct) = 0.22δbct + 0.37. Note that this probability assumes that the
CDC’s offer is competing only with owner occupants and public entities as part of the
108
12010896847260
12
9
6
3
0
Property Value Impact ($'000)
F
re
q
u
e
n
cy
(a) Distribution of PVI values
350300250200150
120
105
90
75
60
Property Asking Price ($'000)
P
ro
p
e
rt
y
 V
a
lu
e
 I
m
p
a
ct
 (
$
'0
0
0
)
(b) Relationship between asking prices and PVI
values
Figure 4.3. Distribution of PVI values and their dependency on asking prices for
foreclosed properties in the CDC’s service area.
early opportunity to bid for a foreclosed property. The structure of this probability
of success function is also consistent with the discussions and function descriptions
by Holt and Sherman (2000) and Aobdia and Caskey (2012) for similar settings.
Given this framework, the CDC needs to decide on how to utilize the funds that
they can potentially access with and without fund expiration conditions. Since the
grant based funds are prioritized in making the acquisitions, the decisions for the two
sources do not need to be considered together. Based on available information, we
assume a $4 million fund level for both finite and infinite horizon implementations,
but we also analyze the optimal policies for other fund levels.
4.2.2 Implementation and Analysis under No Fund Expiration
Our first implementation and analysis are for the case without fund expiration,
which refers to the usage of resources that do not have certain deadlines. Using
the numerical data provided, we specifically try to develop numerical insights on the
policies that should be used by the CDC.
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Figure 4.4. Optimal expected total PVI for different funding levels and the marginal
value of funds under no fund expiration.
4.2.2.1 Optimal Expected Property Value Impact
For a fund level of $4 million without an expiration deadline, the current expected
PVI to be realized through the foreclosed property acquisitions by the CDC is around
1.9 million dollars. Note that the expected PVI is independent of time due to the funds
not expiring and only being subject to discounting. This value decreases for lower fund
levels as shown in Figure 4.4(a) through the top curve corresponding to an overbid rate
of 0%. It can be observed that the optimal expected value is a nondecreasing concave
function of the remaining amount of funds. While we discuss the optimal overbid rates
and their implications later in this section, as some additional information, Figure
4.4(a) also includes the impact of using different overbid rates on the optimal value
function under the assumption that the same overbid rate is used for all properties.
Although the differences are not that large, the value function can be observed to be
decreasing as the overbid rate is increased.
Clearly, the value of the accessible funds for a CDC, in terms of its potential
PVI based returns, is constant over time given an infinite horizon setting. On the
other hand, a relevant question involves the marginal value of these resources. For
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Figure 4.5. Optimal PVI thresholds and the change in expected total PVI for
different funding levels and overbid rates under no fund expiration.
example, the marginal impact of a reduction in the acquisition funds can play a role
when a CDC faces a decision on whether to use part of their available line of credit for
purposes other than foreclosed property acquisition. As can be seen in Figure 4.4(a),
the marginal return decreases as the fund level is increased. In Figure 4.4(b) we
quantify this change over fund levels, which can be used by CDCs for budgeting
purposes. While each dollar of accessible funds is expected to result in about $0.8
of PVI at a fund level of $0.5 million, this marginal PVI impact reduces to around
$0.3/dollar at the $4 million fund level.
4.2.2.2 Optimal PVI Thresholds for Offer/No-Offer Decisions
A policy implication for the infinite horizon problem is that, assuming a discount
rate and no time limitation for using the accessible funds, the CDC should work with
the funding source and make an offer on all properties that satisfy the minimum PVI
level, which is $60 thousand for the given data. Indeed, this threshold is much lower,
around $20 thousand for a general implementation. This is based on the analysis of
the optimal PVI thresholds as illustrated in Figure 4.5(a) where the lighter dashed
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horizontal line in the plot represents the minimum possible PVI of any acquired
property. Hence, a PVI threshold less than this value implies that all properties in
the market should be made an offer. It can be observed that even at lower funding
levels the optimal policy is not selective, i.e. an offer is made on all properties with
PVI values of at least $30 thousand. Given that the current numerical setup is likely
to be reflective of most urban neighborhoods, specifically with respect to the PVI
distributions as shown through a numerical study, this result might be applicable
to a large number of CDCs. Such a result might be due to the interaction between
property availability rates and the discounting effects. The value of the current funds
will decrease over time based on a standard discount rate, and the CDC might be
better off by acquiring properties early before the present value of the funds decreases.
Moreover, the current average availability rate of 2.5 properties per week, while quite
high historically, is still not significant enough to justify a highly selective policy.
We later describe a sensitivity analysis that shows how increases in availability rates
impact these optimal policies .
We note that in general the marginal change in the PVI thresholds decreases as
a function of the funding level as observed in Figure 4.5(a). In other words, having
access to larger amount of funds implies less selectivity in making offers to foreclosed
properties in the market. In Figure 4.5(a), we also illustrate that the optimal PVI
threshold is a nonincreasing convex function of the remaining funds, and that the
threshold value is higher if a high overbid rate were to be used for the offers. In
addition, as also mentioned in Section 4.1.3, a critical fund level can be identified
such that at that funding level the threshold drops below the minimum realizable
PVI values. Hence, for any remaining fund level that is greater than the critical fund
level, the CDC would make offers to all available properties satisfying the minimum
PVI level of $60 thousand, while a more selective policy can be used for fund levels
that are less than the critical fund level based on the optimal PVI thresholds. On
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the other hand, while not shown explicitly, we observe through Figure 4.5(a) that
the critical fund level for this numerical setup is very small, i.e. much less than $0.5
million.
4.2.2.3 Optimal Overbid Rates
The optimal overbid rate for the types of CDCs studied is at the minimum possible
level for all properties, i.e. the CDC should not offer more than the asking price for
any foreclosed property. This result implies a different policy than what is used in
practice, and is a result of the characteristics of the current data. We show in Theorem
2 the ranges of cases where the optimal overbid rate is not zero. In Figure 4.5(b), we
illustrate the changes in the optimal expected PVI as a function of the overbid rate for
different remaining amounts of accessible funds. These representations visually show
the optimal overbid rate to be zero. On the other hand, the differences in value and
threshold levels are not huge for different overbid rates. In general, it can be observed
that the optimal expected PVI is a decreasing function of the overbid rate, while the
threshold is increasing in the overbid rate. This result is consistent with both our
analytical findings and the expert views from the CDC staff. One potential reason
for this conclusion is that the overhead costs are not that significant when compared
with other costs such as the losses due to discounting, while at the same time there
exist a relatively large number of foreclosures in the CDC’s service area. The result
holds even when the overhead costs are increased to higher levels than 1.5% of the
asking price. Therefore, even if the CDC’s offer is not successful, it is likely that
there will be other properties with comparable PVI values that will become available.
This also implies that the shape of the PVI distribution might have an impact on
the overbid rate decisions, and thus our finding may be a result of the distribution
observed in practice. We also note that the optimal overbid rate values can serve as
a benchmark such that they could be the maximum to be accepted in a negotiation.
113
4.2.3 Implementation and Analysis under Fund Expiration
In this section we analyze the optimal policies for the case where any accessible
but unused funds have no value after a finite expiration date. As noted previously,
this is typically the case for grants that the CDC can receive for foreclosed housing
acquisitions, which may have stipulations such that they need to be expended within
a certain time frame. Our analysis follows a similar structure as in the infinite horizon
case.
4.2.3.1 Optimal Expected Property Value Impact
For an accessible funding level of $4 million to be used within a year, the optimal
expected total PVI due to foreclosed property acquisitions by the CDC is approxi-
mately $1.8 million under the optimal policy. As observed in Figure 4.6(a), this value
decreases over time if the funds remain unused. For higher fund levels the rate of
reduction in value when accessible funds are not used is mostly linear at an average
rate of $7,000 per week until around the last three months of the year. After that
point, the expected total PVI decreases sharply. Hence, the CDC should try to uti-
lize their accessible funds earlier rather than later. Moreover, the marginal value of
accessible funds does not significantly diminish for higher fund levels, or rather the
rate of decrease is very slow, especially in the first three quarters of the planning
year. Hence, higher levels of accessible funds are likely to result in proportionally
higher total PVI. We quantify these observations in Figure 4.6(b) by displaying the
change in marginal PVI values over fund levels and time. Per dollar PVI returns
of potentially accessible acquisition funds decrease from $0.6 at a fund level of $0.5
million to $0.4 at a fund level of $4 million. This difference is less than that of the
case without fund expiration, where both the marginal values and their rate of change
over fund levels are higher. It can also be observed that the behavior of the marginal
114
50403020100
2000
1500
1000
500
0
Time (weeks)
E
x
p
e
c
te
d
 T
o
ta
l 
P
V
I 
($
'0
0
0
)
Funding
4.0 $mil
3.2 $mil
2.4 $mil
1.6 $mil
0.8 $mil
(a) The change in expected total PVI over time for different funding
levels
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
1
2 483 3624124 0
M
a
rg
in
a
l 
P
V
I 
($
/
$
)
Funds ($'000,000) Time (weeks)
(b) The change in the marginal value of accessible funds over time
Figure 4.6. Optimal expected total PVI for different funding levels and the marginal
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values at different fund levels over time is similar with a slow rate of decrease until
the last three months of the planning period, followed by a sharp decline afterwards.
4.2.3.2 Optimal PVI Thresholds for Offer/No-Offer Decisions
For low annual accessible fund levels, i.e. less than around $1.5 million, the
CDC should employ a selective strategy based on the optimal PVI thresholds shown
in Figure 4.7(a). For example, for accessible funds of around $1 million, initially
offers should be made only to those properties with a PVI value greater than $65
thousand. In addition, we note that the marginal change in the PVI thresholds
decreases as a function of the amount of accessible funds. In other words, selectivity
increases significantly at lower fund levels. On the other hand, at higher levels of
accessible funds and for the given foreclosure rates, the optimal policy for the CDC
is to make offers to all available foreclosed properties above the minimum PVI level
of $60 thousand when a finite planning horizon of one year is assumed. As can be
seen in Figure 4.7(a), for these funding levels the optimal PVI threshold is always
below the minimum PVI level. This is another demonstration of the impact of the
available funds in the acquisition decisions, where larger funds enable more aggressive
acquisition policies.
We also perform a sensitivity analysis over different availability rates, and observe
how the optimal PVI thresholds change as the availability rate increases. The case
where availability rates decrease is not so interesting, as it would imply even lower
threshold levels which will be further less than the minimum possible PVI level. In
Figure 4.7(b) we display the optimal PVI threshold graph for an average availability
rate of 5 properties per week, which represents foreclosure rates twice the current
levels. In this case, a highly selective policy is optimal at all fund levels until around
the last quarter of the planning period. This indicates that under the given numerical
setting CDCs should become highly selective in acquisitions only if foreclosure rates
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Figure 4.7. The change in optimal PVI thresholds over time for different availability
rates.
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Figure 4.8. The change in critical fund level over time for different availability rates
become worse than the current levels. Related to this analysis, Figure 4.8 contains in-
formation about the critical time and critical fund level levels for different availability
rates for an initial funding level of $4 million. This diagram can be used to identify the
critical fund level for a given time or the critical time for a given budget for the given
availability rate. For example, if the average availability rate is 5 properties/week,
then the CDC should not be as selective and make offers to all properties with PVI
values above $60 thousand when the current time and available budget combination
falls in the region above the dashed line corresponding to 5 properties/week. As an-
other example, the CDC should start making offers to all such properties in the 20th
week of a budget period if the potentially accessible funds at that time are greater
than $4 million, while this critical level is $1 million for an availability rate of 2 prop-
erties/week. Overall, based on the slopes of the lines in Figure 4.2.3.1, we note that
critical fund level increases significantly at high availability rates. Similarly, critical
time for a given fund level decreases with a higher rate for high availability rates.
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4.2.3.3 Optimal Overbid Rates
We conclude that, contrary to the current practice, for the given numerical setting
the CDC does not need to overbid on foreclosed properties and should typically offer
the asking price. This result is similar to the infinite horizon case, and is again
possibly due to relatively lower overhead costs and the variance of the PVI values of
properties. Figure 4.9 shows the changes in optimal expected PVI and PVI thresholds
as a function of overbid rates for different amounts of remaining funds. The optimal
expected total value can be seen to be a nonincreasing, almost linear function of
overbid rate. On the other hand, the PVI threshold is a nondecreasing function of
overbid rate, implying that selectivity increases for higher overbid rates.
4.2.4 Value of Optimal Policies
In this section we describe a comparative study aimed at demonstrating the value
of the optimal policies with respect to current practice and other simplistic heuristic
procedures. The analysis is based on historical bidding and acquisition data obtained
from the CDC that has been collaborated with. This data consists of information on a
set of properties which were considered for potential acquisition and an offer/no offer
decision was made. In Table 4.1 we show part of this information, which includes the
asking price and the estimated PVI value for each property, whether an offer was made
on the property and the overbid rate used. Current practices used by the CDC when
considering an offer decision do not involve a systematic structure, and are mostly
based on qualitative and subjective expert opinions. An important observation is that
the CDC is selective in making offers, and almost always overbids on the properties
for which an offer decision is reached. Contrary to this implementation, the optimal
policy suggests that an offer decision should be made on all candidate properties,
and that there is no need for overbidding. For our comparative study, we assume
an accessible funding level of $1 million and calculate the expected total discounted
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Figure 4.9. Optimal expected PVI values and PVI thresholds as a function of
overbid rate for different funding levels under fund expiration.
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ID Asking Price Estimated PVI Offer Made? Overbid Rate Outcome
1 $164,500 $85,401 Yes 4.6% Lost
2 $170,360 $91,896 Yes 5.6% Acquired
3 $201,250 $75,628 Yes 4.5% Lost
4 $205,400 $103,884 Yes 9.6% Lost
5 $221,100 $88,122 No - -
6 $226,700 $112,285 No - -
7 $227,800 $104,507 No - -
8 $212,100 $85,767 No - -
9 $214,000 $85,513 Yes 5.2% Acquired
10 $190,000 $105,989 Yes 0% Acquired
11 $142,000 $100,850 Yes 7.2% Lost
12 $259,700 $122,034 No - -
13 $259,500 $106,138 No - -
14 $296,500 $108,519 Yes 3.2% Acquired
15 $338,200 $92,093 Yes 3.5% Lost
16 $226,800 $64,390 No - -
17 $125,000 $75,620 No -
18 $150,000 $88,765 Yes 6.7% Lost
19 $184,900 $93,487 Yes 5.4% Lost
Table 4.1. Summary information on a set of properties considered for potential
acquisition by the CDC.
PVI that would have been achieved if the optimal policy were implemented on the
properties in the data set. This value is then compared with the total discounted PVI
achieved through the actual offer and acquisition decisions. Similarly, we test the
efficiency of two heuristic selection criteria by calculating the corresponding expected
total PVI values if they were to be implemented for the sample data set. The two
heuristics have a somewhat similar setup. In the first heuristic, an offer decision is
reached if the standardized marginal return of a given property is greater than 0.5,
while the offer price is selected as the asking price. In the second heuristic, offer/no-
offer decisions are made similarly, but the overbid rate used is assumed to be the
average overbid rate in current practice, i.e. 5%. In Table 4.2 we show the differences
in expected total discounted PVI values based on multiple simulated bid outcomes
for the four cases, as well as the average time it takes to use the accessible funds of
$1 million for each case.
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Expected Total % Difference Fund Usage
Discounted PVI from Implemented Time (months)
Implemented Policy $380,159 - 2.5
Optimal Policy $445,727 17.2% 1
Heuristic-1 Policy $415,478 9.3% 5
Heuristic-2 Policy $399,886 5.2% 4
Table 4.2. Comparison of different policies based on historical property availability
data.
Based on the results of this comparative analysis, it can be observed that the op-
timal policy improves the expected total PVI of a funding level of $1 million by about
17%, when compared with the PVI levels realized from the historically implemented
offer/no-offer decisions. The superiority of the optimal policy is also visible over the
heuristic policies that were based on marginal returns of properties. Similarly, it can
be noted through a comparison of the two heuristics that overbidding still does not
add value when it is used as part of a less aggressive strategy such as the marginal
return based heuristic evaluated. Overall, we observe that a systematic approach
to acquisition decisions of a CDC through the simple optimal policy results is likely
to be of value in terms of the societal response to the foreclosure problem through
property value impact reduction.
4.3 Conclusions
In this chapter we developed, implemented and evaluated a dynamic and stochas-
tic decision model that aims to assist community-based organizations to choose fore-
closed properties for potential acquisition in the service of community stabilization
and revitalization, specifically in response to the increase in foreclosures due to eco-
nomic decline. We considered two practical planning situations based on whether the
potentially accessible funds need to be used by a certain deadline or not. For both
cases, we derived analytical results for calculating optimal return thresholds that a
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CDC can use to determine which properties they should work with their funders on
and make an offer. We also determined policies for overbidding on a property given
that probability of success for an offer depends on the amount offered on that prop-
erty. The policies were implemented in a numerical setting based on operational data
from a CDC, which is considered to be reflective of the operating conditions of many
other CDCs in major cities. General policy guidelines have been suggested based on
this numerical study, where it is estimated that a potential increase of around 17%
can be achieved in expected total PVI through optimal policy implementations, when
compared with historical acquisition data.
We conclude that CDCs should be more selective in making offers on foreclosed
properties if they operate with lower funding levels accessible for acquisition. If the
funds will expire at the end of the planning period, then they should initially make
offers on properties with higher expected returns. Increased selectivity is also optimal
if foreclosed property availability is higher. On the other hand, for the current data,
which is expected to be reflective of conditions in urban neighborhoods, we conclude
that it is optimal to make offers on all properties with property value impacts greater
than the minimum of $60 thousand, when the accessible funds are greater than about
$1.5 million. Moreover, the optimal policy is always to make offers at the asking price
and not to overbid. These results change and return thresholds become more active,
only when availability rates reach almost twice the current high levels, or when the
PVI values of potential acquisitions are very low, which typically is the case in low
population density neighborhoods. Hence, unless the foreclosure crisis is significantly
worsened, the proposed guidelines can be expected to be valid for urban areas in major
cities. We also find that cost of making an offer on a property has a negligible impact
on the optimal policy, and CDCs should continue with a given optimal strategy even
if the overhead costs might vary from initial levels. In general, most policy results
are similar for the cases with and without fund expiration, especially before the last
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several periods of the finite horizon case. Given the expiration of the funds, the
acquisition policies get aggressive in using the remaining funds towards the end of
the planning horizon.
Overall, the presented models and guidelines can potentially aid CDCs and other
similar organizations in making investment decisions with social returns, as in fore-
closed housing acquisition and redevelopment. Given the absence of any such opti-
mization based analysis tool for this type of nonprofit decision making, our results
can help in improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the decisions by these non-
profit organizations, thus helping improve the value to the society. We believe that
the presented research contributes to nonprofit operations management literature by
studying a new and important decision problem with many implications for a sus-
tainable economy and society.
124
CHAPTER 5
TEAM-BASED RESOURCE ALLOCATION IN ROBOTIC
SURGERY
Consider a hospital making surgical team configuration decisions to maximize op-
erating room efficiency and effectiveness in advance of a planning horizon for robotic
surgical operations. It is assumed that the team allocation decisions will be made
at the beginning of the planning horizon and performance information on the teams
will become available over the planning periods as teams work together on different
surgeries. Future team allocation decisions will be made based on this realized infor-
mation, as well as probabilistic information on performance values further into the
future, as compatibility of team members become more clear.
A more specific representation of this general decision process is depicted in Fig-
ure 5.1, which can be described as follows. The decision maker, i.e. the scheduling
office, decides on possible multiple team configurations for a given period by consider-
ing potential individual and dependent performances of each team member according
to their experiences. Subsequently, the assigned surgeries are performed and inde-
pendent/dependent performances of each team member become known. Once this
Decision 
Timeline
Decide team allocationDecide team allocation
Epoch I Epoch II
Learn performance 
values of each team 
member
Learn performance 
values of each team
Figure 5.1. General decision process for robotic surgery team allocation problem
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information is available, the new team allocation decisions are made by considering
realized performance measures. The process can continue for multiple periods where
team reallocations can take place based on any information that becomes available.
In many cases, these assignments could take place every 1-3 months.
An important process in modeling this decision framework involves the defini-
tions of team performance, and identification of mappings between team member
experiences and performances. We first describe this input generation process in the
following section, and then introduce our stochastic programming model which we
use to determine optimal team configurations under performance uncertainty.
5.1 Modeling and Analysis of Team Performance Functions
Using Operational Data
In this section, we analyze available data and obtain an input to our stochastic
optimization model to identify policies that apply to the decision framework currently
faced by many hospitals in determining surgery teams.
Data based implementation and analysis of robotic surgery team allocation prob-
lem was performed in close coordination with a hospital located in Massachusetts.
Hospital staff were also involved in the model building phase of the study. Our data
focused on robotic sacrocolpopexy operations, i.e. urologic and pelvic surgeries. The
available information spanned the period between March 2008 and April 2012, con-
sisting of a sample of approximately 400 surgeries. This data involves confidential
patient information, and is not publicly available.
We perform some statistical data analyses to study the characteristics of different
attributes within the decision framework, and to obtain experience and performance
metrics for use in our stochastic model. For analysis purposes, we apply factor analy-
sis, regression analysis and one way analysis of variance (ANOVA), which we describe
in detail in the following subsections.
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5.1.1 Factor Analysis
We use factor analysis to develop a more detailed description of the role of the
relevant robotic surgery procedures for use in model building. More specifically, factor
analysis is used to group numerous factors in robotic surgery performance into a few
critical factors that explain most of the variability in the data by taking into account
the parameter relationships.
For this analysis, we filtered our data to obtain standardized robotic sacrocolpopexy
instances with similar characteristics. We included patient information and surgery
team member experiences as variables into the factor analysis model, while redun-
dant measurements and dimensions that were deemed irrelevant to the analysis (i.e.
race, length of stay, etc.) were eliminated. The patient characteristics considered in
the analysis are patient’s age, body mass index (BMI), menopausal status, gravida
(the number of times a woman has been pregnant), pathology result, and measures
related to the severeness of the patient’s condition. This filtered database includes
150 patient records, each containing 10 variables or factors. Once these variables were
selected, factor analysis using varimax rotation was performed which allows for an
easier interpretation (McLain, 2010). A varimax rotation is a change of coordinates
that maximizes the sum of the variances of the squared loadings. Thus, all the co-
efficients will be either large or near zero, with few intermediate values. The goal
is to associate each variable with at most one factor that had the highest weighted
value. The factor analysis results are summarized in Table 5.1. In this table, the
components with eigenvalue values greater than 1 are shown in bold and accounted
as one factor. It can be observed that there would be a small benefit in adding more
factors and that four factors explain around 60 percent of the total variance for the
surgery data. These four factors are then used to form a factor loading matrix.
Table 5.2 shows this factor loading matrix, which is a varimax rotated matrix
of variables and factors that shows the amount of influence a variable has on each
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Initial Eigenvalues
Total % of Variance Cumulative %
1 2.903 22.858 22.858
2 2.118 16.677 39.535
3 1.396 10.992 50.528
4 1.146 9.024 59.551
5 0.947 7.457 67.008
6 0.899 7.079 74.087
7 0.857 6.748 80.835
8 0.741 5.835 86.669
9 0.653 5.142 91.811
10 0.496 3.906 95.717
11 0.338 2.661 98.378
12 0.206 1.622 100
Table 5.1. Factor analysis table showing all the components included.
Component
1 2 3 4
Surgeon Experience -0.794 0.007 -0.204 -0.026
Anaesthetist Experience -0.493 0.055 -0.037 0.123
ST Experience -0.472 0.236 -0.189 0.079
CN Experience -0.748 0.016 -0.208 -0.093
PA Experience -0.482 -0.275 0.197 -0.462
Age of Patient 0.004 0.901 0.104 -0.031
BMI -0.002 -0.24 -0.111 0.685
Menopausal Status 0.076 0.867 0.088 -0.129
Gravida 0.266 0.206 0.201 0.64
Pathology Report Result 0.179 -0.345 -0.018 -0.135
Severity Measure-1 -0.004 0.049 0.904 -0.026
Severity Measure-2 0.074 0.134 0.846 0.008
Table 5.2. Rotated component matrix.
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factor. The first factor explains about 23% of total variance and there are 5 variables
in factor one, corresponding to the experience levels of the surgeon, PA, ST, CN, and
the nurse anaesthetist. Since all the variables in this factor are related to the surgery
team experience, factor one is called the experience factor. Based on this, it can be
further concluded that experience of each team member has crucial importance in
robotic surgery. Factor two consisted of 3 variables related to patient’s health status:
age of patient, menopausal status, pathology report result. This factor accounts for
approximately 17% of total variance. The severeness measure variables are grouped
in the third factor where they explain 11% of total variability. Finally, the last factor
is composed of two variables, namely BMI and gravida, which are related to the
demographic information about the patient. Overall, there are four main factors
which have significant influence on the surgery and it is sufficient to consider these
four factors instead of all variables. We also highlight again that the experience factor
plays an important role in robotic surgery based on our analysis.
After reducing the dimension of categories, regression analysis is then used to
extrapolate the data onto the remaining variables to predict total operating time in
the following subsection.
5.1.2 Regression Analysis
Using the results that we obtained from the factor analysis study, we perform
a multiple nonlinear regression analysis to develop a model for predicting robotic
surgery operating room time based on each team member’s experience levels and
some primary patient characteristics. In order to obtain better predictions, we split
the total operating room time in three categories: preparation time (phase 1), surgery
time (phase 2), and patient awakening/out time (phase 3). In phase 1, every team
member has a role except the scrub tech, while all team members without excep-
tion are involved in phase 2. For patient awakening/out time, the circulating nurse
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and the nurse anesthetist are the active participants. Using this setup, we obtain
the regression equation (5.1) to predict the total operating room time t based on
identified factors. We include in our regression model the patient age a, the mea-
sure of severeness m, and the experience of each team member, denoted by ei for
i = Doc, PA, ST,AN , and CN . Note that Doc refers to the surgeon, while AN
refers to the nurse anaesthetist.
t = −.15(a)− 2.10(m)− 0.05(eCN)
2 − .14(eAN)
2 + 0.03(ePA)
2 − 0.02(eDoc)
2
+ 22.30(eAN) ln (eAN) + 10.99(eCN) ln (eCN ) + 9.40(eDoc) ln (eDoc)
− 8.33(ePA) ln (ePA) + 140.27 ln (eCN)− 51.71(eCN)− 166.98 ln (ePA) + 41.62(ePA)
− 102.22(eAN) + 343.26 ln (eAN)− 50.99(eDoc) + 239.11 ln (eDoc) + 71600.6
+ 1.92(eST )
2 − 753.31(eST ) ln (eST ) + 4191.03(eST )− 35393.8 ln (eST ) (5.1)
In order to assess the validity of our regression model we perform cross validation,
which is an evaluation method that is typically better than simply looking at the
residuals. To this end, we split our data into two sets called training and testing sets.
We perform the analysis on the training set, and validate the analysis on the testing
set. We find that there is no significant difference between training and testing data
sets, implying a validation of our model.
Using the regression analysis results, we obtain the “optimal” experience level for
each team member that would minimize the total operation time assuming indepen-
dence between individual experiences and joint experiences of team members. To
find this optimal level, we calculate the first order derivative of the regression func-
tion with respect to each team member’s experience level, again by assuming all the
other parameters as constant. We further validate our result by comparing it with
those obtained by single regression models for each parameter. This is achieved by
building a nonlinear regression model for each experience level to predict operating
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(b) Operating room time over scrub techni-
cian experience.
Figure 5.2. Operating room time as a function of team member experiences.
Doctor PA Anesthetist ST CN
Exp. Per. Exp. Per. Exp. Per. Exp. Per. Exp. Per.
Low 13 0.295 3 0.23 10 0.217 52 0.788 5 0.089
Medium 24 0.545 7 0.538 24 0.522 59 0.894 34 0.607
High 44 1 13 1 46 1 66 1 56 1
Table 5.3. Categorization of experience and independent performance levels of each
team member in robotic surgery based on number of surgeries performed.
room time, and then by comparing our findings of full and single regression models
for each experience level separately. We also categorize the experience levels for each
team member as being low, medium, or high, according to the 33rd, 66th percentiles
and optimum levels of experience data. These experience levels are summarized in
Table 5.3 where “high” refers to the optimum experience level. We note that we use
the single regression model function to find optimum experience level for doctor since
it provides a better prediction based on our interactions with hospital.
In Figure 5.2 we provide sample graphs for operating room time as a function of
experiences of the surgeon (doctor) and scrub technician. These graphs can also be
used to develop a single regression model for each team member separately. We use
this single regression model to validate the optimal experience levels that we obtained
from the full regression model. The optimal value is expected to be around 50 for the
surgeon, while this value is expected to be between 55-65 for the scrub technician.
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By using these experience levels we calculate individual standardized performance
measures for each team member as summarized in Table 5.3 by dividing the corre-
sponding experience level by the optimum level. Moreover, we calculate dependent
performance measures where we assume that performance of a team member might
be effected from other team members’ performances. To calculate dependent perfor-
mance values we use our predicted regression function and vary the given experience
levels by keeping the others as constant. For example, to calculate the dependent
performance value when the doctor and the PA are both with low experience lev-
els, we plug in low experience values of doctor and PA, shown in Table 5.3, into
equation 5.1 and keep other experience values at their optimum levels. We note that
in our study we only consider dual dependency, as higher degree dependencies have
much less implications and are also harder to quantify based on existing samples of
data.
In our joint performance analysis we find that the anesthetist has the lowest
impact on robotic surgery performance compared to other team members. We also
note that the scrub technician has a key role in robotic surgery, specifically as the
low performance of a scrub tech has a significant affect on the team performance. As
expected, the roles of the surgeon and the PA are also very significant.
5.1.3 Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)
In this subsection we use analysis of variance to evaluate the differences in op-
erating room times as a function of various parameters for practical implications.
Since we analyze variability across one factor categorically, we implement a one-way
ANOVA analysis.
We first analyze the effect of the time of the surgery on total operating time.
Based on our interactions with the hospital staff, it was hypothesized that surgeries
that are held in afternoon typically take longer, when compared to morning surgeries,
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ANOVA
Operation Starting Time
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Between Groups 11403.549 1 11403.549 4.262 .040
Within Groups 904322.507 338 2675.510
Total 915726.056 339
Table 5.4. ANOVA results for surgery starting time.
Multiple Comparisons ANOVA
Dependent Variable:Operating Room Time Tukey HSD
Proc Type Mean Difference Std. Error Sig. 95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
1.00 2.00 54.535* 8.779 .000 33.87 75.20
3.00 53.304* 8.705 .000 32.81 73.80
2.00 1.00 -54.535* 8.779 .000 -75.20 -33.87
3.00 -1.230 5.676 .974 -14.59 12.13
3.00 1.00 -53.304* 8.705 .000 -73.80 -32.81
2.00 1.230 5.676 .974 -12.13 14.59
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.
Table 5.5. ANOVA results for different types of surgeries.
as a shift change occurs in the afternoon. So we divide our data into two groups,
e.g. surgeries starting before 11am and surgeries starting after 11am. The ANOVA
results are shown in Table 5.4, which validate the hypothesis that there is significant
difference between the morning and afternoon surgeries, based on the F-test results.
As a second analysis, we compare different types of surgeries with respect to
operating room time and provide the ANOVA results in Table 5.5. In this table,
surgery types 1, 2 and 3 refer to surgery types robotic supracervical hysterectomy
with sacrocolpopexy, total robotic hysterectomy with sacrocolpopexy and robotic
sacrocolpopexy, respectively. Based on these results, it is concluded that surgery
types 1 and 2, as well as 1 and 3 have significant differences between each other in
terms of operating room time. However, no significant difference can be observed
between surgery types 2 and 3.
We also analyze the operating room time across the number of scrub technicians
attending the surgery to see whether taking a break during the surgery would effect
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Multiple Comparisons
Dependent Variable: Operating Room Time Tukey HSD
Number of STs Attended Mean Difference Std. Error Sig. 95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
1.00 2.00 -4.529 6.014 .732 -18.69 9.63
3.00 .290 11.615 1.000 -27.06 27.64
2.00 1.00 4.529 6.014 .732 -9.63 18.69
3.00 4.819 11.743 .911 -22.83 32.47
3.00 1.00 -.290 11.615 1.000 -27.64 27.06
2.00 -4.819 11.743 .911 -32.47 22.83
Table 5.6. ANOVA results for different number of STs attended
the operating time, since multiple scrub technicians may exchange roles during the
surgery to take breaks. The results are represented in Table 5.6. It can be concluded
that taking breaks do not have a significant effect on operating times because no
significant difference could be observed between surgeries with a higher number of
scrub techs attending the surgery.
5.1.4 Stochastic Characterization of the Performances
We include stochasticity into our model through a representation of the uncer-
tainty in the realized performance levels for each team member and experience level
combination. To this end, we define exogenous random performance variables and
associate them with a probability distribution based on analysis of existing data.
Let ǫ be a vector of random variables corresponding to performances of each team
member with different experience levels. The components of this vector are denoted
by ǫij , where i refers to the team member, and j refers to the experience level of the
team member. We assume two possible realizations for each random parameter, e.g.
low ǫlowij , and high ǫ
high
ij . In order to quantify these realizations, we first calculate the
difference between the highest and lowest possible performance values for each type
of performance measure. We then divide it by 6 by assuming that lowest and highest
values are 6 standard deviations away from the average. To calculate ǫlowij and ǫ
high
ij , we
add and subtract a single standard deviation from the observed performance levels,
134
respectively. The same procedure is used for dependent performance measures as well,
where the notation in this case involves elowiji′j′ and e
high
iji′j′, where i and i
′ correspond to
two different team members, while j and j′ are their respective experience levels.
The probability distributions for these realizations are determined through the
analysis of historical data. For each team member with a given experience level, we
calculated the likelihood of having low or high performance based on the frequency
of the observations. For example, an experienced doctor is assumed to perform well
if the total operating room time is lower than the overall average time, while it would
imply a low performance if the observed time is higher than the average time. Looking
at the frequency of historical occurrences of such cases, a discrete probability can be
assigned for each outcome.
5.2 Stochastic Programming Model
In this section we develop a two stage stochastic programming approach and uti-
lize it to determine optimal team configurations for robotic surgery, based on different
levels of experience that each team member can have. Assume that there are K cat-
egories of team members that need to be present in the surgery, e.g. surgeon, scrub
tech, etc., and each category has J different experience levels, e.g. low, medium, and
high. It is further assumed that, during the given period it is required to set up a |M|
teams for surgical operations, whereM is the set of all teams. Since the performance
of team members are uncertain and become known after a set of surgeries is com-
pleted, the problem is stochastic and analyzed for different realizations ψ ∈ Ψ, which
represent scenarios with corresponding probabilities πψ. Each scenario corresponds
to one possible combination of performance outcomes over all team members.
Given this setting, we first define a binary variable xjψskm such that it is 1 if a
member in group k ∈ K at performance level of j ∈ J is assigned to be in team
m ∈M at stage s = 1, 2 in scenario ψ, and 0 otherwise. The individual performance
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value of each member in group k at level j in period s is represented by pjsk while the
dependent performance of a member in group k at level j with member in group n
at level l for scenario ψ in period s is represented by parameter ρjlψskn. Another binary
variable zjlψsknm is also defined such that it is equal to 1 if both the member of group k
at level j and group n level l is assigned to team m in time period s under scenario
ψ. We first summarize the notation used in the model as follows:
Variables Used in the Model
xjψskm : Binary variable such that it is 1 if a team member in group k ∈ K at
performance level of j ∈ J is assigned to be in team m ∈M at stage
s = 1, 2 in scenario ψ ∈ Ψ, and 0 otherwise.
zjlψsknm : Binary variable such that it is equal to 1 if both member of group k ∈ K
at level j ∈ J and group n ∈ K level l ∈ J is assigned to team m ∈M
in time period s ∈ S under scenario ψ ∈ Ψ , and 0 otherwise.
cjψkm : Auxiliary variable used to define team change cost in the second period
Parameters Used in the Model
pjψsk : The individual performance value of each member in group k ∈ K
at level j ∈ J in period s ∈ S
ρjlψskn : Dependent performance of a member in group k ∈ K at level j ∈ J with
member in group n ∈ K at level l ∈ J for scenario ψ ∈ Ψ in period s ∈ S
πψ : Probability value of scenario ψ ∈ Ψ
λjψkm : First lagrangian multiplier for the first set of nonanticipativity constraints
µjlψknm : Second lagrangian multiplier for the second set of nonanticipativity
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constraints
Using these variable definitions, the two stage stochastic programming formulation
is as follows:
F(x, z,Ψ) = max min
m∈M
{
Eψ
[∑
s∈S
∑
k∈K
∑
n∈N
∑
j∈J
∑
l∈L
(
pjψskx
jψ
skm − |x
jψ
1km − x
jψ
2km|
)
5
+
ρjlψsknz
jlψ
sknm
10
]}
(5.2)
s.t
zjlψsknm ≤ x
jψ
skm ∀k ∈ K ∀n ∈ K − k ∀j ∈ J ∀m ∈M ∀s ∈ S ∀l ∈ J − j
∀ψ ∈ Ψ− ψ′ (5.3)
zjlψsknm ≤ x
jψ
snm ∀k ∈ K ∀n ∈ K − k ∀j ∈ J ∀m ∈ M ∀s ∈ S ∀l ∈ J − j
∀ψ ∈ Ψ− ψ′ (5.4)∑
m∈M
xjψskm = 1 ∀k ∈ K ∀j ∈ J ∀s ∈ S ∀l ∈ J − j ∀ψ ∈ Ψ (5.5)∑
j∈J
xjψskm = 1 ∀k ∈ K ∀m ∈M ∀s ∈ S ∀l ∈ J − j ∀ψ ∈ Ψ (5.6)
∑
k∈K
∑
j∈J
xjψskm = 5 ∀m ∈ M ∀s ∈ S ∀ψ ∈ Ψ (5.7)
xjψ1km = x
jψ′
1km ∀k ∈ K ∀n ∈ K − k ∀j ∈ J ∀m ∈M ∀s ∈ S ∀l ∈ J − j
∀ψ ∈ Ψ− ψ′ (5.8)
zjlψ1knm = z
jlψ′
1knm ∀k ∈ K ∀n ∈ K − k ∀j ∈ J ∀m ∈M ∀s ∈ S ∀l ∈ J − j
∀ψ ∈ Ψ− ψ′ (5.9)
xjψskm, z
jlψ
sknm ∈ {0, 1} ∀k ∈ K ∀n ∈ K − k ∀j ∈ J ∀m ∈M ∀s ∈ S ∀l ∈ J − j
∀ψ ∈ Ψ (5.10)
where F(x, z,Ψ) is a scalar value and represents value of objective function. Equa-
tion (5.2) refers to the objective function which maximizes the minimum expected
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total performance value of team configuration decisions at all stages, which includes
a penalty for team changes in the second period. More specifically, individual and
dependent performance values in each period are summed, and then a penalty cost
for team changes in the second period is included into the objective function. We
divide performance values by 5 and 10, since there are 5 individual and 10 dependent
performance values to be summed up for each team configuration. Note that the non-
linearity due the absolute value term at the objective function can be linearized by
replacing the term with cjψkm and adding the following constraints in the formulation:
cjψkm ≤ x
jψ
1km − x
jψ
2km (5.11)
cjψkm ≤ −x
jψ
1km + x
jψ
2km (5.12)
where cjψkm refers to a team change cost for the second period.
Constraint (5.3) and (5.4) relate zsjlψknm and x
jψ
skm variables and linearize a nonlinear
constraint structure which is originally stated as zsjlψknm ≤ x
jψ
skmx
jψ
snm. More specifically,
zsjlψknm = 1 if both x
jψ
skm and x
jψ
snm are equal to 1, and z
sjlψ
knm = 0 if any or both of them
are equal to 0. Constraint (5.5) ensures that each team member at each performance
level should be assigned to one team exactly while constraint (5.6) is used to assign
exactly one member from each group to each surgical team. The total number of
team members is at most |K| and this is defined by constraint (5.7). Constraint (5.8)
and (5.9) are stated as nonanticipativity constraints where the first stage variables
should be equal to each other. Finally, Constraint (5.10) states that decision variables
of the model are binary variables.
5.3 Solution Approach and Numerical Analysis
In this section, we perform a numerical analysis through the stochastic program-
ming model to seek insights for the general team allocation problem. More specifically,
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we try to determine whether general rules of thumb for team composition decisions
exist, which might aid hospitals for determining optimal team combinations. In our
analysis, we also address computational issues related to the stochastic programming
model, which runs into tractability issues. To this end, we propose a Lagrangian de-
composition method as a solution algorithm, as explained in the following subsection.
5.3.1 Solution through a Lagrangian Decomposition Procedure
Model (5.2)-(5.10) is linked in scenarios through the nonanticipativity constraints
(5.8) and (5.9). Let gψ(x, z) represent the objective function (5.2). Then by subject-
ing the nonanticipativity conditions to Lagrangian relaxation, we form the following
Lagrangian
L(x, y, λ, µ) =gψ(x, z) +
∑
k∈K
∑
j∈J
∑
m∈M
∑
ψ∈Ψ
πψλ
jψ
km
(
xjψ1km − x
jψ′
1km)
+
∑
k∈K
∑
n∈N
∑
j∈J
∑
l∈L
∑
m∈M
∑
ψ∈Ψ
πψµ
jlψ
knm(z
jlψ
1knm − z
jlψ′
1knm) (5.13)
where λjψkm and µ
jlψ
knm are the Lagrange multipliers. Notice that the formulation of
the nonanticipativity constraints (5.8) and the multiplication of the relaxed con-
straints (5.9) by πψ in the above Lagrangian account for the scenario probabilities,
and prevent the ill-conditioning in the Lagrangian dual as discussed by Louveaux
and Schultz (2003). This procedure is similar to the decomposition method described
by Carøe and Schultz (1999). We adapt this procedure and express the resulting
Lagrangian as:
L(x, y,λ, µ) = gψ(x, z) +
∑
k∈K
∑
j∈J
∑
m∈M
∑
ψ∈Ψ
{
λjψkm
(
− xjψ1km
)
+
∑
ψ′∈Ψ
+πψλ
jψ′
kmx
jψ
1km
}
+
∑
k∈K
∑
n∈N
∑
j∈J
∑
l∈L
∑
m∈M
∑
ψ∈Ψ
{
µjlψknm
(
− zjlψ1knm
)
+
∑
ψ′∈Ψ
πψµ
jlψ′
knmz
jψ
1km
}
(5.14)
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Problem (5.14) is a nonsmooth convex minimization problem, and can be solved
by subgradient optimization methods (Hiriart-Urruty and Lemare´chal, 1996). Notice
that this method reduces to solving |Ψ| problems of manageable size, each of which
corresponds to a single scenario.
The overall procedure to solve the stochastic team allocation problem is summa-
rized below.
Step 1. Perform Lagrangian relaxation on the problem, decomposing the problem
into individual scenario subproblems.
Step 2. Use subgradient algorithm to obtain an upper bound for the problem.
Step 2a. Solve the LP relaxation of constraints (5.2)-(5.10), and set the corre-
sponding dual values as the initial Lagrangian multipliers. Use a rounding heuristic
to obtain an initial lower-bound on the problem.
Step 2b. At each iteration j of the algorithm, determine a lower-bound for the
scenario subproblems by calculating the corresponding Lagrangian and selecting the
minimum.
Step 2c. Use the best lower-bounds for the scenario subproblems as the starting
solution for the subproblems at iteration j + 1.
Step 3. Calculate the duality gap upon convergence of the subgradient algorithm.
If the gap is less than or equal to the minimum acceptable level, stop. Else, if
computationally feasible, use branch and bound to close the duality gap, by branching
on the nonanticipativity conditions.
5.3.2 Numerical Results and Optimal Policy Insights
Our numerical analysis in this section utilizes the stochastic programming model
to seek insights for the surgical team allocation problem. More specifically, we try
to determine whether general rules of thumb for allocation decisions can be observed
that might aid hospitals for the optimal allocation of team members.
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CN ST Surgeon Anesthetist PA
Team-1 Medium High Medium Medium Medium
Team-2 High Low Low Low High
Team-3 Low Medium High High Low
Table 5.7. First stage team allocation decisions representing best team configura-
tions.
Computational tests based on the available data set were conducted using the
developed solution procedure. The performance data was extracted through the re-
gression analysis described in detail in Section 5.1. We implemented our model for
1024 scenarios where low and high realizations are used for each stochastic parame-
ter. Computations were performed on a PC with an Intel i7 Quad processor with 2.4
GHz speed and 8 GB of internal memory, using IBM ILOG CPLEX Version 12.1. Al-
though the computational studies were conducted on a single computer, the proposed
solution procedure can easily be parallelized by solving the scenario subproblems on
multiple machines to improve the solution times significantly. We obtained a con-
verged solution for 1024 scenarios in approximately 10 hours of time. The percent
gap between best upper and lower bounds was around 0.14% at convergence. Opti-
mal team allocation decisions for the fist stage are represented in Table 5.7, where
low, medium, and high refers to different experience levels for each team member as
defined in Section 5.1.
In Table 5.7 we present the optimal team configuration for the first decision epoch.
These results reflect the “ideal” configurations such that the maximum expected
operating room time is minimized over the three teams. Note that the problem setup
assumes the existence of team members from each possible experience level, and seeks
to identify the best team structures if all team members are to be utilized.
These results suggest some relevant practical insights for hospital schedulers.
First, it can be concluded that if a doctor has low experience, it is generally bet-
ter to match him/her with a more experienced PA. Similarly, if a doctor has high
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experience, it is fine to match him with a less experienced PA or scrub tech. These
findings also support the general observation that the surgeon and the PA are the
key actors and have primary control on robotic surgery, as both of them can perform
robot docking, positioning and anything that relates to the coordination of robot’s ac-
tivities during a surgery. Hence, the surgeon and the PA can generally substitute each
other, and at least one of them should have higher levels of experience for improved
performance in the surgery. We also note that if the scrub tech has low experience
in a surgical team, then either the surgeon or the PA should be more experienced.
Independent from other team member experiences, it is not recommended to include
low experienced ST, PA and surgeon in the same team. In the case that both the
surgeon and PA are not as experienced, then it is better to match them with an
experienced scrub tech. These results are also supportive of our observations that
ST plays an important role in surgery and sometimes could replace the PA if there
is no PA available. Another relationship exists between the CN and the anesthetist.
It can be observed that if the anesthetist has more experience, it is fine to have a
less experienced CN in the team, however if anesthetist has less experience, he/she
should be matched with a more experienced CN. This relationship between CN and
the anesthetist is also reasonable since both of them mostly work together during the
surgery room preparation and patient awakening phase. Given that the surgeon is
also sometimes active in the preparation process we can observe from the results that
a low experienced CN should be matched with an experienced surgeon or vice versa.
Besides first stage allocation decisions, for demonstration purposes we also provide
second stage allocation decisions for some selected scenarios in Table 5.8. These
are recourse decisions that would be implemented if it turns out that the observed
performances differ significantly from their expected levels. As it can be generally
observed, similar conclusions as above can be derived for the surgeon, PA and the ST
in the recourse decisions as well.
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Team Members
Sample Scenario Index Teams CN ST Surgeon Anesthetist PA
Team-1 Low High Medium Medium High
1 Team-2 Medium Low High Low Low
Team-3 High Medium Low High Medium
Team-1 High Low Low Low High
2 Team-2 Low High Medium High Medium
Team-3 Medium Medium High Medium Low
Team-1 High Low Medium High Low
3 Team-2 Low Medium High Medium Medium
Team-3 Medium High Low Low High
Team-1 Low Medium High High Low
4 Team-2 High Low Medium Medium Medium
Team-3 Medium High Low Low High
Team-1 High Low Medium Medium Medium
5 Team-2 Medium High High Low Low
Team-3 Low Medium Low High High
Table 5.8. Second stage team allocations for sample scenarios.
5.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, we investigated dynamic portfolio management approaches for
optimization of surgical team compositions in robotic surgeries. For this problem, we
developed stochastic dynamic model to identify policies for optimal team configura-
tions, where optimality is defined based on the minimum experience level required to
achieve the maximum attainable performance over all ranges of feasible experience
measures. We derived individual and dependent performance values of each surgical
team member by using data on operating room time and team member experience,
and then used them as inputs to a two-stage stochastic programming based framework
that we developed. In our analysis, we also addressed computational issues related to
the stochastic programming model, which runs into tractability issues. To this end,
we proposed a Lagrangian decomposition method as a solution algorithm. Finally,
we performed a numerical analysis based on real-world data for practical insights.
Although, our conclusions are based on the specific numerical data used, we be-
lieve that hospitals can benefit from the proposed models either through direct imple-
mentation for specific guidance, or through the indirect use of several policy results
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obtained. In our results we show that operation starting time and different operations
could affect operating room time while the breaks that STs and CNs use during the
surgery do not have significant effects on the overall operating room time. We fur-
ther obtain dependent and independent performance levels for each team member by
finding optimal experience levels for each case. By using these findings as an input to
our stochastic model we derive further insights related to the team configuration de-
cisions. An important characteristic of our study is that we build our models by using
real-world data through interactions with a hospital. As a first stochastic model of its
type in this application area, we aim to provide surgical team allocation guidelines for
hospitals through explicit consideration of uncertainty. As future work, this problem
could be combined with a staffing problem by considering time, costs, experiences,
and performances of individuals, rather than team member categories.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
In this dissertation, we study specific types of resource allocation problems where
social benefits and non-quantitative objectives are specifically considered in resource
allocation decisions. Two applications of stochastic dynamic models on societal re-
source allocation are described throughout the thesis. In the first application, we
present strategic and tactical aspects involving the acquisition of foreclosed proper-
ties by nonprofits, while in the second application, we propose a two-stage stochastic
programming model for allocating team members to surgeries to minimize operating
room times.
In Chapters 1 and 2, we provide general introduction and literature review in-
formation describing the background for the problems investigated in the study. In
Chapter 3, the strategic dimension of the foreclosed housing acquisition problem is
described in detail, where we consider long term budget allocation decisions along
with acquisition decisions. We model the strategic foreclosed housing acquisition
problem as a two stage stochastic programming model and then expand this model
through a multi-stage structure involving gradual uncertainty resolution. We include
some further variations to reflect potential real life cases to obtain better practical
insights for CDCs and practitioners in their long term decisions. Some computational
analyses are also performed to demonstrate the applicability of the proposed models.
In Chapter 4, the tactical dimension of the foreclosed housing acquisition problem
is discussed where we mainly consider short term acquisition decisions in our modeling
framework. We investigate two practical planning situations based on whether the
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potentially accessible funds have an expiration date or not. Analytical results are
obtained for both cases. In addition, we describe policies to determine optimal overbid
rates to use when targeting a property for potential acquisition. We implement our
model and policies in a numerical setting by using operational data obtained from
a CDC. Based on this analysis, we observe a potential increase of around 17% in
expected total property value impacts, if the optimal policies were to be implemented
by the CDC that the data was obtained from.
In Chapter 5, we develop a data-based optimization model to identify policies for
surgical team compositions in robotic surgeries. As part of this analysis, we derive
individual and dependent performance values of each surgical team member by using
operational data obtained from a hospital. By using these performance values, we
develop a stochastic optimization model to obtain general insights that can be used
as decision guidelines. In our analysis, we also address computational issues related
to the stochastic programming model, which runs into tractability issues. To this
end, we propose a Lagrangian decomposition method as a solution algorithm for the
problem.
As potential future research, we note for the foreclosed housing acquisition prob-
lem that as in any model, accurate quantification of relevant measures is crucial for
the validity of implementations involving the presented approaches. Hence, in addi-
tion to the consideration of the variances of objectives and priorities between different
CDCs, future work may involve assessments of the accuracy of expert opinions used
in quantitative measurements with respect to their impacts on the optimization mod-
els. The observed real life implications of the proposed models on CDCs would also
constitute an important extension to our study in terms of its practical significance.
One additional issue that relates to foreclosed housing acquisition problem involves
the role of private investors as competitors to nonprofit CDCs. This becomes relevant
under stable market conditions, where prioritization of CDCs in acquiring properties
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is not implemented by funding agencies or lenders. Since acquisitions in such cases
will involve game theoretical aspects, it is possible that a game theory based analysis
approach is likely to be more valid for that problem setting. On the other hand it
is still possible to use the tactical decision framework in Chapter 4 by modifying the
probability of success function to account for the increased competition in bidding
for properties.
For future research in robotic surgery team composition problem, it is likely to
be of value to analyze staffing and scheduling policies by taking into account the
individual and joint experiences of team members. Current staffing and scheduling
policies are mostly done in an ad hoc fashion based on random assignments. Hence,
if such assignments were to be performed based on expected performance levels, it is
likely that overall surgery times can be reduced.
While there are certain tractability issues, one alternative approach to optimal
surgical team composition problem involves a Markov decision process based analysis
where analytical policies can potentially be derived. On the other hand, the combina-
torial nature of the problem might make it necessary to use simplifying assumptions
in such an approach, and this might take away from the validity of the model.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX FOR STRATEGIC SOCIETAL RESOURCE
ALLOCATION
A.1 Stochastic Parameters
Acquisition and redevelopment costs
Social returns
Total required budget to acquire all properties of a given category in a
neighborhood
A.2 Deterministic Parameters
Available budget
Financial returns
Collective efficacy measure of a given neighborhood
Probability that a given category property will be sold within a certain time
frame
Current number of owner occupied properties in a given neighborhood
Total number of properties in a given neighborhood
Distance between two neighborhoods
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Figure A.1. Supporting information for the stochastic treatment of acquisition and
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Figure A.2. Supporting information for the stochastic treatment of social returns.
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Figure A.3. Supporting information for the stochastic treatment of total required
budget for acquiring all properties and deterministic treatment of financial returns.
A.3 Values of Parameters used in Numerical Analysis for
Case 2x2
A.3.1 Deterministic Parameter Values
Budget : $5 million
Distance between neighborhoods: 0.9 miles
Standardized neighborhood efficacies: 0.3; 0.5
Current number of properties in neighborhoods: 2,640; 4,335
Current number of owner occupied properties: 1492; 2795
Probability of sale for categories: 0.5; 0.6
Expected financial returns: $13,960 and $15,780 for
neighborhood 1;
$22,350 and $25,410 for
neighborhood 2
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APPENDIX B
APPENDIX FOR TACTICAL SOCIETAL RESOURCE
ALLOCATION
B.1 Proofs of Analytical Results
Proof of Theorem 1
Kleywegt and Papastavrou (2001) note that for any given policy in the stochastic
dynamic knapsack problem, the value of the policy can be calculated by conditioning
on the availability time Ak after time t of a property k, its asking price Ck and PVI
value Rk as follows, where the availability rate λ and discount rate α are also included.
Given this, we have that:
V
(
bt
)
=
∫ b
C
∫ R¯
R
∫ ∞
t
λe−λ(ak−t)E
[ ∑
i:Ai>t
e−α(Ai−t)max
{
V
(
bAi
)
, max
δbCiAi
{[
Ri
+ V
(
(b− Ci − CiδbCiAi)Ai
)]
p(δbCiAi) +
[
V
(
bAi
)
− g(Ci, δbCiAi)
]
[
1− p(δbCiAi)
]}}∣∣∣∣∣Ak = a, Rk = r, Ck = c
]
daf(r, c)drdc (B.1)
=
∫ b
C
∫ R¯
R
∫ ∞
t
λe−λ(a−t)
{
e−α(a−t)
[
max
{
V
(
ba
)
,
max
δbca
{[
r + V
(
(b− c− cδbca)a
)]
p(δbca)
+
[
V
(
ba
)
− g(c, δbca)
][
1− p(δbca)
]}}
+ E
[ ∑
i:Ai>a
e−α(Ai−a)max
{
V
(
bAi
)
, max
δbCiAi
{[
Ri
+ V
(
(b− Ci − CiδbCiAi)Ai
)]
p(δbCiAi)
+
[
V
(
bAi
)
− g(Ci, δbCiAi)
][
1− p(δbCiAi)
]}}
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∣∣∣∣∣Ak = a, Rk = r, Ck = c
]]}
daf(r, c)drdc
=
λ
α + λ
[∫ b
C
max
δbca
{∫ R¯
x(δbca)
rp(δbca)− g(c, δbca)
(
1− p(δbca)
)
f(r, c)dr
}
dc
]
+
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C
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R
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}
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V
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][
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]
daf(r, c)dr
}
dc (B.2)
Given that the planning horizon is infinite and that the distribution of asking prices
and PVI values are stationary, we have V
(
bt
)
= V
(
b). This implies that equation
(B.2) can be expressed as:
V
(
b
)
=
λ
α + λ
[∫ b
C
max
δbc
{∫ R¯
x(δbc)
rp(δbc)− g(c, δbc)
(
1− p(δbc)
)
f(r, c)dr
}
dc
]
+
λ
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[∫ b
C
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{∫ x(δbc)
R
V
(
b
)
f(r, c)dr
}
dc
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C
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{∫ R¯
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V
(
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dc
]
(B.3)
=
λ
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[∫ b
C
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δbc
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x(δbc)
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(
1− p(δbc)
)
f(r, c)dr
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C
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R
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b
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(B.5)
When a countable state space is assumed, the results of Yushkevich and Feinberg
(1979) or Kleywegt and Papastavrou (2001) can be used along with equation (B.5)
above to conclude that, after some simple algebraic manipulation, the value of the
optimal policy can be calculated using the equation:
αV ∗(b) =λ
∫ b
C
max
δbc
{∫ R¯
x(δbc)
p(δbc)
(
r −
[
V ∗(b)− V ∗(b− c− cδbc)
+
1− p(δbc)
p(δbc)
g(c, δbc)
])
f(r, c)dr
}
dc (B.6)

Proof of Theorem 2
For results 1 and 2, we note that based on Equation (4.5) in Theorem 1, optimal
overbid rate δ∗bc for a given asking price c can be expressed as:
δ∗bc = argmax
δbc
{∫ R¯
x(δbc)
p(δbc)
(
r − x(δbc)
)
f(r, c)dr
}
(B.7)
We first analyze when the function is on the right hand side is increasing or decreasing
with respect to δbc. Considering the derivative of the function with respect to δbc, we
get:
∂
∂δbc
∫ R¯
x(δbc)
p(δbc)
(
r − x(δbc)
)
f(r, c)dr =
∫ R¯
x(δbc)
∂
∂δbc
[
p(δbc)
(
r − x(δbc)
)
f(r, c)
]
dr
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+
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)
f(R¯, c)
] ∂R¯
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−
[
p(δbc)
(
x(δbc)
− x(δbc)
)
f(x(δbc), c)
]∂x(δbc)
∂δbc
(B.8)
where the relationship is due to the property that
d
dy
∫ h(y)
g(y)
f(x, y)dx =
∫ h(y)
g(y)
∂f(x, y)
∂y
dx+ f(h(y), y)
dh(y)
dy
− f(g(y), y)
dg(y)
dy
(B.9)
Given that the second and third terms on the right hand side of Equation (B.8) are
zero, it follows that:
∂
∂δbc
∫ R¯
x(δbc)
p(δbc)
(
r − x(δbc)
)
f(r, c)dr =
∫ R¯
x(δbc)
∂p(δbc)
∂δbc
rf(r, c)dr
−
∫ R¯
x(δbc)
∂p(δbc)x(δbc)
∂δbc
f(r, c)dr
=
∫ R¯
x(δbc)
∂p(δbc)
∂δbc
rf(r, c)dr −
∫ R¯
x(δbc)
∂p(δbc)
∂δbc
x(δbc)f(r, c)dr
−
∫ R¯
x(δbc)
p(δbc)
∂x(δbc)
∂δbc
f(r, c)dr (B.10)
= p′(δbc)
∫ R¯
x(δbc)
rf(r, c)dr − p′(δbc)x(δbc)
∫ R¯
x(δbc)
f(r, c)dr
− p(δbc)x
′(δbc)
∫ R¯
x(δbc)
f(r, c)dr (B.11)
= p′(δbc)E[r|r ≥ x(δbc)]P (r ≥ x(δbc))− p
′(δbc)x(δbc)P (r ≥ x(δbc))
− p(δbc)x
′(δbc)P (r ≥ x(δbc)) (B.12)
Note that x′(δbc) ≈
∂
∂δbc
(
(1−p(δbc))g(c,δbc)
p(δbc)
)
under the assumption that ∂(V (b)−V (b−c−cδbc))
∂δbc
is small enough to be ignored. This implies that p(δbc)x
′(δbc) in the last term of
equation (B.10) above can be expressed as L(δbc) = Gc(1 − p(δbc) −
p′(δbc)
p(δbc)
(1 + δbc)).
It follows that:
∂
∂δbc
∫ R¯
x(δbc)
p(δbc)
(
r − x(δbc)
)
f(r, c)dr = p′(δbc)P (r ≥ x(δbc))
(
E[r|r ≥ x(δbc)]
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− x(δbc)−
L(δbc)
p′(δbc)
)
(B.13)
Clearly, the function maximized in equation (B.7) will be decreasing in δbc, if equa-
tion (B.13) is negative, i.e. if E[r|r ≥ x(δbc)]−x(δbc)−
L(δbc)
p′(δbc)
≤ 0 . Given that this func-
tion depends on x(δbc) which is a variable itself, a condition based on an upper bound
for the expression can be used to determine whether the function will be decreasing in
δbc for all possible threshold levels. To this end, let K¯ = maxk∈{R,R¯}{E(r|r ≥ k)−k}.
In addition, let L¯ = maxδbc∈[0,δ¯c]{L(δbc)} and L = minδbc∈[0,δ¯c]{L(δbc)}. Given this
notation and that p(δbc) is increasing in δbc, an upper bound for the left hand side of
the condition can be expressed to get the condition p′(δ¯c)K¯−L ≤ 0. If this condition
holds, then the optimal overbid rate is zero, regardless of the threshold policy used
by the CDC.
Similarly, a lower bound for the right hand side is when {E(r|r ≥ k) − k} = 0,
which implies that if L ≤ 0, then the derivative function is increasing in δbc for all
threshold levels. If so, the optimal overbid rate is the maximum possible value for
δbc, which is defined as δ¯c.
For result 3, we show when the function on the right hand side is convex in δbc,
which implies that the optimal overbid rate should be at the boundaries of the range
for δbc. The function to maximize over δbc is as follows.
∫ R¯
x(δbc)
p(δbc)
(
r −
[
V (b)− V (b− c− cδbc) +
1− p(δbc)
p(δbc)
g(c, δbc)
])
f(r, c)dr (B.14)
=
∫ R¯
x(δbc)
p(δbc)
(
r −
[
V (b)− V (b− c− cδbc) +
1
p(δbc)
Gc+
1
p(δbc)
Gcδbc
−Gc−Gcδbc
])
f(r, c)dr (B.15)
=
∫ R¯
x(δbc)
[
p(δbc)r − p(δbc)
(
V (b)− V (b− c− cδbc)
)
−Gc−Gcδbc +Gcp(δbc)
+Gcδbcp(δbc)
]
f(r, c)dr (B.16)
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We now show when the expression inside brackets in equation (B.16) is convex. We
consider the second derivative of the function as follows:
∂2
∂δ2bc
(
p(δbc)r − p(δbc)
(
V (b)− V (b− c− cδbc)
)
−Gc−Gcδbc +Gcp(δbc)
+Gcδbcp(δbc)
)
(B.17)
= p′′(δbc)r −
∂
∂δbc
[
p′(δbc)
(
V (b)− V (b− c− cδbc)
)
+
∂
(
V (b)− V (b− c− cδbc)
)
∂δbc
p(δbc)
]
+
∂
∂δbc
[
−Gc+Gcp′(δbc)
+Gcδbcp
′(δbc) +Gcp(δbc)
]
(B.18)
= p′′(δbc)r −
[
p′′(δbc)
(
V (b)− V (b− c− cδbc)
)
+ p′(δbc)
∂
(
V (b)− V (b− c− cδbc)
)
∂δbc
+ p′(δbc)
∂
(
V (b)− V (b− c− cδbc)
)
∂δbc
+ p(δbc)
∂2
(
V (b)− V (b− c− cδbc)
)
∂δ2bc
]
+
[
Gcp′′(δbc) +Gcp
′(δbc) +Gcδbcp
′′(δbc) +Gcp
′(δbc)
]
(B.19)
= p′′(δbc)
[
r +Gcδbc +Gc−
(
V (b)− V (b− c− cδbc)
)]
+ 2Gcp′(δbc) (B.20)
which is based on the assumption that
∂
(
V (b)−V (b−c−cδbc)
)
∂δbc
≈ 0. Given that the multi-
plier of p′′(δbc) is positive by the definition of PVI threshold and integration preserves
convexity, the function being maximized over δbc is convex, if p
′′(δbc) ≥ 0; i.e. when
p(δbc) is convex in δbc, which implies that δ
∗
bc is at the boundary of the range of δbc
values.
Moreover, the function being maximized is also convex when the expression in (B.20)
is negative for concave probability of success functions. Hence, if p′′(δbc) < 0, the
maximized function is convex when the following condition holds for all δbc ∈ [0, δ¯c]:
−p′′(δbc)
[
r +Gcδbc +Gc−
(
V (b)− V (b− c− cδbc)
)]
≤ 2Gcp′(δbc) (B.21)
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Note that by the definition of the PVI threshold we have that r ≥
(
V (b)−V (b− c−
cδbc)
)
and a lower bound on V (b)− V (b− c− cδbc) is R +
1−p(δbc)
p(δbc)
Gc. It follows that
for convexity :
− p′′(δbc)
[
r +Gcδbc +Gc− R−
(1− p(δbc)
p(δbc)
)
Gc
]
≤ 2Gcp′(δbc) (B.22)
⇒ −p′′(δbc)
[
r +Gc
(
δbc + 1−
1− p(δbc)
p(δbc)
− R
)]
≤ 2Gcp′(δbc) (B.23)

Proof of Corollary 1
For result 1, we note that the function in equation (B.7) is either convex or concave
depending on the problem parameters as defined by (B.23). If it is convex, then the
optimal overbid rate δ∗bc ∈ {0, δ¯c} as discussed in the proof of Theorem 2. If the
function is concave, then per equation (B.13), the maximizer for the function has to
satisfy the condition that p′(δbc)K − L(δbc) = 0 for a PVI threshold level k. Note
that if the solution of this equation does not lie within the range [0, δ¯c], then the
optimal overbid rate is either 0 or δ¯c depending on whether the function is increasing
or decreasing in that range.
For results 2 and 3, the optimal overbid rate corresponds to a root of a polynomial
defined by p′(δbc)K − L(δbc) = 0, which can expressed as Gc(1 − p(δbc) −
p′(δbc)
p(δbc)
(1 +
δbc)) − Kp′(δbc) = 0. Thus as the polynomial function is nonincreasing in K and
nondecreasing in c, the solution for the optimal overbid rate is also nonincreasing in
K and nondecreasing in c. 
Proof of Corollary 2
For result 1, we can express equation (B.12) for the uniformly distributed PVI
values as follows:
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p′(δbc)
∫ R¯
x(δbc)
r
1
R¯− R
dr − p′(δbc)x(δbc)
R¯ − x(δbc)
R¯−R
− L(δbc)
R¯− x(δbc)
R¯− R
(B.24)
If this derivative is negative, then δ∗bc = 0. Hence, we have that:
p′(δbc)
R¯2 − x(δbc)2
2(R¯−R)
− p′(δbc)x(δbc)
R¯− x(δbc)
R¯− R
− L(δbc)
R¯ − x(δbc)
R¯−R
≤ 0 (B.25)
⇒ p′(δbc)(R¯− x(δbc))(R¯ + x(δbc))− 2p
′(δbc)x(δbc)(R¯− x(δbc))
− 2L(δbc)(R¯− x(δbc)) ≤ 0 (B.26)
⇒ p′(δbc)(R¯ + x(δbc))− 2p
′(δbc)x(δbc)− 2L(δbc) ≤ 0 (B.27)
⇒ p′(δbc)(R¯− x(δbc))− 2L(δbc) ≤ 0 (B.28)
An upper bound for the expression on the left hand side is when δbc = δ¯c, x(δbc) =
R, and L(δbc) = L . Hence, the function is decreasing in δbc and δ
∗
bc = 0, if the
condition p′(δ¯c)(R¯−R)−2L ≤ 0 holds. Similarly, δ∗bc = δ¯c if the derivative is positive,
and in that case result 2 in Theorem 2 applies.
For result 2, we use the derivative function given on the left hand side of (B.28),
along with the observation that in case of convexity the optimal overbid rate is either
0 or δ¯c. If the function being maximized is concave in δbc and a threshold k is used,
then p′(δbc)(R¯−k)−2L(δbc) = 0 should hold for the optimal overbid rate. If, however,
none of the solutions of the equation lie within the range [0, δ¯c], then again optimal
overbid rate is either 0 or δ¯c. 
Proof of Theorem 3 Item 1
The result implies that the optimal expected total PVI value is nondecreasing
in the amount of accessible funds. Note that for a given overbid rate δbc, the value
function can be represented as follows:
αV (b) =λ
∫ b
C
max
δbc
{∫ R¯
x(δbc)
p(δbc)
(
r − [V (b)− V (b− c− cδbc)
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+
1− p(δbc)
p(δbc)
g(c, δbc)]
)
f(r, c)dr
}
dc (B.29)
Note that upper limit on the first integral is b. Moreover, PVI values are accumu-
lated additively for every property that can be acquired with the current amount of
accessible funds. Hence, if the same acquisition policy is used for two fund levels b1
and b2 such that b1 > b2, then the definition of V (b) in (B.29) implies V (b1) ≥ V (b2).

Proof of Theorem 3 Item 2
This result implies that optimal PVI thresholds are nondecreasing in availability
rate λ. Note that the optimal PVI threshold x(δ∗bc) is defined based on
x(δbc) = V (b)− V (b− c− cδbc) +
1− p(δbc)
p(δbc)
g(c, δbc) (B.30)
Per the result in Theorem 1, for any fund level the value function is defined as follows:
V (b) =
λ
α
∫ b
C
∫ R¯
x(δbc)
p(δbc)
(
r−
[
V (b)−V (b−c−cδbc)+
1− p(δbc)
p(δbc)
g(c, δbc)
])
f(r, c)drdc
(B.31)
which implies that expected total PVI is nondecreasing in the availability rate λ.
Considering that this would apply both to V (b) and V (b − c − cδbc), and given the
fact that V (b) ≥ V (b−c−cδbc), it follows that V (b)−V (b−c−cδbc) is nondecreasing in
λ. This in turn implies that optimal PVI thresholds are nondecreasing in availability
rate λ. 
Proof of Theorem 3 Item 3
Note that the statement implies the concavity of V ∗(b) if and only if the optimal
PVI thresholds x(δ∗bc) are nonincreasing in the amount of accessible funds b for any
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property with asking price c. V ∗(b) is concave in b when the following holds for any
b1 ≥ b2.
V ∗(b1)− V
∗(b1 − c− cδ
∗
b1c) ≤ V
∗(b2)− V
∗(b2 − c− cδ
∗
b2c) (B.32)
⇔ V ∗(b1)− V
∗(b1 − c− cδ
∗
b1c
) +
1− p(δ∗b1c)
p(δ∗b1c)
g(c, δ∗b1c) ≤ V
∗(b2)− V
∗(b2 − c− cδ
∗
b2c
)
+
1− p(δ∗b2c)
p(δ∗b2c)
g(c, δ∗b2c) (B.33)
⇔ x(δ∗b1c) ≤ x(δ
∗
b2c) (B.34)
where the inequality in (B.33) is due to the approximate independence of the optimal
overbid rate δ∗bc and the fund level, i.e. due to having δ
∗
bc = δ
∗
c for all fund levels b. 
Proof of Theorem 3 Item 4
Note that the optimal PVI threshold x(δ∗bc) is defined based on
x(δbc) = V (b)− V (b− c− cδbc) +
1− p(δbc)
p(δbc)
g(c, δbc) (B.35)
Hence, to determine whether PVI thresholds will decrease or increase as a function
of δbc, we approximate the derivative of x(δbc) for given b and c as:
∂x(δbc)
∂δbc
∼=
∂
∂δbc
(
1− p(δbc)
p(δbc)
(Gc+Gcδbc)
)
(B.36)
= −
(
p′(δbc)[Gc +Gcδbc]
p(δbc)
+
1− p(δbc)[Gc+Gcδbc]p′(δbc)
p2(δbc)
)
+
(1− p(δbc))Gc
p(δbc)
(B.37)
By setting expression (B.37) equal to zero, we get
−
p′(δbc)[Gc+Gcδbc]
p(δbc)
(
1 +
1− p(δbc)
p(δbc)
)
+
(1− p(δbc))Gc
p(δbc)
= 0 (B.38)
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⇒ − p′(δbc)[Gc+Gcδbc] + (1− p(δbc))Gcp(δbc) = 0 (B.39)
⇒ Gc(−p′(δbc)− δbcp
′(δbc)) +Gc(p(δbc)− (p(δbc))
2) = 0 (B.40)
⇒ p(δbc)− p(δbc)
2 − p′(δbc)− δbcp
′(δbc) = 0 (B.41)
⇒ p(δbc)(1− p(δbc))− p
′(δbc)(1 + δbc) = 0 (B.42)
Note that ∂
2x(δbc)
∂δ2
bc
≤ 0 as it follows from differentiating the left hand side of equation
(B.41). Hence x(δbc) is concave in δbc. Let δ˙bc be a solution to the equation p(δbc)
(
1−
p(δbc)
)
− p′(δbc)(1 + δbc) = 0. Given the concavity of x(δbc) in δbc, we note that if
there is a unique solution δ˙bc ∈ [0, δ¯c] or if δ˙bc > δ¯c, then for all δbc ∈ [0, δ˙bc], the
PVI threshold increases as a function of the overbid rate. For all, δbc ∈ [δ˙bc, δ¯c] or if
δ˙bc < 0, the PVI threshold decreases as a function of the overbid rate. 
Proof of Theorem 3 Item 5
Assume that the PVI threshold x(δbc) is nondecreasing in δbc. Without loss of
generality, let x(δbc) = R, which implies by definition that when the overbid rate δbc
is used, the critical fund level B˙(δbc) = b. Now consider an overbid rate δ
′
bc such that
δ′bc > δbc. Given that x(δbc) is nondecreasing in δbc, this implies x(δ
′
bc) ≥ x(δbc) = R,
which in turn indicates that the critical fund level B˙(δ′bc) ≥ B˙(δbc). We note through
a similar argument that if the latter condition holds, then it would imply that x(δbc)
has to be nondecreasing in δbc. 
Proof of Theorem 3 Item 6
Since ∂V (b)
∂t
= 0 and
∂x(δ∗
bc
)
∂t
= 0, the critical fund level value where x(δ∗bc) = R is
the same for different time values. Hence, critical fund level is constant over time.
Moreover, given that
∂x(δ∗
bc
)
∂t
= 0, the PVI threshold is constant over time. Hence, it
follows from conditions (B.32)-(B.34) that this implies marginal value of accessible
funds is constant over time. 
161
Proof of Theorem 4
We express the value function at time t as follows by conditioning on whether a
new property becomes available in the next ∆t time units or not:
V ∗
(
bt
)
= (1− α∆)
{
λ∆
[[ ∫ b
C
max
δbct
{∫ R¯
x(δbct)
(r + V ∗((b− c− cδbct)t+∆)p(δbct)
+ (V ∗(bt+∆)− g(c, δbct))(1− p(δbct))f(r, c)dr
}
dc
]
+
∫ b
C
∫ x(δbct)
R
V ∗(bt+∆)f(r, c)drdc
]
+ (1− λ∆)V ∗(bt+∆)
}
(B.43)
= (1− α∆)λ∆
[[ ∫ b
C
max
δbct
{∫ R¯
x(δbct)
(r + V ∗((b− c− cδbct)t+∆)p(δbct)
+ (V ∗(bt+∆)− g(c, δbct))(1− p(δbct))f(r, c)dr
}
dc
]
+
∫ b
C
∫ x(δbct)
R
V ∗(bt+∆)f(r, c)drdc
]
+ V ∗(bt+∆)−∆(α + λ− λα∆)V
∗(bt+∆) (B.44)
⇒
V ∗(bt)− V ∗(bt+∆)
∆
= (1− α∆)λ
[[ ∫ b
C
max
δbct
{∫ R¯
x(δbct)
(r + V ∗((b− c− cδbct)t+∆)
p(δbct) + (V
∗(bt+∆)− g(c, δbct))(1− p(δbct))f(r, c)dr
}
dc
]
+
∫ b
C
∫ x(δbct)
R
V ∗(bt+∆)f(r, c)drdc
]
− (α + λ− λα∆)V ∗(bt+∆) (B.45)
Letting ∆→ 0;
∂V
(
bt
)
∂t
= λ
[ ∫ b
C
max
δbct
{∫ R¯
x(δbct)
(r + V ∗((b− c− cδbct)t)p(δbct) + (V
∗(bt)
− g(c, δbct))(1− p(δbct))f(r, c)drdc+
∫ b
C
∫ x(δbct)
R
V ∗
(
bt
)
p(δbct)f(r, c)drdc
]
− (α + λ)V ∗
(
bt
)
(B.46)
= λ
[ ∫ b
C
max
δbct
{∫ R¯
x(δbct)
(r + V ∗((b− c− cδbct)t)p(δbct) + (V
∗(bt)
− g(c, δbct))(1− p(δbct))f(r, c)dr
}
dc+
[ ∫ C¯
C
∫ R¯
R
V ∗
(
bt
)
f(r, c)drdc
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−∫ b¯
C
∫ R¯
x(δbct)
V ∗
(
bt
)
f(r, c)drdc
]]
− (α+ λ)V ∗
(
bt
)
(B.47)
= λ
[ ∫ b
C
max
δbct
{∫ R¯
x(δbct)
[
(r + V ∗((b− c− cδbct)t)p(δbct)
+ (V ∗(bt)− g(c, δbct))(1− p(δbct))− V
∗(bt)
]
f(r, c)dr
}]
dc
− (α + λ)V ∗(bt) + λV
∗(bt) (B.48)
Hence, the optimal value function V ∗(bt) is the solution of the differential equation:
∂V
(
bt
)
∂t
= λ
∫ b
C
max
δbct
{∫ R¯
x(δbct)
p(δbct)(r − [V
∗
(
bt
)
− V ∗((b− c− cδbct)t)
+
1− p(δbct)
p(δbct)
g(c, δbct)])f(r, c)dr
}
dc− αV
(
bt
)
(B.49)

Proof of Theorem 5
Note that equation (B.7) is equivalent to the following for the case with fund
expiration:
δ∗bct = argmax
δbct
{∫ R¯
x(δbct)
p(δbct)
(
r − x(δbct)
)
f(r, c)dr
}
(B.50)
Following the same procedure as in the no fund expiration case, the derivative of the
function to be maximized is:
p′(δbc)E[r|r ≥ x(δbct)]P (r ≥ x(δbct))− p
′(δbct)x(δbct)P (r ≥ x(δbct))
− p(δbct)x
′(δbct)P (r ≥ x(δbct)) (B.51)
Note that x′(δbct) ≈
∂
∂δbct
(
(1−p(δbct))g(c,δbct)
p(δbct)
)
under the assumption that ∂(V (bt)−V ((b−c−cδbc)t)
∂δbct
is small enough to be ignored. This implies that x′(δbct) is independent of time and
thus the same results for the infinite horizon case apply. 
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Proof of Theorem 6 Item 1
The same procedures applied for the proofs of the corresponding results in the no
fund expiration case can be used to show that these results hold independent of time.
More specifically, for result 1 we note that the upper limit on the integral in the value
function definition is b, and a larger value here would imply a larger expected total
PVI without any implication of the time. The other results follow from the fact that
optimal overbid rates are approximately independent of time. 
Proof of Theorem 6 Item 2
The statement implies that the expected total PVI value is nonincreasing in time.
We show through the discrete time approximation of the optimal value function that
this holds for all fund levels. Recall that this approximation is expressed as follows:
V ∗(bt−T/τ ) =(1− α)V
∗
(
bt
)
+
T
τ
λ
∫ bt
C
max
δbct
{∫ R¯
x(δbct)
p(δbct)
(
r −
[
V ∗
(
bt
)
− V ∗
(
(b− c− cδbct)t
)
+
1− p(δbct)
p(δbct)
g(c, δbct)
])
f(r, c)dr
}
dc (B.52)
Note that the second component on the right hand side is nonnegative by definition.
Given that α ≥ 0, we get V ∗(bt−T/τ ) ≥ V ∗(bt) for any T/τ at all fund levels. 
Proof of Theorem 6 Item 3
Let ∂V (bt)
∂b
be the marginal value of accessible funds. Per Theorem 6 item 2, we
have that PVI value V (bt) is nonincreasing over time. Given that
∂
∂t
∂V (bt)
∂b
= ∂
∂b
∂V (bt)
∂t
per Young’s theorem, we have that ∂V (bt)
∂b
is also nonincreasing in time. 
Proof of Theorem 6 Item 4
The change in the optimal PVI threshold over time is expressed as:
∂x(δ∗bct)
∂t
=
∂
(
V
(
bt
)
− V
(
(b− c− cδ∗bct)t) +
1−p(δ∗
bct
)
p(δ∗
bct
)
g(c, δ∗bct)
)
∂t
(B.53)
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We have through the result in Theorem 2 Item 3 that:
∂
(
V
(
bt
)
− V
(
(b− c− cδ∗bct)t)
)
∂t
≤ 0 (B.54)
In addition, Theorem 5 establishes the independence of δ∗bct over time, implying that
the derivative of the last component in the numerator of (B.53) with respect to t is
zero. It follows that
∂x(δ∗
bct
)
∂t
≤ 0. 
Proof of Theorem 6 Item 5
Without loss of generality, let x(δbct) = R, which implies by definition that when
the overbid rate δbct is used, the critical fund level at time t is B˙(δbct) = b. Now
consider the same overbid rate used at time t′ such that δbct = δbct′ where t
′ > t.
Given that x(δbct) is nondecreasing in t due to Theorem 6 Item 4, this implies x(δbct′) ≥
x(δbct) = R, which in turn indicates that the critical fund level B˙(δbct′) ≥ B˙(δbct). 
Proof of Theorem 6 Item 6
We show the correctness of this statement through a similar argument as in the
proof of Theorem 3 Item 5 above. Assume that the PVI threshold x(δbct) is nonde-
creasing in δbct. Without loss of generality, let x(δbct) = R, which implies by definition
that when the overbid rate δbct is used, the critical time T˙ (δbct) = t. Now consider
an overbid rate δ′bct such that δ
′
bct > δbct. Given that x(δbct) is nondecreasing in δbct,
this implies x(δ′bct) ≥ x(δbct) = R, which in turn indicates that the critical time
T˙ (δ′bct) ≥ T˙ (δbct). We note through a similar argument that if the latter condition
holds, then it would imply that x(δbct) has to be nondecreasing in δbct. 
Proof of Theorem 6 Item 7
Assume that the PVI threshold x(δbct) is nonincreasing in b. Without loss of
generality, let x(δbct) = R, which implies by definition that when the overbid rate δbct
165
is used, the critical time T˙ (δbct) = t. Now consider the same overbid rate used at
fund level b′ such that δbct = δb′ct where b
′ > b. Given that x(δbct) is nonincreasing
in b, this implies x(δb′ct) ≤ x(δbct) = R, which in turn indicates that the critical time
T˙ (δb′ct) ≤ T˙ (δbct). We note through a similar argument that if the latter condition
holds, then it would imply that x(δbct) has to be nonincreasing in b. 
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